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Abstract 
In this thesis it is argued that famine is a concatenation 
process caused by a severe shock to the economy which in 
turn leads to a series of socio-economic adjustments by the 
affected population. If the economic shock is sufficiently 
prolonged, then fallback strategies fail for vulnerable 
sections of the population. Unless the state intervenes to 
prevent mass migration and mass starvation, famine ensues. 
It is shown that in northern Ethiopia, severe shocks to the 
economy, in the form of rain failures, pest attacks and 
warfare have frequently disrupted agricultural production, 
often leading to famine in an economy and society 
overwhelmingly dependent upon agriculture for subsistence. 
The failure of Ethiopian society to adapt sufficiently to 
changing agricultural production conditions is explained 
historically. Excess extraction of surplus from the 
peasantry was undertaken by a ruling class which largely 
failed to reinvest its wealth in agriculture and industry, 
and these conditions still generally hold true under the 
present regime. 
The famine of 1983-85 is analysed in terms of a general 
socio-economic model of famine. It is shown that crop 
failures were severe and prolonged, leading to exceptional 
inflation of grain prices and erosion of fallback 
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strategies of highland peasants. These strategies included 
livestock sales, wage labour, trading, access to credit, 
consumption of famine foods, and migration out of the 
famine zone. 
The failure of the Ethiopian state to respond sufficiently 
to the famine reflected its prioritisation of other aimst 
which included warfare and agricultural collectivisation. 
Western governments were in turn unwilling to provide 
relief aid to a hostile regime. The result was a lack of 
substantive action by international relief agencies, many 
of whose staff sought to avoid responsibility for providing 
sufficient famine relief. Television exposure of the 
famine eventually forced an expansion of the international 
relief effort. 
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Preface: Background to the Thesis 
Data Collection and Methodology 
This thesis was begun in September 1983 and completed in 
September 1988. It was carried out on a part-time basis, and had 
to be built around other research and consultancy commitments. 
Fortunately, these frequently provided opportunities for the 
development of the thesis. 
I first became interested in the process of the development of 
famine in Ethiopia through my involvement in an ODA-funded 
research project (1983-84) on famine indicators in Ethiopia and 
Bangladesh. In many ways, the project approach was 
unsatisfactory, as it presumed that sufficient information would 
be available from official sources which would provide early 
warning for risk of famine to be assessed in a systematic 
fashion. In Ethiopia, basic data on the situation in the rural 
hinterland of the northern highlands - the traditionally most 
famine-prone region, were almost non-existent. At the same time, 
disturbing reports of famine were arising from the rebel 
administrations in this region, and from occasional Western 
visitors. I was keen therefore to get more information on actual 
peasant experience of the famine process as it developed. 
Unfortunately, I was consistently denied access to rural areas of 
the north under government control where famine victims could be 
found. I had to content myself with documentary evidence such as 
reports of crop-conditions and grain prices in parts of the 
provinces of Gonder and Wollo, supplemented by sparse 
documentation of conditions in the rebel-held areas of Tigray and 
Eritrea. Nevertheless, by the end of 1983 1 had become convinced 
that famine conditions in the north were widespread, and that the 
trickle of displaced victims of this process was about to become 
a flood. Accordingly, I wrote up the available evidence (Cutler 
1984), thinking that this might add documentary weight to the 
urgent calls for international assistance on both sides to 
contain the famine. 
The research so far was, however, heavily based on macro 
information. I was reduced to speculating about such phenomena 
as the nature and extent of grain price inflation in the centre 
of the famine zone; and the range of survival strategies that the 
peasantry could adopt. in my first article I had suggested that 
it would be possible to construct maps of grain prices which 
would help locate more precisely the zones where crop failures 
were at their worst, and I wanted to show that this could be 
done. I had also suggested a range of strategies the peasantry 
might adopt in order to survive, but hard evidence was required. 
I 
According to my predictions, famine victims would descend onto 
market towns and into established camps during 1984.1 rather 
callously hoped that this would give me an opportunity to 
interview some of them, in Sudan if not in Ethiopia. My chance 
came in December 1984, when I was able to append an unofficial 
trip to Kassala in eastern Sudan onto a consultancy visit. I 
managed to interview 100 famine refugees, with the capable 
assistance of a colleague, Jeremy Shoham. The results of this 
work, with the "macro" evidence collected previously, provide the 
core case study of the 1984-85 famine developed in the thesis, 
presented in chapters six to eight. 
Other consulting trips to Ethiopia brought me into contact with 
the institutions apparently responsible for alleviating the 
famine. At two critical periods in the calendar of failure of 
these institutions to respond effectively in March/April 1984 
and in August/September of the same year I was able to witness 
firsthand the ways in which evidence was ignored or manipulated 
to suit the purposes of decision-makers in the international aid 
agencies. I interviewed over 100 officials and voluntary agency 
staff, both formally and informally, in order to broaden my 
understanding of issues of response. I was a participant 
observer - lobbying enthusiastically, although largely 
ineffectually, for famine relief efforts to be radically 
enlarged. I also became involved in a review of the national 
early warning system, and organised a workshop bringing together 
providers and recipients of the information (held in September 
1984 and sponsored by UNICEF), which enabled me to focus on some 
of the key issuesand areas of disagreement between the agencies 
and the RRC. 
The latter experience convinced me of the necessity of 
understanding why the great institutions of humanitarian relief 
were unable or unwilling to do what I supposed they were mandated 
to do - that is to take timely and efficient action to prevent, 
or at least substantially to mitigate, disasters such as famines. 
In order to document the avoidance of institutional 
responsibility, I have drawn upon both published and unpublished 
sources (some obtained through my work with international 
organisations and therefore not always able to be attributed) as 
well as interviews with officials. I was also fortunate to have 
been able to meet Bernard Schaffer before his death, and became 
influenced by his ideas, which I found to have great explanatory 
power in terms of the apparent failure of response by the 
humanitarian organisations. The synthesis of his work and my own 
ideas is discussed in chapter one, and the evidence presented in 
chapter nine. 
I managed to view the belated, but massive relief operation of 
1985 in June of that year, while again on a UNICEF-sponsored 
visit to Ethiopia as part of the continuing review of the early 
warning system. The way in which the relief operation was 
conducted brought out yet more questions which required at least 
partial answers, this time regarding resource allocation by the 
various actors. This is easily the subject for another thesis, 
but I have tried to address some of the major issues in chapter 
10. These particularly concern the ways in which the controllers 
of famine relief resources (food, sheltýer and transport) direct 
them to suit their political objectives - such as to encourage 
resettlement (the government of Ethiopia); or to avoid economic 
development (the Western donors). 
Finally, I realised that a bald account of the famine, without 
historical and geographical background was unsatisfactory. I 
spent the latter part of my time on the thesis in developing this 
background material, which draws from many sources. Again, I was 
able through a consultancy to gain access to the FAO databases in 
1986.1 was also able to tap into some of the unpublished 
accounts emerging from the experience of the 1970s and early 
1980s. This information is presented in chapters two to five. 
Structure of the Thesis 
I 
The structure of the thesis may be summarised as follows. The 
first chapter reviews the important literature, and establishes 
the theoretical framework proposed to account for the development 
of famine. Chapter 2 introduces the political economy of 
Ethiopia, setting the scene for what follows. Chapter 3 
considers the history of famine in the country, revealing common 
themes of frequent crop production failure through rain failures, 
pest attacks and warfare, together with documentary evidence for 
peasant response to these events. Chapters 4 and 5 develop an 
explanation of vulnerability to famine in Ethiopia, which is 
rooted historically in the excessive extraction of surplus from 
the peasantry and the lack of reinvestment in the forces of 
production. This process has led directly to a dangerous degree 
of environmental degradation, with a concommitant increase in 
production failures. 
Chapters 6-8 present the case study of regional crop failures and 
the responses to these as expressed through grain price inflation 
(chapter 7) and peasant survival strategies through asset sales, 
labour migration, trading etc. (chapter 8). Evidence for the 
failure of institutional response is presented and discussed in 
chapter 91 while the progress and strategies of the relief effort 
are considered in chapter 10. Finally, chapter 11 summarises the 
major arguments and evidence by way of a conclusion. 
FAD and Entitlements 
It is perhaps necessary, given the recent debates in the 
literaturey to make my position on food availability decline 
(FAD) and entitlements (as developed by Professor Sen) quite 
clear. I consider FAD versus entitlements as a false dichotomy. 
At a high level of aggregation (eg national or even 
international) one can usually argue that there is not FAD. Data 
presented in chapter 5 of this thesis, showing food availability 
at national levelf appear to support the FAD thesis, although it 
is important to note that food production data have been until 
very recently highly suspect, subject to unscientific collection 
methods. 
However, at a regional level, the situation is very different, 
with very severe absolute declines in food production per caput 
having occurred repeatedly in famine years. Again, data are 
presented in chapter 5 to make this clear for our case study. It 
is argued that a severe shock to the economy causing agricultural 
production failures always precipitates the famine process in 
Ethiopia, both through reducing food production available for 
subsistence, and through its effects in reducing the marketed 
surplus, leading to rapid inflation of grain prices. This in 
turn triggers a collapse of effective demand, causing distress 
sales of assets and competition among impoverished farmers for 
scarce agricultural employment and other income-earning 
opportunities, such as trading. These strategies fail to arrest 
the slump in effective demand, especially as the markets for 
saleable assets such as livestock and labour become glutted and 
their prices fall. 
In Ethiopia, regional FAD is further aggravated by controls on 
inter-regional trade, meaning that food supplies cannot easily be 
brought into the affected regions, where purchasing power still 
exists. However, these controls are an aggravating factor, 
rather than a fundamental cause of famine. 
The FAD versus entitlements dichotomy is not only shown to be 
unhelpful in explaining the famine of 1983-85, but also the Wollo 
famine of 1972-73, which has been examined by Sen himself. There 
were undoubtedly severe sub-regional production failures, 
affecting the overall Wollo "food balance sheet". Sen agrees 
that this occurred, but notes that food exports from the region 
continued. He makes much of the fact that the grain market in 
the regional capital of Dessie in southern Wollo did not record 
inflation but neglects to mention that there was a doubling of 
grain prices in the rural hinterland -a fact which is recorded 
in the available literature. Sen pays no attention to 
alternative income sources of the peasantry, preferring to 
believe that crop failure destroyed their direct entitlements to 
food and left them with no other options. In fact, he makes a 
strong case for FAD at the sub-regional level, although not in a 
wider context. 
A sufficiency of food at a high level of aggregation is 
irrelevant to peasants who have no access to it, and Sen makes 
this case very well. Unfortunately, the question of how and why 
people lose their "entitlements" to food (especially in Ethiopia) 
is insufficiently addressed by entitlement analysis. When Sen 
suggests that famine happens when entitlements disappear, it begs 
the question as to why they disappear. It is a key contention in 
this thesis that an abnormal shock to the economy, causing FADr 
is essential to the process of famine development, as it destroys 
"entitlements" in various ways. Whether or not FAD may be 
measured at national (or even regional) level is irrelevant to 
the argument. Researchers will be hard-pressed to discover a 
famine, in Ethiopia or elsewhere, which was not triggered by a 
shock to the system of food production and distribution, whatever 
its eventual effect on the ex post national food balance sheet. 
Chapter 1: Theories of Famine 
1.1. Introduction 
This thesis investigates the process of development of the 
1983-85 famine in northern Ethiopia, taking into account 
its historical roots as well as proximate causes of 
famine. It is argued that the famine was a concatenation 
process triggered by a prolonged shock to the economy -a 
series of rain failures - which persisted to such an 
extent that the coping mechanisms of the affected 
peasantry eventually broke down on a large scale. In the 
absence of an adequate preventative measures by the State, 
mass destitution and elevated mortality resulted. The 
analysis is carried out according to a theoretical 
framework elaborated in this chapter. 
Famine is, as Seaman and Holt have observed, "both easily 
recognised and quite distinct from even the extremes of 
poverty" (Seaman and Holt 1980 p 284). It is an abnormal 
breakdown in access to food which leads to mass starvation 
among vulnerable groups or classes of people. Starvation 
occurs when a person is unable to meet his or her minimum 
nutritional requirements if eating some food - and 
is forced to metabolise tissue to an extent where bodily 
functions become impaired. There are different 
perspectives on the causes of breakdown in access to food, 
and a general lack of understanding of the processes 
leading to famine has in part contributed to the failure 
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of the international relief and development establishment 
to prevent famines developing on a large scale in modern 
times. 
A variety of situations are described in the literature as 
"famines", "food crises" or "food emergencies", and 
sometimes these terms are used interchangeably. In order 
to avoid confusion with terminology, it is worth making 
the following distinctions. A food crisis or food 
emergency is understood here to be an event necessitating 
extraordinary measures by the authorities to prevent mass 
starvation among vulnerable sections of the population. 
The term "food crisis" also implies a degree of change, or 
potential change, in society or government, so that 
government action is necessary to maintain the status quo. 
Famine conditions exist when elevated mortality would be 
likely to result in the absence of government 
intervention. Famine implies that starvation-related 
deaths are already occurring on a large scale. A fuller 
definition which includes causal factors, is as follows: 
Famine is an abnormal event, characterised by a breakdown 
in social relations giving rise to epidemic starvation and 
excess mortality. It is caused initially by a severe 
disruption in normal economic activity, principally but 
not exclusively brought about by the vagaries of climate, 
which leads to expectations of future scarcities of food 
among producers, traders and consumers. This in turn 
leads to-modes of social behaviour such as asset sales, 
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hoarding, speculation and the erosion of traditional 
social bonds / which 
themselves contribute to the 
development of famine conditions. When famine conditions 
have become fully established, so that large numbers of 
vulnerable people have become stripped of their assets and 
options and have begun to starve, there will be widespread 
mortality in excess of normal levels unless the 
authorities or other outside agencies intervene with 
effective relief and rehabilitation aid. Excess mortality 
is concentrated among certain classes, social groups and 
household members who are particularly vulnerable socio- 
economically or culturally. A corollary of this is the 
profit which can be made from famine by other dominant 
classes, social groups or households. This general 
explanation of the processes leading to famine is 
illustrated in figure 1.1. 
The general model described above implies several 
necessary conditions, but only one sufficient condition. 
Firstly, it is necessary that the shock to the economy 
should take place, and in largely agro-pastoralist 
economies such as Ethiopia, the shock usually has to be 
very severe and prolonged to result in mass destitution, 
for otherwise social adjustment mechanisms tend to absorb 
its effects. Prolonged drought is normally the catalyst 
for famine in Ethiopia, acting synergistically with pest 
attacks and sometimes exacerbated by warfare. Secondly, 
it is a necessary condition that the modes of social 
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behaviour described above take place, impoverishing the 
majority and enriching the few, but again, a recovery of 
the economy can take place and poor households can survive 
intact, although stripped of many of their assets. 
Finally, it is a sufficient condition that the State fails 
to prevent the final stages of the famine process - mass 
migrationt mass starvationt elevated morbidity and 
mortality, and social chaos. The reasons for the failure 
of the State, and by extension the international 
humanitarian organisations to relieve famine will shortly 
be discussed, following an exposition of current and 
historical theories of famine. 
We shall begin by considering the classical theory that 
absolute shortages of food in a given geographical area 
cause famine, and show that apart from being quite rare 
events, absolute shortages of food are neither necessary 
nor sufficient conditions for the onset of famine. Later 
we shall consider more recent approaches to famine 
analysis, in particular the notion that the behaviour of 
markets is a major factor in the development of famine. 
At its most sophisticated, this argument has been , 
elaborated by Sen (1981) into a new theory, known as the 
entitlement approach. Senr however. 'has his critics, and 
their views shall also be considered. A general model of 
famine behaviour will then be proposed, which describes 
some of the major features of famine discussed in the 
literature. 
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While the general model describes famine behaviour common 
to both rich and poor economies, in the former famine is 
only likely to be encountered under wartime seige 
conditions. It is widely recognised that famines today 
occur only in parts of sub-saharan Africa, although famine 
conditions can be encountered in some parts of South Asia 
and Latin America. Thereforer some of the key features of 
the political economy of famine are brought out prior to 
the analysis of famine vulnerability and famine behaviour 
in Ethiopia. It is argued that the roots of the 
vulnerability of the poor to a collapse in access to food 
in famine-prone areas are historical and reflect the 
excessive extraction of surplus product by the ruling 
classes and (to a, lesser extent) foreign investors. The 
failure of these elites to reinvest sufficiently in 
economic development, particularly in agriculture, has 
compounded rural poverty, and has forced the peasantry to 
degrade its own resource base, leading to a crisis of 
agricultural production and social reproduction. While 
these factors all contribute to increasing the 
vulnerability of poor households to famine, the event 
itself is ultimately the result of a failure of the Stater 
and by extension richer States allied to it, to make 
- famine control a priority. 
1.2. Food Availability Decline as the Major Causal Factor 
The "Food Availability Decline" (FAD) theory states that 
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famines occur when droughts, floods or other natural 
disasters cause crop failures, which in turn lead to a 
critical reduction in food availability below subsistence 
requirements for the affected population, causing mass 
starvation. 
The first proponent of the FAD theory was Thomas Malthus 
(1766-1834). He stated that because food production grew 
arithmetically while population grew geometrically 
eventually human beings in any society would breed 
themselves into starvation. "Natural checks' of war, 
famine and disease would control their numbers, unless 
they did so voluntarily. Malthus advocated abstinence, in 
the absence of any contraceptive techniques. The present- 
day 'developed countries' did not experience FAD through 
population growth. Instead, they increasingly managed to 
control disease, although not being so successful with 
warfare. At the same time, the industrial revolution 
increased the volume of economic activity, and increased 
the overall demand for labour. 
Nevertheless, the opening up of rich agricultural land in 
the New World, and the development of agricultural science 
and techniques of production did not lead to an 
eradication of famine. The problem was rife in India 
during the 19th centuryt while Ireland experienced a 
famine in 1845-49 which led to the death or emigration of 
about two-fifths of the population. The recent famines in 
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Ethiopia (1973-74), the Sahel (1972-74), Bangladesh (1974- 
75), and the famines in Africa of the early-mid 1980s, 
have given new life to the Malthusian thesis, which has 
been part of a general concern over the relationship 
between man and his environment which has become popular 
during the last two decades or so (e. g. Dumont 1974; 
Timberlake 1985). 
other Explanations of Famine 
The FAD thesis cannot escape criticism on both empirical 
and theoretical grounds. Ireland exported food as well as 
people during its years of famine; and Sen has shown that 
the widespread Bengal famine of 1943 had apparently 
occurred when per caput agricultural production was 
greater than in previous years (Sen 1981). It was 
recognised then, as it is now, that famine can be caused 
through a failure in effective demand. The laissez-faire 
policies of the British government had meant that food was 
not sold in Ireland in sufficient quantities because there 
was not enough demand for it. Prices were too high, and 
the cash available to the poor too low. The law of supply 
and demand proved to be a pitiless one. 
Governments did not always allow market forces their head. 
There was market intervention in Bengal in 1943, but this 
was applied on an insufficient scale, being directed 
mainly at urban workers in key industries at a late stage 
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in the famine process. The death rate grew to an 
estimated three million, while there were feeble, attempts 
at famine relief 1. These attempts were later to be 
strongly criticised by the Famine Inquiry Commission, set 
up to investigate the causes of the famine. This led to 
recommendations for greater efficiency in distributing 
famine relief. 
Thus,, as Seaman and Holt argue (op cit), there have been 
until recently three distinct causes of famine identified 
by writers on the subject: these being FAD; failures in 
demand; and failures in intervention. These three causes 
can be related to each other, for a fýilure of food supply 
raises food prices and bring about a failure of effective 
demand, which necessitates intervention, which again fails 
where there is insufficient attention paid to the affected 
population (notably the rural poor) and there is a famine. 
A famine is of course mass starvationt which according to 
Malthus is unavoidable given the primary environmental 
constraint which caused the FAD in the first place. 
The above argument was roughly the state of the art of 
accounting for famines in the late 1970s, when there was a 
reappraisal. Beginning with Seaman and Holts' work let us 
consider whether this reappraisal is producing new and 
valuable insights into the causes of famine. 
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Theories of Failures in Demand as a Cause of Famine 
Seaman and Holt argue that an analytical framework for the 
study of famine should be able to account for "a number of 
(its) observed features". They assert that: firstly, the 
FAD approach is not always applicable, for there can be 
local famine in a good year, and no famine in a bad year. 
Secondly, the incidence of famine may fluctuate in one 
place over considerable lengths of time. For example, in 
India under the British, famine was not a very common 
problem before their arrival, became frequent, and then 
disappeared again from 1903-1943 (Bhatia 1967). Thirdly, 
famine can occur very quicklyl there is not always a "slow 
onset" of starvation as food supply gradually peters out. 
They go on to argue that the major features of a famine 
can be understood through the consideration of five main 
subjects. These are: (i) the food market and its 
behaviour under changing supply and demand conditions; 
(ii) monetary incomes of consumers; (iii) the extent of 
the population's involvement in the market; (iv) the 
potential for State involvement in the-market; and (v) the 
potential for governmental intervention in times of food 
crisis. Actually, Seaman and Holt note that these are not 
particularly new insights as "many of the principles 
involved in this discussion were clearly known to the 
Chinese by 400 B. C. " (ibid p 284). 
Giving the experience of Bangladesh and Ethiopian famines 
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as evidence, the authors conclude that famine is often 
caused by abnormal fluctuations in grain prices following 
"crop failure and other insults to the economy" (ibid p 
295). Therefore, impoverished people heavily dependent 
upon the market for food are more likely to suffer. 
Furthermore, a slight FAD may cause a much larger decline 
in the marketed surplus of food. Fluctuations in the 
marketed surplus will cause speculation by traders 
involved in its buying and selling; while as prices climb 
producers may sell less surplus and speculate themselvest 
leading to further artificial shortages. The rise in 
price of such a basic wage good as food means that people 
who do not grow their own food lose purchasing power over 
it, while at the same time there will be an increase in 
the number of households demanding food on the market. 
Anyone who pays cash for food will find the real value of 
his or her money falling very quickly. Extra food does 
not flow into the region because the falling real value of 
money incomes reduces effective demand. A situation like 
that of the Irish famine develops, where market forces 
operated against the interests of poor consumers and 
brought about their deaths. 
Spitz has shown that it is not merely consumers who can 
suffer from declining food consumption as a result of the 
market mechanism (Spitz 1980). Using a mathematical 
model, he demonstrates that in the event of a drought 
reducing the output of peasant farmers, the marketed 
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surplus is affected disproportionately. The smaller the 
proportion of marketed surplus in relation to production, 
the larger the proportional reduction in marketed surplus 
in a bad year. For example, a farmer who produces 100 
quintals of rice and sells 20 in a normal year will sell 
only 10 quintals of rice in a bad year if he experiences a 
10 per cent drop in production. In order to maintain his 
subsistence supply, the surplus sales are halved. If 
there is a substantial shortfall in production, (less than 
20 quintals in this case), the marginal peasant will still 
fail to meet his consumption needs and may be forced to 
sell some of his assets to supplement his household's food 
requirements. Such "distress selling" of assets will 
lower their market value, as other marginal peasants will 
be selling at the same time. This is a very common 
feature of agrarian crises in general, for example, Jodha 
(1975) has noted that farm implements and animals were 
selling at half to a quarter of their normal price during 
the 1963-64 drought in Rajasthan. Therefore, droughts and 
other natural disasters can accentuate inequalities 
between classes of the peasantry; and should be considered 
in the light of an entire socio-economic system rather 
than as mere environmental constraints. Inequalities may 
even feed-back through the state and affect the world 
political economy - where countries require food aid,, but 
only get it at a heavy political and economic price. This 
happened, for example, when Bangladesh was forced to end 
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its jute trade with Cuba as a precondition for receiving 
food aid from the USA during the 1974-75 famine (McHenry 
and Bird 1977). 
Meanwhile, Seaman and Holt argue that famine is not simply 
caused by FAD, which obtains (at least on a regional 
level) as a necessary, but not sufficient condition. It 
is as much to do with the behaviour of the market, the 
availability of stocks (which are dependent upon storage 
facilities as well as extra supplies) and the efficiency 
of public distribution. They argue that as food shortages 
are exacerbated or even caused by the market then food aid 
should be sold on the market as a means of Kestoring it to 
an even keel. Presumably, if food is sold cheaply enough 
then the market will stabilize and people will be able to 
buy as much food as they need as its price drops and their 
real incomes rise. Again, if this were to happen, traders 
would have to compete and food would become even cheaper. 
Hence the authors argue that such an approach is 
"rational" and should be considered in the light of 
failures in free public distribution of food following 
interventions by governments and international agencies. 
Whether it is practical depends upon the willingness and 
ability of the State to intervene in a manner which 
requires a very much more active role than in simply 
facilitating the provision of free food by foreign 
agencies. The success of such intervention also 
critically depends upon its timing. Mesfin Wolde Mariam 
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(1984) notes that grain was sold cheaply by the 
authorities during the Ethiopian famine of 1968, but very 
little was actually bought as the famine-affected 
population had by that time exhausted its sources of 
income. 
The above analyses represent a considerable break from the 
old theories, particularly FAD. They complement some 
previous work done on the Ethiopian famine by Seaman and 
Holt in conjunction with Rivers and Bowden (1976). The 
latter is noteworthy because it shows how famine can 
develop very quickly. When aid arrived it went to the 
Wollo district where the famine was already nearly over 
and did not find its way to the Harerghe province to the 
south where famine was developing. Harerghe was ignored 
until it was too late. 
The interesting point about this case is that the authors 
mention that pastoralists in the famine area suffered very 
badly. This seems to have occurred not only because their 
animals died but also because more animals had to be sold 
to get the necessary cash with which to buy grain. The 
price of cattle was reduced while the price of grain was 
rising. The barter terms of trade moved so far against 
the pastoralists that the value of the remaining cattle 
fell to 15 percent of their pre-famine purchasing power. 
As a result the herdsmen began to starve. Seaman and Holt 
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did not develop this crucial point about relations of 
exchange between groups of producers in their 1980 paper, 
preferring instead to concentrate on the behaviour of the 
market in relation to cash sales of grain. To develop the 
argument further, we should now consider Sen's (1981) 
essay, Poverty and Famines, which is the culmination of 
more than a decade of work, and which attempts to 
expand the explanatory base of a new, possible general 
theory of famine. 
The Exchange Entitlement Thesis 
Sen attempts to generalise about famines, taking as his 
starting point the "sudden collapse" of food consumption 
which characterises a famine, and focusing on this, as a 
definitive feature, rather than on "regular starvation" 
which characterises undernutrition. He notes that famine 
does not affect all groups of people equally, some starve 
while others do not. In fact, Sen states that there has 
probably never been a famine in which everybody suffered 
equally. This is not really a new idea, the work by 
Seaman and Holt has hinted at this possibility, although 
perhaps has not not'ed it explicitly. At the same time,. 
Spitz does make it clear that farmers with only a small 
surplus to sell will suffer disproportionately in bad 
years. what is interesting is Sen's assertion that some 
people living in a famine area might not suffer at all; or 
even that they might profit from a famine. Again, this 
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has been hinted at, Spitz and Jodha having shown that 
distress sales of assets occur as small farmers become 
more desperate to feed themselves. Sen develops the 
argument that famines affect people unequally, and at the 
same time accentuate inequalities. 
Sen is concerned to analyse changes in people's 
entitlements to food. He does not accept that we should 
consider peasant societies in famine areas as largely 
"self-provisioning" as Spitz does; as primarily dependent 
on cash income through involvement in the market, as 
Seaman and Holt argue; or as largely dependent upon the 
terms of trade between two commodities as was the case 
with the pastoralists in Ethiopia. In an economy based on 
private ownership of the means of production, people may 
be considered to have a set of "exchange entitlements" to 
its fruits. These entitlements are based on a mixture of 
several given "endowments", such as access to or ownership 
of land, labour power and capital. One can obtain 
resources through trading (with or without the use of 
money); by actually producing (Sen also calls this a 
direct entitlement); by working (selling one's labour 
power); by inheritance; or through transfer payments like 
interest on money deposited in a bank. of course, any one 
group of entitlements may involve the interaction of 
several factors which would modify it slightly. Sen gives 
an example of rationing in a market economy. Each bundle 
of entitlements that one has can be related to the other 
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to build up a "map" of exchange entitlements. If a 
person's "E-mapped" set of entitlements falls below a 
critical level then he or she will starve. Sen calls this 
set of below-par entitlements the "starvation set". 
In his analysis of four different famines (in Bengal, - 
Ethiopia, the Sahel and Bangladesh) Sen is concerned to 
find out how the starvation set was reached; that is how 
relations of entitlement were affected, and under what 
conditions. His particular concern has been to demolish 
the proposition that famine is inevitably and necessarily 
caused by FAD. A brief examination of two of the above 
case studies will demonstrate the weakness of the FAD 
case, and it will also be seen that Sen's entitlement 
approach purports to be a general theory of famine 
causation. 
1.6. The Bengal Famine of 1943 
Sen carefully documents a case for arguing that there was 
not a shortfall in production precipitating the Bengal 
famine; indeed, 1942 had been a relatively good year both 
in terms of absolute and per caput production. The famine 
victims were overwhelmingly rural people from a handful of 
occupational groups - agricultural labourers, fishermen 
and artisans. Therefore there was a "class basis of 
destitution". These groups suffered because their E-maps 
were heavily dependent in each case upon one baser selling 
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labour in the case of the landless agriculturalists; and 
selling commodities in exchange for cash to buy food 
(selling labour indirectly) for the last two groups. The 
price of rice rocketed, while the cash result of the 
labourers, fishermen and artisans' entitlement bundles did 
not: they were unable to buy enough food, and so starved. 
The groups of the poor who did not suffer so badly were 
those who produced foodcrops directly - Spitz's "self- 
provisioning" peasants and share-croppers. 
If the Bengal famine was not caused by FAD, then what did 
cause it? Sen argues that the wartime inflationary boom 
had already begun the process of entitlement erosion. This 
was compounded by speculation and hoarding following an 
"indifferent" winter crop which intensified shortfalls in 
, surplus reaching the market. This situation could have 
been defused through prompt government intervention, but 
half-hearted attempts at foodgrains procurement only made 
things worse, for speculation became even more intense 
with the eventual abandonment of price-control. By the 
time the government had regained control several million 
people had died. 
Sen's analysis of the Bengal famine has come under strong 
attack from Bowbrick on both empirical and theoretical 
grounds (Bowbrick 1986t 1987). In direct contradiction to 
( Sen, Bowbrick argues that there was a major food supply 
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shortage in Bengal during 1943. He further argues that 
there was little or no hoarding or witholding of food 
stocks through speculation, citing contemporary sources as 
stating that there was a widespread apprehension of 
shortage amongst traders, and that house-to-house searches 
for hoarded grain organised by the government failed to 
produce very much grain. 
Bowbrick's alternative account of the famine suggests a 
rather different chain of causation. To begin with, he 
argues that the Japanese invasion of Burma had reduced 
exported supplies to rice-deficit India. Rice prices had 
risen throughout 1942 primarily as a result of the 
blockade, rather than through a wartime inflationary boom. 
The cyclone of October 1942 caused immense damage, killing 
an estimated 14,000 people, 190,000 cattle and destroying 
some 30 per cent of the winter rice crop. This reduced 
carryover into 1943. The reduction in grain supplies 
caused further inflation, and famine developed during the 
monsoon season before the major aman harvest, between July 
and November. The famine only ended after this date 
because the government increased its imports, which 
coincided with a reasonable harvest. 
Bowbrick and Sen have since entered into an acrimonious 
debate. Much of their controversy has centred upon the 
reliability of the available statistics. Bowbrick 
continues to assert that as the agricultural statistics 
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are based on subjective estimates made by district 
officers they are subject to such large errors that they 
are useless for famine analysis. He nevertheless 
continues to argue on the basis of other evidence that 
there were major supply shortfalls, and that even the 
population of Calcutta was forced to reduce its 
consumption during the famine. Bowbrick is particularly 
scathing about the means by which, in the absence of FAD, 
the favoured one million industrial workers (who were 
guaranteed food rations) could have increased its 
consumption by enough to deny sufficient food to 40 
million rural people. This, he says, is implied by Sen's 
entitlement theory of famine. 
Sen has replied to these criticisms by noting that the 
data on production and consumption were subjected by him 
to analysis on the basis of several different assumptions, 
all of which proved fatal to the FAD thesis. Sen accepts 
that the data are far from perfect, but notes that the 
other sources cited by Bowbrick are equally flimsy. This 
is particularly the case with the observations of the 
grain trade, whom Sen says had a vested interest in 
promoting the notion that there was a grain shortage. He 
also disputes Bowbrick's assessment of the extent of 
effective demand in Calcutta, arguing that it was in 
excess of one million employees, and that dependents 
should be taken into account. Furthermore, if the cyclone 
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was a prime agent of the price rise of 1942-43, Sen wishes 
to know why the price of rice was lower two months after 
the cyclone than just before it. 
Allen (1986) has attempted to mediate between the two 
points of view. He chides the participants in the debate 
for not conducting it in a less vituperative manner and 
suggests that while Sen's contribution to the literature 
is widely recognised, he might be well-advised to take 
more note of the role of FAD in famine causation. Allen 
considers that Bowbrick is right to take Sen to task for 
relying too much on poor data. Allen also makes an 
interesting point, derived from Bhatia (1967), by noting 
that the marketed supply of grain in British India was 
highly elastic, and that this factor would necessarily 
have a major effect on the availability of food to non- 
producers. This reinforces Spitz's view which has already 
been discussed in this chapter. 
The dispute between Bowbrick and Sen seems set to 
continue. Yet even if Sen is proved entirely wrong in 
terms of his analysis of food availabilitý, which is 
unlikely unless some startling new source of information 
is revealed,, his entitlement theory will still be valid. 
FAD destroys direct ownership entitlements of producers. 
At the same time, Bowbrick does not explain why certain 
occupation groups should be more vulnerable to famine than 
others. 
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Nevertheless, Bowbrick's notion of FAD being a trigger of 
the famine process, leading to inflation and eventually to 
starvation through denying food to the poor seems to be 
more plausible than Sen's notion of massive price hikes 
caused by a wartime boom. As Bowbrick points out, there 
was wartime inflation in other parts of India, but not 
famine. 
1.7. The Ethiopian Famine (1972-1974) 
Sen has also attempted to explain the Ethiopian famine of 
1972-74 in terms of the entitlement approach. This had 
two phases in different areas, as we have already seen. 
In both areas (Wollo and Harerghe) the pastoralists 
suffered, although large numbers of agriculturalists died 
in the former case. At first sight it might seem that the 
Wollo famine was entirely a result of FAD, because there 
had been two successive rainfall failures. However, these 
had only drastically affected the north-eastern part of 
the country. The rest of Ethiopia was having average 
harvests, and aggregate per-caput food availability 
remained at roughly normal levels. In this case, 
according to Sen, low purchasing power for the province 
was at fault, or more specifically of those whose direct 
exchange entitlements had been demolished. Farmers and 
pastoralists could not buy food which was selling at 
normal prices, because they could not generate money 
incomes sufficient for their consumption needs. The grain 
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and labour market mechanisms therefore directly excluded 
them. 
The pastoralists suffered badly from drought because much 
of their fallback grazing had been taken over by 
commercial farming. Therefore their tolerance of drought 
had fallen - which gives strength to Spitz's (op 
cit) assertion that a drought can be defined in terms of 
an entire political economy. As their cattle began to die 
in large numbers, the pastoralists' losses were compounded 
by the worsening terms of trade for grain caused by a glut 
of animals on the market, and they too began to die. 
As with the Bengal case, there are empirical grounds for 
disputing Sen's account of the Wollo famine. It will be 
shown in chapter 7 that grain prices did rise during the 
famine in areas suffering crop failures. Furthermore, 
evidence from refugees fleeing the most recent famine in 
northern Ethiopia suggests that peasant farmers do not 
depend entirely on own production for their entitlement to 
food. Indeedt they are likely to be thrown onto the 
labour market in growing numbers, and will increasingly 
take up trading on their own account. Poor peasants are 
not passive victims of faminef and show great ingenuity in 
devising ways of supplementing their incomes. 
According to Sen, the examples of famine in Bengal and 
Ethiopia demonstrate the weakness of the FAD approach and 
the inability of the market approach to wholly explain the 
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processes leading to famine. Sen argues that although the 
Ethiopian case appears to have been caused by FAD, the 
decline in food availability was only a regional problem. 
The government would have had no difficulty in procuring 
food from other areas to make up the losses. The 
situation could not be left to the market because there 
was insufficient effective demand. At the same time, Sen 
feels that there are few grounds for arguing that the 
foodgrain market was behaving abnormally. Prices were not 
much higher than usual. The entitlement base of a section 
of the population had been wiped out, which was the real 
problem. 
Similarly, the fisherman and artisans in Bengal, and the 
pastoralists in Hararge suffered sudden erosion of their 
entitlement bases because they were so dependent upon 
exchanging only one type of commodity for food. During 
famines, people with a more diversified bundle of 
entitlements were more likely to survive. Farmers who 
could generate sufficient income from trade, or who could 
live off credit and charity would survive in both cases. 
over-specialization in a particular resource base (whether 
through direct production, employment or trading) would 
seem to lessen one's chances of survival in famine-prone 
regions. 
sen's exchange entitlement thesis seeks to show that the 
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insufficient intervention argument examines only part of 
the whole process leading to famine. He believes that FAD 
is only barely relevant to the Ethiopian case, and cannot 
explain the Bengal experience. The demand deficiency 
approach explains a lot more, but relies upon "market 
abnormality" as an explanation for famine, which according 
to Sen cannot be said to have occurred in the Ethiopian 
case. 
While Sen's work has attracted a great deal of interest 
recently, and has begun to influence policy-makers 
internationally (such that the term 'entitlement' has even 
begun to appear in discussion papers on the food policy of 
aid agencies), there has been criticism from the political 
left. Ashok Mitra in his book review 'The Meaning of 
Meaning , published in Economic and Political Weekly 
(1982), tartly argues that Sen is saying nothing new, and 
is merely dressing up self-evident truths in economic 
language: 
*our great-grandmothers, who, Amartya Sen will kindly 
pardon the reviewer, were altogether innocent of the 
notion of 'non-negative orthant of n-dimensional real 
space', knew about these common factors underlying 
famines. The poor have little of assets or incomes; since 
the exchange value of these assets and incomes goes down 
further in the years of famine, poor people starve and 
occasionally die. Amartya Sen, I am afraid, has not said 
anything beyond what our great-grandmothers were already 
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aware of.... " (ibid p 488). 
Rangasami (1985) also considers that the substance of 
Sen's theory is implicit in the literature, especially in 
the Indian famine codes of the late nineteenth century. 
She further argues that famine is a long-drawn out 
process, and is not a "sudden collapse" in access to food, 
as Sen believes. Rangasami distinguishes three phases of 
famine - dearth, famishment and morbidity - to describe 
the phases undergone by the poor in reaching the point of 
destitution, and she criticises definitions of famine 
which ignore this long-onset aspect of the phenomenon. 
Rangasami's comments are very relevant to this study of 
the most recent famine in Ethiopia. The victims 
themselves argue that their problems began at least 4-5 
years before the last stages of famine - mass migration, 
rapid increase in morbidity and excess mortality - became 
apparent to the authorities and foreign observers. 
Nevertheless, Sen has carried out a valuable exercise in 
showing that it is possible for famines to occur in the 
absence of absolute shortages of food either at national 
or local level, and that it is important to identify 
precisely which groups or classes of people are most 
vulnerable to famine. However, in this study we shall 
have cause to take issue with him over his 
misunderstanding of the genesis of the 1972-73 Wollo 
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famine in Ethiopia, the proximate cause of which was in 
fact serious crop failure. moreover, it will be argued 
that famine is, always preceded by a shock to the 
production system, whether drought, pest attack, warfare, 
typhoon etc. or some combination of these factors. Indeed, 
it would be difficult to find cases of famine where some 
acute shortfall in crop production, albeit locally, did 
not happen. Furthermore, it will be argued that 
exceptional grain price inflation did take place during 
the Wollo famine of 1972-73. Howeverl neither of these 
facts undermine Sen's general theory. Crop failures 
destroy direct ownership entitlements of the peasant 
producer, while grain price inflation erodes exchange 
entitlements. 
Currey (1984) is not convinced that Sen's entitlement 
approach has improved explanatory power for another 
reason: "Sen's 'entitlement approach' does not ... 
explain' the causes of famine" (ibid p 186), instead it 
details the impact of famine. For Currey, famine is best 
explained as a complex-concatenation of events - their 
coming together in space and time - which results in a 
breakdown of the bonds of reciprocity which normally 
ensure the survival of 'marginal members' of society. 
Currey gives two encapsulated examples, one of which is 
reproduced here as an illustration: 
The 1974-75 famine in Bangladesh "in the wake of the 
independence war; the administration was inexperienced; 
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relations with aid donors were strained; government 
personnel in rural areas were left unpaid. Annual 
flooding was severely out of phase with the agricultural 
calendar in both 1973 and 1974. The dumping of sterile 
sand and the ponding of flood water on the fields lessened 
the need for agricultural labour. The government's 
initial response was minimal amidst widespread 
speculation, hoarding and smuggling by certain people. " 
(ibid p 187). 
similarly, the Ethiopian famine of 1983-84 can be 
presented as a concatenation phenomenon as follows: 
following the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie a 
Marxist-Leninist inspired military government pursued a 
relentless war against Eritrean seperatists and regional 
dissidents. This necessitated large arms imports from its 
strategic ally, the USSR, thereby alienating the largest 
potential food donors and minimising the amount of foreign 
exchange available for developing agriculture and for 
purchasing food imports. The agricultural base was 
already fragile through centuries of over-exploitation 
caused by a peasantry which had itself been overexploited 
by feudal landlords. A devastating drought which 
persisted for as long-as ten years in some areas was 
therefore allowed to develop unchecked. Grain prices. 
rocketed and livestock prices fell. The employment 
available to the poor and landless sections of the. 
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peasantry as an alternative source of income was reduced 
by government policy and crop failures both in Ethiopia 
and Sudan. Warfare in the countryside made it impossible 
for agency officials to assess properly the scale of the 
disaster, and annual appeals for food aid were ignored by 
Western donors who were unwilling to sustain a hostile 
regime. 
While concatenation process models are undoubtedly very 
useful for describing famine, the nature of the event 
itself is more than a mere "sloughing off" of marginal 
members of the family, as Currey goes on to describe 
(Currey op cit). Neither is famine merely an extension of 
chronic levels of poverty and undernutrition, a point of 
view put forward by certain scholars of South Asian 
conditions in particular (eg, Muqtada 1981; Rangasami pp 
cit). Famine ought to be seen as qualitatively different 
from extreme poverty if the term is to have any real 
meaning, for full-blown famine results in a widespread 
collapse of the social and moral order that distinguishes 
it from chronic conditions of food deprivation. Greenough 
(1982) vividly recalls this process in his accounts of 
interviews with survivors of the 1943 famine in Bengal. 
During this dreadful time, families were torn apart and 
parents attempted to sell or even kill their children. 
Thus the moral values of idealised "Golden Bengal" when 
the rich dealt with the poor with patronising affection, 
and when children were treated with great indulgence, were 
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turned completely upside down. Similarly, Tigrayans 
recall famines as the years when "brother betrays 
brother". Yet there are degrees of famine, depending 
upon the intensity and duration of starvation, which in 
turn largely depends upon the availability of relief. 
Those families which reach relief camps often do stay 
together - although mothers may well compete with their 
children for food. It is only when relief is hopelessly 
inadequate that we see human beings least likely to 
maintain normal intra-familial'relationships. This can 
also occur when a society'lives permanently under the 
threat of mass starvation. The anthropologist Colin 
Turnbull discovered a whole culture - the Ik people of 
north-eastern Uganda - living lives apparently devoid of 
love, affection, kindness and charity (Turnbull 1972). 
These emotions seemed to have been sloughed off in the 
brutal quest for survival. 
Some famines certainly are worse than others, while some 
are referred to only as "food crises". Yet in every food 
crisis - such as in Bangladesh in 1979,1982 and 1984 - we 
would probably be able t'o find pockets of mass starvation 
on a local scale (see RDRS 1980). Politicians do not like 
to use the term famine, or even "food crisis" or "food 
emergency". Indeed, they might steadfastly refuse to- 
acknowledge any problems at all even when outright famine 
openly exists, as in Sudan in 1984 (cutler and Shoham, 
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1985). We shall consider the politics of the response to 
famine in the next section. 
The Response to Famine 
The response to the threat of famine can be very different 
between countries with similar levels of per capita income 
and associated vulnerability to famine. We can take as 
examples Ethiopia and Bangladesh, both of which suffered 
famine conditions in early 1984, but only one of which 
allowed these to degenerate into outright famine. 
Although in both cases the governments reacted to the 
threat of famine by asking foreign donors for aidt only 
the Bangladesh government (GOB) actually purchased grain 
on world commercial markets, thereby adding substance to 
its claims for assistance. The government of Ethiopia 
(GOE), on the other hand, never bought grain on commercial 
markets to supply its relief effort. As we have shall see 
in the next chapter, the result has been a loss of 
international credibility and resources for GOE. By the 
time foreign donors became convinced of the magnitude of 
famine in Ethiopia, it was too late for bulk grain 
shipments to prevent many deaths. 
However, this interpretation is only part of the reason 
for the failures of foreign donors to respond to famine in 
Ethiopia. The major reason is in fact Ethiopia's 
political and strategic wedlock with the USSR. Ethiopia 
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provides military facilities and a willing experiment in 
Soviet systems of political and economic management in 
return for the USSR's military and economic aid. Ethiopia 
is particularly tied to the USSR through massive imports 
of arms used for its civil wars. The World Bank estimates 
that up to 40 per cent of the Ethiopian national budget is 
given over to military expenditure. Consequentlyl the 
Western alliance is unwilling to give aid to Ethiopia for 
developmental purposes, and disburses substantial amounts 
of emergency assistance only for humanitarian reasons: in 
the face of widely publicised unambiguous need and the 
pressure of humanitarian politics in the West. Relief aid 
to Ethiopia commensurate with actual needs only began to 
arrive in January 1985, some three months after extensive 
television coverage of the famine which was by now 
affecting an estimated 7 million people in nine provinces 
(RRC 1985). 
By contrast, Bangladesh is favoured for Western 
development aid. Its strategic position (sandwiched 
between non-aligned India and Burmay but close to major 
spheres of Communist influence), its pro-Western outlook 
and historical ties make the country a priority aid 
recipient for Western governments. Famines tend to cause 
political instability, so they must be prevented if the 
weakness of a regime is not to become exposed. Thus it is 
in Western political interests to prevent famine in 
Bangladesh and to allow it to occur in Ethiopia. These 
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political realities have wider consequences. A relatively 
stable status quo in Bangladesh has the effect of 
preventing the overthrow of the big landlord class which 
holds power in the countryside and whose removal is a 
necessary condition for accelerated agricultural growth 
(pace India; Januzzi and Peach 1980). Western interests 
may therefore be in conflict here, as modern agricultural 
technology is being promoted by western development 
agencies at the same time as the rural elite is being 
sustained. The status quo in Ethiopia guarantees 
continual warfare, which ensures that economic development 
in some of the most famine-prone regions of the country is 
virtually impossible. However, if the warfare could be 
prevented through political means, the 'grass roots' 
structure and political will to develop the agricultural 
base for the benefit of the peasantry do existr although 
the precise form these approaches would take may not be to 
the liking of many western donors. The peasantry has been 
organised by the government into "associations", which are 
required to implement directives from the politburo 
concerning initiatives in education, health, rural 
development, military service etc. Many of these 
initiatives are organised on a collective basis, so that 
even with peace, Ethiopia's socialistic outlook would not 
make it a prime target for Western development aid. 
Ultimately, however, the responsibility for famine 
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prevention lies at the door of the government of the 
country experiencing famine. Even poor countries can 
obtain at least some commercially-purchased food from 
abroad, although much of this will necessarily be used to 
feed the politically volatile urban populations. 
Nevertheless, commercial purchases from abroad would take 
some pressure off the peasantry if they were to displace 
"surpluses" that would otherwise have to be extracted from 
a food-deficit rural sector. Like Bangladesh, in 1984 
Kenya moved swiftly to purchase maize when harvest 
failures in the normally grain-surplus highlands 
threatened national food supplies. Kenya was able to 
contain the threat of possible famine with the aid of 
these purchases as a stop-gap measure before the arrival 
of western-donated food aid. The latter was, of course, 
quickly forthcoming as Kenya is considered an ally of the 
West. 
There is one further possible reason for the Ethiopian 
government's unenthusiastic pursuit of famine control. 
Many of the traditionally worst-hit areas also harbour 
guerrilla fighters and the populations who support them. 
Famine is a convenient weapon of war which can be used to 
help destroy enemies and to favour friends. There is 
compelling evidence, presented in chapter 10 of this 
study, that food aid under the control of government was 
denied in those areas where the liberation fronts 
operated. Food aid was available only to government 
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forces, militia, and loyalist civilians in these areas, or 
else was given out only as an inducement for resettlement 
of households, or to facilitate the conscription of able- 
bodied men. However, in general the use of food aid for 
these purposes can be seen as opportunistic. As we shall 
see in chapter 3, the Ethiopian State has traditionally 
done little to aid rural famine victims, be they passive 
supporters of government or active opponents. 
Institutional Behaviour During Famine 
Although the political context of famine is of paramount 
importance fbran understanding of apparent failures of 
response (which may in fact reflect succesful policy), 
there is, at a deeper level, a corresponding failure of 
international humanitarian institutions to respond which 
reflects not only the political context of famine but also 
the inherent behavioural patterns of the institutions 
themselves (Schaffer and Lamb 1981; Clay and Schaffer, 
1984). We shall consider the essential features of these 
behavioural patterns after a brief review of the available 
literature. 
To date, virtually no academic work has been done on the 
behaviour of humanitarian institutions during famines and 
other emergencies. Most of the available accounts are 
written by journalists. Probably the most widely read 
work of this nature has been written by Shawcross (1984), 
e 
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who has described the politics of the governmental and 
institutional response to the Cambodian refugee emergency 
of 1979-80. In a recent edition of this studyl Shawcross 
has added a postcript on the Ethiopian famine of 1984. He 
draws parallels between the famine and the Cambodian 
crisis, arguing that in both cases the victims of war and 
famine were also victims of the policy outcomes of 
international political alliances. Shawcross further 
considers that western famine relief aid to the Ethiopian 
regime is being used to "underwrite a war" and thereby can 
be said to be contributing to famine. 
Another journalistj Peter Gillr has written a 
comprehensive account of political and institutional 
behaviour prior to the mass public awareness of the 
Ethiopian famine (Gill 1985). Unfortunatelyr although 
being quite clear on overall political analysis, both 
5hawcross and Gill fail to explain exactly why aid 
bureacracies behave in a contradictory manner - ostensibly 
existing to prevent mass starvation, and yet standing 
passively by as it develops. On the other hand, Harrell- 
Bond (1986) has written extensively on the failures of aid 
policy towards refugees, using case studies from southern 
Sudan. These are good sources of material and provide a 
sympathetic account, particularly from the perspective of 
the refugees themselvest of the problems inherent in 
international humanitarian organisations "imposing aid". 
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However, a theoretical perspective is still lacking. only 
Kent (1986) has made a serious attempt at constructing a 
theoretical framework to account for the behaviour of 
institutions during emergencies. It is therefore 
important to consider his work in some detail. 
Kent is concerned to explain the conditions underlying the 
extent to which agencies will or will not cooperate with 
each other during disaster relief operations. He takes as 
his starting point a description of what he labels the 
"aid imbroglio" characterising the Ethiopian famine relief 
operation from October 1984 onwards - when the famine had 
reached the stage of mass distress migration and was the 
focus of international news media attention. Kent 
observes that the relief operation was marked by a 
profound lack of trust and cooperation between the many 
agencies involved. This was equally the case with 
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) such as the United 
Nations Organisations; with non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) such as western charities; and even among 
ministries of the Ethiopian government. 
The analytical framework Kent uses to account for the aid 
imbroglio has several components. To begin with, there 
are organisational perspectives - agencies will seek to do 
what they feel themselves competent to do under conditions 
which will give them maximum publicity. This is important 
because agencies feel themselves inherently insecure - 
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depending upon governmental donors and the general public 
in their constituencies for money and other kinds of 
resources, notably food aid. In order to protect and 
enhance their support base, agencies jealously guard their 
territory, and at the same time seek to extend it wherever 
possible. Under these conditions, information becomes a 
strategic resource, and will not be shared with other 
agencies unless something of value can be exchanged for 
it. 
Apart from having good reasons not to share informationt 
agencies are prote. cted from the need to coordinate with 
each other by the lack of any particular body among their 
ranks with the power to actually do the coordination. 
This power is rooted in "the power of the purse", which 
ultimately lies with the donors who provide the resources 
to the agencies. The host government could have the power 
to regulate agency activities, but is itself in the 
position of supplicant vis-a-vis the donors. 
There are other constraints on information sharing and 
coordination. Notable among these are the political 
sensitivities of agencies operating in disputed territory, 
who may not want governments to be too well-informed about 
their projects. Equally there are the sheer pressures 
inherent in running relief operations - there is little 
time for liason meetings and in any case situations change 
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very rapidly, necessitating fast decision-making 
processes. The difficult logistics of moving relief 
materials and people essential to the continued flow of 
funds into the organisation - journalists, headquarters 
staff, politicians, TV crews, media personalities and 
representatives of donor agencies and governments - take 
up enormous amounts of time and administrative effort. 
Perhaps the most important of the constraints on 
coordination is the highly-charged area of agency 
mandates, which relate very much to agency self-image, 
territoriality and access to resources. Mandates are 
usually confusing and can be manipulated to suit the needs 
of the agency concerned. This behaviour leads to overlap 
and duplication on the one hand,; and to vacuums of 
inaction on the other. Mandates are in fact very useful 
tools for agencies as a means of both claiming and 
disclaiming responsibility for interventions during a 
famine, depending upon the prevailing political climate. 
We shall discuss the latter tendency in greater detail 
shortly. 
While Kent has provided useful insights into agency 
behaviour during relief operations, his framework does not 
allow for a thorough explanation as to when and under what 
conditions governments and aid agencies will actually 
begin to intervene to prevent the development of a famine, 
or to mitigate its effects. This is primarily a political 
59 
question, and should be discussed on a case-by-case basis. 
Nevertheless, there remain modes of agency behaviour which 
Kent has not discussed which have recently emerged from a 
critique of conventional views of bureaucratic behaviour. 
These help to explain the behaviour of IGOs under 
conditions of political uncertainty or donor hostility to 
the government of a country facing famine. 
1.10. The AVoidance of Responsibility by 
Public Bureacracies 
A great deal has been written on the formation and 
functioning of organisations and bureacracies. Weber was 
the first social scientist to formally elucidate the 
principles of bureaucratic organisationr noting that 
bureacracies were the epitome of "rationalw authority, as 
opposed to "traditional" and "charismatic" forms, and were 
therefore most suited to societies emerging from the 
industrial revolution (Weber 1968). Since then, Weber's 
principles have been elaborated and applied to a whole 
branch of social science concerned with organisational 
behaviour. 
One offshoot of this development has been the "science" of 
administration, and with the post-war wave of 
decolonisation, arose a branch known as "development 
administration". A principle concern of this school has 
been the advocacy of a particular model of rational 
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Fiqure 1.2: A Linear Model of the Policy Cvcle 
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Source: Schaffer, 1984, figure 1. 
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decision-making which states that policy formulation takes 
place according to a linear and universally recognised 
process. First there is analysis and appraisal of the 
problem to be addressed; then there is a choice of the 
best policy from several alternatives; following this 
there is the implementation of the policy and its 
evaluation; and finally the process begins again with the 
analysis of further policy implications (see figure 1.2). 
This rational, linear "mainstream" model of project 
administration is commonly taught as the correct approach 
to development planning at university level, and is 
explicitly stated as the preferred methodology by 
international development organisations such as the United 
Nations agencies and the World Bank. 
The mainstream model suggests a bureaucratically rational 
response to the risk of famine in a given country. Once a 
government has appraised a donor agency of a potential 
famine, or its field office has done likewise, an 
If 
investigation is launched, and a policy is devised. This 
would seek to minimise the loss of life in the country 
concerned. To be rational, the policy would take account 
of the policy choices and actions of other aid agencies, 
so that it harmonises with them. The policy will then be 
implemented and adjusted in future as necessary. 
Unfortunately, as Schaffer has argued, the mainstream 
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policy model is a myth (Schaffer 1984) . This is so for 
two reasons. Firstly, the choice of policy is obviously 
constrained by the political and ideological bias of the 
decision-makers, such that certain policy choices will 
automatically be excluded from the agenda. Secondlyr the 
effective planning and administration of policy is 
constantly avoided by the institutions themselves, which 
make it their prime aim to avoid risk. This in turn 
implies that they must avoid responsibility. 
There are several ways in which risk and responsibility 
can be avoided, which Schaffer has labelled "escape 
routes" or "escape hatches". He argues that the most 
important of these is to be found in the nature of the 
policy-making process itself. In practice, policy choice 
and planning (phase I in figure 1.2) is deliberately 
divorced from policy implementation (phase 2 in the 
figure). This is often achieved by making 
'implementation' the responsibility of some other branch 
of the institution, or another institution entirely. A 
classic escape route for both parties is then created. 
Policy failures can be blamed on poor implementation; and 
poor implementation can be blamed on poor policy. 
There are other escape routes deriving from this process. 
Chief among them are the tendencies to blame poor 
implementation upon poor information, which in turn 
apparently requires more monitoring equipment and better 
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trained manpower. Yet trained manpower cannot circumvent 
the traps laid by the institutions themselves to avoid 
responsibility, for in doing so the latter make it more 
and more difficult for trained manpower to actually carry 
out policy. Thus even if a skilled and experienced person 
sees a problem or a potential opportunity developing, he 
or she may not be allowed to pursue the matter. 
Demarcations between institutional responsibilities become 
strictly enforced. The low-level technician/administrator 
is forced to refer to superiors for instructions on 
procedure. In the meantime, the technician/administrator 
cannot act. 
Schaffer's approach can be used partly to explain why 
famine relief operations are so later and so poorly 
organised. However, in order to give the model a better 
fit, we need to distinguish between institutional policy- 
making under conditions of political (and personal/career) 
risk, as opposed to decision-making under conditions of 
political urgency. Under conditions of political risk, 
personnel working for humanitarian agencies deliberately 
restrict their policy choices to fit their perceptions of 
"what is possible". In Ethiopia, during 1983 and 1984, 
aid bureaucrats knew that even if the government's claims 
were true, given the country's international political 
alignment, it would be almost impossible to gain extra 
resources from the western donors commanding the bulk of 
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the supply of available food aid. Consequently, officials 
took refuge in various escape routes to deflect criticism. 
These commonly included resorting to mandates, (such as 
arguing that famine victims crossing international borders 
were not political refugees and so couldn't be fed); 
centralising decision-making to delay action; and arguing 
that insufficient information existed upon which to base a 
decision. At the same time, a very limited amount of help 
was provided, usually through another implementing agency, 
such as a western charitable organisation, which could be 
used to deflect criticism that nothing was being done. 
However, such aid was provided only in response to a 
visible problem - mass migration and mass starvation 
which during the development of widespread famine 
conditions represented only a small part of the affected 
population. Response to famine perceived in this manner 
is always untimely, in that it takes at least six months 
to gear up an efficient relief operation. In any case, 
the sudden influx of tens and even hundreds of thousands 
of famine refugees into established feeding centres from 
mid-1984 onwards quickly overwhelmed relief camps which 
were planned to cater for at most a few thousand victims. 
If the political rules change, the donors and agencies go 
into reverse gear. With the massive TV and press coverage 
of the Ethiopian famine in the autumn of 1984, it became 
politically risky for all western governments and 
humanitarian agencies not to be seen to giving aid. 
65 
Agencies promptly reacted to this threat by publishing 
long lists of things that they were already doing or 
planned to do, and attempted to grab as much as possible 
of the extra resources being made available by the 
government and general public. However, at the same time, 
they had to avoid responsibility for the inevitable 
failures of intervention, arising from the general 
political environment in Ethiopia and the inexperience of 
many of the implementing agencies. This objective could 
be met partly through channelling resources through other 
implementing. organisations, notably NGOs, and partly by 
setting up committees and new organisations to control 
information flows. For example, in Ethiopia and Sudan the 
UN Secretary-General installed new "Emergency operations 
Offices"y whose task was ostensibly to monitor and 
coordinate international relief efforts. In reality, the 
offices had virtually no coordinating role because they 
had no real control over resources. They were, however, 
useful "screening devices" (Kent 1986) which could be used 
to marshall, or even manufacture information about the 
relief operation, thereby giving the appearance of being 
in control. 
Eventually, relief operations became institutionalised and 
quite sophisticated. They only began to unravel once the 
flow of funds began to be cut-offf which in turn happened 
as the famine began to drift below the threshold of public 
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consciousness. This situation was opposed by implementing 
agencies desperate for control over their new empires, and 
who began to campaign for more rehabilitation and 
development aid. However, by now the political rules were 
returning to normal. The relief operations were 
eventually reduced to a skeleton staff, although more 
agencies retain a foothold in the country than was the 
case before the famine, having an administrative structure 
and a core of staff experienced in famine relief to draw 
upon. Hence they are a little better prepared for future 
emergencies. 
1.11. Underlying causes of Societal Vulnerability 
4- f% V! m mI"ý 
So far, we have discussed what happens during a famine, 
but not why some societies are more vulnerable to famine 
than others. Rangasamil for example, would argue that it 
is foolish to discuss the short-term processes leading to 
famine without considering the historical circumstances 
under which the affected population has become so 
vulnerable. Today, certain countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa are the most prone to famine, followed to a much 
lesser extent by South Asian countries, particularly 
Bangladeshi and parts of Perul Bolivia and Brazil in Latin 
America. However, in South Asia and Latin America, 
governments usually manage to stave-off the worst effects 
of famine with public works schemes and similar 
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interventions. In sub-Saharan Africa, governments do not 
often manage to do this, although Botswana is a notable 
2 exception. 
The vulnerability of sub-Saharan African countries to 
famine can be attributed to a number of underlying 
conditions. An obvious factor is the relative 
youthfulness, not to mention arbitrary character, of the 
States which came into existence following decolonisation 
(Hyden 1983). In several cases, notably Chad, Sudan, 
Mozambique and Ethiopia, the territorial integrity of the 
State is strongly contested by insurgents, whereas in 
13 South Asia and Latin America this is far less the case. A 
further dimension is added when we consider that those 
countries or regions which are most famine-prone are also 
those closest to the Sahara, and hence are those which 
suffer the most marginal and varied conditions for 
agriculture. Consequently, they are countries which are 
most likely to suffer prolonged droughts - the major 
sources of shocks to the economy in famine-prone 
countries. Examples include Mali, Ghana, Burkina Faso, 
Mauretania and Niger, as well as Chad, Sudan and Ethiopia. 
Again, another dimension of vulnerability is added if we 
consider that many of the changes wrought by the 
colonising powers in Africa have marginalised peasants and 
pastoralists, making them increasingly vulnerable to 
economic shocks. Examples include the expropriation of 
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some of the most productive farmland by foreign settlers 
and companies; excessive taxation; the encouragement of 
cash crops such as groundnuts whose overcultivation can 
quickly destroy the soil; borehole and ranching 
development which encourage the destruction of pasture 
through overgrazing around, the water source; and generally 
worsening barter terms of trade for the exported primary 
products vis a vis imported energy sources and industrial 
goods (see, for example, Meillasoux 1974; Wisner 1981; 
Watts 1983; Franke and Chasin 1981). In general, such 
analyses tend to stress the ways in which rural producers 
are marginalised - squeezed out from their productive base 
- while being forced to produce more and more agricultural 
goods for less and less return. The most vulnerable 
producers are those who have been entirely alienated from 
their land, and have been left with only their labour as 
the means of subsistence. 
Yet many of these factors can be found outside Africa, 
especially in South Asia and Latin America, where 
proletarianisation (the process of transformation of an 
independent peasantry into a dependent wage labour force) 
is particularly far advanced. The proportion of landless 
labourers to the remainder of the rural population in 
South Asian countries is very high - at between 30 and 50 
percent - depending upon the region. The proportion of 
landless peasant households in sub-Saharan Africa is far 
lower, typically at around 5-10 per cent of the rural 
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population. Yet today famine is a much more common event 
in Africa than in Asia. The decisive factor preventing 
famine in such circumstances therefore remains the 
political willingness and administrative capacity for 
effective state intervention. 
It is difficult to generalise about the precise 
circumstances under which a given population becomes 
famine-prone. Ultimately, excessive extraction of surplus 
through rents and taxes, together with a failure by the 
ruling elites to reinvest part of the surplus in 
agricultural capital and new techniques is to blame. Yet 
it is simplistic to ascribe the bulk of the increasing 
vulnerability to famine in Ethiopia to the effects of 
"colonialism" or to "international capitalism". Ethiopia 
evolved her own system of surplus extraction in the form 
of the feudal organisation of society which ensured that 
her natural or potential abundance would not accrue to the 
masses. This underlying cause of famine vulnerability, 
which manifested itself in mass rural poverty, warfare, 
and ultimately land degradation is considered in chapters 
4 and 5, following an introduction to Ethiopia (chapter 2) 
and a review of its history of famine (chapter 3). After 
this, a case study of the famine of 1983-85 is undertaken, 
using an analytical approach based upon the general model 
of famine explicated in figure 1.1. Finally, the failure 
of the Ethiopian state to prevent famine, and the related 
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failure of the international humanitarian organisations to 
intervene effectively is discussed in the context of the 
national and international political environment, and in 
the context of the patterns of organisational behaviour 
discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Notes to Chapter 1 
1) Sen believes that: "an estimate of around 3 million 
would be closer to the mark than the figure of 1.5 million 
arrived at by the official Famine Enquiry Commission". For 
his reasons, see appendix D in Sen ibid. 
2) Botswana has invested heavily in an information and 
response system aimed at ameliorating the effects of 
drought. This relies on an administrative code similar to 
that developed for India. State intervention is financed 
partly by foreign exchange surpluses accrued from 
Botswana's advantageous position as a net earner of 
foreign exchange, the bulk of which is provided by diamond 
mining; and partly as a result of its strongly pro-western 
orientation, which makes the country a favourite with food 
donors (see Morgan 1986). 
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Chapter 2: An Introduction to the Political Economy of 
Famine in Ethiopia 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we shall broadly consider the evolution of 
Ethiopian political economy, paying particular attention 
to the structural legacies of the Abyssinian empire which 
continue to contribute to famine vulnerability, 
particularly through their enduring influence on State 
policies. This situation has persisted despite the 
apparently radical reforms carried out under the military 
government which deposed the late Emperor, Heile Selassie. 
The principal structural changer a land reform which 
disposessed the old nobility and its intermediaries has in 
fact bound the peasantry into a new form of subservience, 
with the State acting as the landlord. The State 
increasingly monopolises the surpluses which used to find 
their way from the peasants' holdings into the pockets of 
the landlords. The wealth created by the peasantry is 
then used to finance the apparatus of the Stater which 
comprises principally of a bureaucratic elite and a large 
army and civilian militia. The army and militia are used 
to fight imperial wars on several fronts against tribal or 
national groups who are seeking autonomy within or 
secession from the Ethiopian empire. The centralising 
tendencies of the imperial governments of the late 19th 
century and early-mid 20th century have therefore been 
accentuated by the new government, which'dses Marxist- 
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Leninist doctrine to justify its policies. This 
proclivity has in part been fostered by a strategic 
alliance with the Soviet Union which was entered into in 
1977, when Somalia invaded Ethiopian territory. Since 
then, the Soviet version of socialistic development, with 
its strong emphasis on centralisation and State control 
over the economy has come increasingly to influence 
economic and social development policy in Ethiopia. 
Recent attempts at bringing the population under central 
control include forced resettlement and villagisation, 
which are reminiscent of Stalin's solution to the problem 
of wresting sufficient surplus from the Russian peasantry. 
I New forms of agricultural taxation have been introduced, 
and the role of the established State marketing 
institution in siphoning agricultural surpluses to the 
centre (through direct control over agricultural pricing 
and through physical quotas) has been considerably 
strengthened under the new regime. At the same time, both 
urban and rural populations have been collectivised into 
mass peasant and urban dwellers' associations. These 
organisations serve as means of social control, and 
enhance the security of the regime. They also produce 
opportunities for economic development through the 
organisation and control of labour. However, State 
control of large-scale industrial and agricultural 
enterprises has reduced wage-labour and trading 
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opportunities for the peasantry and has often produced a 
poor,. or even negative rate of return on capital 
investment. 
As a result of the continued exploitation of the 
peasantry; the diversion of a large proportion of 
available funds into a rms expenditure; the physical 
destruction and economic disruption wrought by the wars; 
and the abandonment of the capitalist growth path which 
had been gradually emerging under the old regime; the 
economic base of the country grows ever-more fragile and 
subject to climatic disruption. At the same time, 
improvements in disease control have helped to fuel rapid 
population growth which threatens the resource base of the 
peasantry, which has failed to adapt sufficiently to the 
declining man/land ratio. This situation has arisen 
mainly because of the historical legacy of a lack of 
reinvestment of surplus in the means of production, so 
that agricultural technology and techniques have often 
failed to keep production up to levels sufficient to 
ensure that foodgrain availability matches national 
demand. 
Before elaborating these themes, it is necessary to put 
them into geographical and historical context. 
Accordingly, in this chapter the physical features, 
climate, economy and political history of Ethiopia shall 
be briefly described. Following this exposition, the 
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history of famine in Ethiopia will be discussed in some 
detail, in chapter 3. In order to elaborate the 
structural causes of famine two further chapters will then 
be devoted to examining the roots of famine. The first 
(chapter 4), shall consider ways in which systems of land 
tenure, taxation and rural development have made the 
peasantry increasingly vulnerable to production failures. 
The second (chapter 5) shall consider how a history of 
exploitation of the peasantry has given rise to 
environmental degradation. The long-term effects of these 
factors shall also be examined, using available data on 
crop production. It will be seen that although the data 
series are poor, and in some cases may even be largely 
guesswork, there are signs that the longest-settled 
regions of the north have become chronically incapable of 
supporting their populations, whether through direct 
production on peasant holdingsl or through producing 
livelihoods through other economic means. 
2.2 Physical Features and Climate. 
Ethiopia is situated in the Horn of Africa, and has a 
north-easterly coastline along the Red Sea. Sudan is to 
the west, Kenya to the south,, Somalia to the east,, and 
Djibouti to the north-east. For the most part, the 
country is mountainous, with a large central massif rising 
abruptly to above 3,000 metres, bisected by the East 
African rift valley (see figure 2.1). 
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Much of the highland massif experiences a season of main 
rains (kremt), which runs from June to September, although 
the timing of onset and duration of the rains can vary 
considerably. In parts of the highlands, a short (belg) 
season precedes the main rains, usually in March-April 
(see average annual precipitation for Kombolcha in figure 
2.2). Although the belg season typically provides only 5- 
10 per cent of total crop production, it is very important 
in some locations (such as Western Wollo), where up to 
50 per cent of production can be forthcoming from the belg 
rains. The main harvest follows the kremt rains and runs 
from November to January. 
The highlands support the vast majority of the population, 
most of whom are cultivators growing crops at various 
altitudes. These include the popular indigenous staple 
teff (eragrostis abyssinica)f wheat, oats, barley, maize, 
sorghum, pulses and oil seeds. Unfortunately, the 
highlands have experienced considerable deforestation and 
soil erosion as more and more land has been cleared*for 
cultivation and as indigenous forests have been cut down 
for building material and domestic fuel. This has in 
certain areas had an adverse impact on the amount of land 
available for cultivation and on yields (see chapter 5). 
The western highlands are most favoured climatically for 
crop production, receiving the highest amounts of 
rainfall, which is normally well-distributed (see Gore in 
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figure 2.2). The north is less well-favoured (see Agordat 
in figure 2.2). The variability of rainfall also appears 
to be greater in the north, perhaps reflecting the 
centuries of deforestation and more recent overcultivation 
of the land. The western provinces remain relatively 
underpopulated, and produce the bulk of the country's crop 
surpluses. 
Highlanders keep animals, needing them for traction and 
transport, as well as for extra sources of food. 
Livestock normally have high market values and can 
therefore be considered as an investment or as insurance 
during times of scarcity, when they are exchanged for 
grain. 
To the south and east the massif gives way to lowlands 
which were territories conquered by the Abyssinian 
highlanders during the 19th century. The lowlands 
generally support much sparser populations which rely on 
pastoralism for a livelihood, although in many cases this 
will be supplemented with a degree of cultivation. In the 
southern and north-eastern lowlands there are two rainy 
seasons of approximately equal length. The first occurs 
in April/May and the second in October/November (see Gode 
in figure 2.2). The rainfall in the lowlands is generally 
less than in the highlands, but is subject to the same 
degree of variability. A'failure of one rainy season is 
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quite common, while the failure of two rainy seasons in 
succession is potentially disastrous for the pastoral 
production system. 
2.3 Economic and Social Indicators 
Although much of the available data is either out of date 
or of doubtful validity, it appears from official sources 
that with an annual income per caput of only $120, 
Ethiopia currently ranks as the poorest country in the 
world (figures from world Bank 1985; see Table 2.1). The 
population, estimated in May 1984 at 42 million, is 
growing at approximately 2.7 per cent per annum. Life 
expectancy at birth is poor, at only 43 years; and infant 
mortality rates are high, at 166 per thousand. The 
average annual growth rate of Gross Domestic Product per 
caput is estimated to have been 0.5 per cent per annum 
over the period 1965-83, although great variations were 
experienced, depending upon the vagaries of climate and 
international trade. overall food production per caput 
appears to have grown over the period 1974-76 to 1981-83, 
with the index rising from 100 to 106. However, this 
figure conceals great regional variations, and 
considerable year-to-year fluctuations in food production. 
overall cereal imports had risen from 118,000 mt in 1974 
to 325,000 by 1983. The demand for cereal imports has in 
part contributed to a deteriorating balance of payments 
situation, by 1983 the current account deficit was 
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Table 2.1: Ethiopia - Economic and Social Indicators 
Area: 
Population: 
Gross National Product: 
GNP growth rate: 
Population growth rate: 
Life expectancy: 
Infant mortality rate: 
Index of food production: 
Index of terms of trade: 
Distribution of GDP 
by sector: 
Agriculture: 
Industry: 
Services: 
Distribution of employment 
by sector: 
Agriculture: 
Industry: 
Services: 
1,222,000 kM2 
42 million (1984 estimate) 
$120 per caput (1983, 
world's poorest) 
0.5 per cent (average, 
1965-83) 
2.7 per cent (1984) 
43 years 
166 per thousand 
106 (1983 figure, 1974-76 
base year) 
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48 per cent 
16 per cent 
36 per cent 
80 per cent 
7 per cent 
13 per cent 
Source: World Bank Development Report, 1985, Washington. 
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estimated at $-171m, compared with -32m in 1970. The 
importation of military equipment is largely responsible 
for this shortfall, although the USSR, the major supplier, 
has extended long-term credit for the purchase of military 
supplies. 
The backbone of the Ethiopian economy is agriculture, with 
80 per cent of the working population employed in this 
sector, producing some 48 per cent of Gross Domestic 
Product in 1983. Agricultural products make up the main 
exports, more than half the value of which comes from only 
one crop, coffee. Upwards of 50 per cent of the total 
land area is used for grazing animals. As a result the 
domestic animal population of Ethiopia easily outnumbers 
the human population - there are more than twice as many 
sheep,, goats, camels and cattle as people. Livestock are 
useful sources of milk, meat, traction, transport and cash 
for rural people, and of foreign exchange generated from 
live animals, hides and meat exports from the country. 
Industrial development in Ethiopia is backward. Only 7 
per cent of the working population is employed in 
industry, whilst 13 per cent work in the service sector. 
There is little in the way of heavy industry and most 
enterprises are devoted to food processing and other light 
industrial activities. The transport system remains very 
limited, and the vast majority of the population live more 
than a day's walk from the nearest motorable roads. There 
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are two railway lines, one in Eritrea running from Asmara 
to the port of Massawa and another from Addis Ababa to 
Djibouti, but the former is only intermittently in use 
owing to guerilla activity. By any economic standards, 
Ethiopia must be classified as an extremely underdeveloped 
country, and the United Nations list it as a 'Most 
Seriously Affected - Least Developed Country' (MSA-LDC). 
2.4 History and Ethnolo 
Northern Ethiopia was first settled by migrants from the 
Arabian peninsula in classical times. The Aksumite empire 
was first fleetingly referred to in written records in the 
first century AD (Markakis 1974). At that time, the 
Aksumites of what is now northern Tigray were a mixture of 
Cushite peoples indigenous to the area and Semites who 
originated from southern Arabia, having crossed the Red 
Sea. The superior culture of the Semites led to the 
establishment of a small but robust empire which had 
embraced Christianity by the 4th century AD. However, the 
rise of militant Islam later forced the Christian empire 
to become isolated within the highlands. As a result, 
almost nothing is known of the Aksumites in the following 
centuriesy although impressive inscribed stelae and other 
artifacts remain as a reminder of their material 
civilisation. 
The descendents of the Aksumites expanded southwards 
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towards the centre of the plateau, where they encountered 
pagan Agaw-speaking people who became subjugated and 
Christianised. The integration of Aksumites and Agaw 
eventually culminated in an Agaw dynasty, the Zagaw, which 
ruled the 'Abyssinians' from around the middle of the llth 
century to 1270, when the dynasty was overthrown by 
another based on the Amhara tribe, which claimed descent 
from Solomon. The historical record becomes more detailed 
at this point. 
There followed some three centuries of conflict with the 
expansionist Muslims, as both sides sought control of the 
south and eastern lowlands. The Abyssinians were finally 
invaded by Ahmad Ibn Al Ghazi (1506-43) who was known as 
Gran (the left-handed). Gran's campaign was successful 
and bloodyt leading to large-scale conversions of 
Christians to Islam, but eventually Gran's forces were 
expelled. The Abyssinians had enlisted the help of the 
Portuguese to achieve this aim, and in return the latter 
were welcomed as architects and advisors, helping to found 
the city of Gonder, which became the fixed centre of the 
throne from the mid-17th century until late 19th centuryt 
when the capital shifted to Addis Ababa. Portuguese 
jesuits proved disruptiver attempting with some success to 
convert first the monarchy, and then the rest of the 
population to Catholicismy before being eventually 
expelled. 
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Following the protracted struggle with the forces of 
Islam, the Abyssinians were faced with a new threat. The 
Oromo peoples, also known as Galla, advanced from the 
south and west, facing the empire along a semi-circular 
front. Markakis has argued that this was not a readily- 
intercepted invasion, but a series of skirmishes with a 
people who were seeking a new home, and who effectively 
infiltrated the empire (Markakis 1974 p 16). As a result, 
the Abyssinians managed to retain much of their hegemony 
over the newly-settled Oromo tribes. Eventually, however, 
the Abyssinians themselves were to fall prey to a "highly 
virile provincialism" (ibid p 17) which has traditionally 
marked the conduct of Ethiopian affairs, and continues to 
do so today. By the late 18th centuryt the monarchy had 
become eclipsed, and a period known as the 'age of 
princes' followed, with endemic conflict being waged by 
provincial nobles seeking control over the State (see Abir 
1968). 
The 'age of princes' was ended in the middle of the 19th 
century by Emperor Tewoderos, who began the process of 
constructing a modern state in order to control the 
centrifugal tendencies of the provinces. He attempted to 
set up a national administration and a national army, but 
met with limited success, being forced to mount a 
succession of punitive raids against rebellious provinces. 
In 1867 Tewoderos committed suicide to avoid capture by 
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the -forces of Lord Napier,, who headed a British expedition 
which had itself been despatched to accomplish a punitive 
raid against Tewoderos, who was holding a British consul 
in an ill-fated attempt to gain an alliance with Queen 
Victoria. 
The short reign of Yohannes IV (1872-1889) followed, who 
was crowned 'king of kings' over the Kings of Shoa and 
Gojjam. Yohannes was faced with new threats to the 
empire, including the invasion of Eritrea'by the Italians 
in 1879, and the sacking and burning of Gondar by Mahdist 
forces from Sudan in 1888. Emperor Yohannes eventually 
fell in battle during the retaking of Gonder in the 
following year. He was succeeded by the King of Shoa, who 
became Emperor Menelik 11 (1889-1913), the true founder of 
the modern empire of Ethiopia and moderniser of the 
Ethiopian state. 
Despite the onset of terrible famine in the first year of 
Menelik's reign, and despite the incursions of Italian 
forces with their modern weaponry (later defeated at the 
battle of Adwa in 1896), Menelik undertook a massive 
expansion of the Ethiopian empire, more, than doubling its 
territory. He did so partly in response to the threat of 
colonisation by other European powers. In order to 
maximise his claims in the face of European might, Menelik 
despatched soldiers to establish frontier posts at the 
farthest reaches of the south, south-east and south-west 
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North Eritreans Moslem c. 150,000 
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, Christian, Moslem Plough cultivators, c. 170,000 
artisans 
Source: Fitzgerald, 1980 
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of his empire. Markakis notes that "Ethiopian forces 
reached the northern shore of Lake Rudolph (Turkana) in 
1898, just a few months ahead of the British" (ibid p 25). 
At the same time the huge territories of Sidamo, Bale and 
Hararghe were rapidly annexed and subjugated. Eventually,, 
Ethiopia's borders were recognised by the colonial powers, 
with the exception of Italian Somaliland, whose boundaries 
are still in dispute. As Markakis has further observed: 
"Ethiopia is the only African state below the Sahara whose 
boundaries have been determined by an internally induced 
natural process of expansion carried out in the classic 
manner of military conquest" (ibid). The result was a 
polyglot empire in which the Christian Amhara/Tigrayans 
were a distinct minority, exerting political control over 
a very diverse group of tribes and peoples, who included 
Islam, Judaism and Animism among their religious beliefs. 
The distribution of the major tribes and religions in 
modern Ethiopia is reproduced in figure 2.3. 
menelik's political achievements were followed by further 
attempts to create the trappings and structures of a 
modern state. The capital was shifted to Addis Ababa at 
the geographical and political centre of the country in 
Shoa province. A modern army was established, which was 
paid regular wages, instead of relying on the surplus 
extorted from the local peasantry. The elements of a 
modern administrative structure also began to appear, 
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although executive power was still kept in the hands of 
noblesf rather than a modern bureaucracy. 
Menelik II was succeeded for a brief period by his 
grandson, Lij Yasa, but the latter was ousted after three 
years by the Shoan nobility for sympathising with Islam. 
He was in turn succeeded by Ras Tafari Makonnen, later 
crowned Emperor Heile Selassie I in 1930. Heile Selassie 
continued a fitful process of modernisation which was 
interrupted by the Italian invasion of 1935, following 
which he fled the countryt although later he was to return 
as part of an Anglo-Ethiopian force which drove the 
Italians out of Ethiopia in 1941. Heile Selassie's 
reinstatement lasted until 1974, when he was overthrown by 
a gradual coup and replaced by a military committee 
(Halliday and Molyneux 1981). 
2.5 The 1974 revolution 
The downfall of Heile Selassie and the rise of the 
military regime has been much discussedy although it is 
difficult to find accounts which are not biased towards 
one or another of the factions battling for power. 
However, almost all accounts waste no time in condemning 
the regime as a 'feudal' anachronism whose overthrow was 
long overdue. Yet Heile Selassie was ultimately 
overthrown by the forces which he himself helped to 
create. These included the army, the bureaucracyt the 
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urban working class, and the young student intelligensia. 
Although regional discontents grumbled on throughout Heile 
Selassie's reign,, his overthrow was engineered by the 
joint, although rather ad hoc, efforts of urban interest 
groups. The grievances of these groups can be traced 
ultimately to the erosion of their economic position (see 
Love 1978). Thus soldiers mutinied over pay and 
conditions; urban workers and bureaucrats similarly 
complained about the rapidly rising cost of living in the 
face of fixed wages and salaries; and students were 
concerned about their future employment prospects. The 
underlying economic motives behind the grievances of these 
urban interest groups were evident in the first major 
challenges to Heile Selassie - mutinies over pay and 
conditions by soldiers and airmen, and a strike by taxi 
drivers over a 50 per cent increase in petrol prices in 
the capital during January and February 1974. As Halliday 
and Molyneux (op cit) have noted, political rather than 
purely sectoral demands began to emerge only later. These 
included the dismissal of the Aklilu cabinet, which 
occurred in late February. The new cabinet proved weak, 
and strikes and demonstrations continued, particularly 
over the extension of labour organisation rights to 
government employees. 
Limited reforms were undertaken, but the situation 
destabilised once more with the formation by junior 
officers in Addis Ababa of the 'Co-ordinating Committee of 
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the Armed Forces, the Police and the Territorial Army', 
otherwise known as the 'Dergue', which is the Amharic word 
for 'committee'. The 146-man Dergue, although at first 
apparently, unclear in its aims, gradually usurped the 
functions of government in a creeping coup which lasted 
from June-September 1974. Eventually, despite more 
cabinet reshuffles and other imperial concessions, Heile 
Selassie was arrested in September, driven off 
ignominously in the back seat of a Volkswagen car, and 
reportedly died in prison a year, later, although the 
precise circumstances of his demise are uncertain. 
The revolution coincided with the international exposure 
of a famine which had been raging in parts of the northern 
provinces over 1973-4. While the famine helped to reveal 
the callousness of the regime and of its foreign backers 
and international agencies who colluded in its concealment 
(see Shepherd 1975); it cannot be said to have been a 
major factor in the downfall of Heile Selassie. Neither 
was the land question of much importance in bringing about 
the revolution although land reform was later to be a 
major plank in the programme of the Dergue, and was also 
being advocated by other radical critics of the regime, 
notably the various student factions. The peasantry was 
largely uninvolved in the 'creeping coup,, which was 
confined mostly to Addis Ababa. 
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At the time of the revolution, no political party actually 
existed (Halliday and Molyneux op cit). Swiftly, a number 
of parties sprang up, mostly adhering to left-wing 
principles. Chief among these was the Ethiopian People's 
Revolutionary Party (EPRP) which was made up largely of 
radical students and middle-class professionals; CELU, the 
Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions; and MEISON, the 
All Ethiopia Socialist Movement. Other, lesser, socialist 
parties included the oppressed People's Party of Ethiopia, 
ECHA'AT; the Marxist-Leninist Organisation of Ethiopia, 
MALERED; and Revolutionary Flame, ABYOTAWIT SEDED. The 
EPRP soon found itself in opposition to the Dergue, 
principally over the issue of autonomy for the various 
administrative regions of Ethiopia. The EPRP (took) 
"their stand on Leninist principles (defending) the 
untrammelled right of nationalities to self-determination, 
including the right of secession" (Markakis and Ayeler 
1986 p 120). This was not acceptable to certain members 
of the Dergue, notably Mengistu Heile Mariam, who emerged 
victor and head of state from a power-struggle which saw 
more than two-thirds of Dergue members lose their lives. 
The Dergue decided to eliminate the EPRP, which was 
carried out during 1975-77, mainly in the back streets of 
Addis Ababa. The EPRP responded in kind, and indeed in 
some quarters is believed to have initiated the bloodshed 
(Schwab 1985) while others recount that the Dergue began 
the physical oppression of students, labour activists and 
others who opposed the regime (Markakis and Ayele,, op ` 
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cit). In the event, the genuine working class opposition 
to military rule, uhder the banner of the Confederation of 
Ethiopian Labour Unions (CELU) was quickly destroyed, and 
by the end of 1975 had been transformed into a Dergue- 
controlled 'All-Ethiopia Trade Union'. Remaining 
radicalised labour activists mostly joined the violent 
opposition of the EPRP. 
Other socialist groupst including Meison, Echa'atj Malered 
and Abyotawit Seded were initially supportive of the 
Dergue, and were grouped together under the name POMOA, 
the Provisional Office for Mass Organisational Affairs. 
This office set up a training school for revolutionary 
cadres, known as Yekatit 66, which is Amharic for February 
1974. However, one by one, these groups were accused of 
subversive activity, and were effectively destroyed. 
By late 1979l the Mengistu faction of the Dergue had 
emerged total victor, having driven the surviving 
opposition into exile; or into the countryside, where the 
detritus of the city revolution gathered to continue their 
battles. Mengistu swiftly embraced a Soviet model of 
Communism, which was justified according to Leninist 
principles and Stalinist practice. According to this 
somewhat adapted model, the military played the part of a 
socialist vanguard party, organising production and 
commerce in the collective interest. The manner in which 
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this would be carried out would necessarily involve a 
considerable degree of force. In order to secure a 
measure of popular support, from the earliest days of the 
revolution the Dergue had begun to arm the 
lumpenproletariat of the towns and cities (see chapter 4 
for an account of how this class arose from the limited 
capitalist development fostered in Ethiopia) and organised 
the urban population into associations, known as kebeles. 
These poorly educated people were given considerable 
powers during the first7 few years of the military regime, 
and did not hesitate to use them,, killing-anybody 
suspected of being of the 'anti-people forces', as the 
divided opposition was termed. At the same time the 
peasantry# which had already benefited from a radical land 
reform implemented in March 1975 (again described in 
chapter 4), was organised into Peasants Associationst 
(also known as kebeles). However, the peasantry was less 
enthusiastic about pursuing the anti-people forces, and 
was in fact influenced by the (predominantly EPRP) 
students who were hastily despatched to the countryside in 
1975 to implement a campaigný(zemecha)-. for land reform. 
Gradually the opposition was driven out of the kebelest or 
else was forced to operate very clandestinely and 
ineffectuallyl as the urban population was brought more 
under the control of the Dergue. As a means of hastening 
this process, prominent members of kebeles were 
occasionally executed for having exceeded their authority. 
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The kebele, leadership, having benefited from the military 
coup, firmly owes its allegiance to the Dergue and is 
therefore a prime instrument of social control. All 
edicts of the regime, such as forcible conscription, 
allocation of housing, literacy campaignst and control 
over opposition can be effectively implemented through the 
kebele structure. The same is supposedly true of the 
peasant"s associations, but they appear to be more 
democratically constituted, and less subject to central 
control, particularly in regions traditionally hostile to 
the centre. 
2.6 The Rural Opposition 
We have seen that traditionally, opposition to the ruling 
regime has come from the provinces rather than the 
capital. This is still the caser for the remnants of the 
ancien regime and the unsuccessful left-wing factions fled 
to the provinces, where they organised resistance 
movements. Among the first was the Ethiopian Democratic 
Union (EDU), a hotch-potch of interests including ex- 
landlords, pro-western middle-class urbanites, and 
socialist or communist students. The EDU established 
offices in London and Khartoum, but after 1977 the 
movement split into various factions. These included týe 
Popular Ethiopian Democratic Union (PEDU); the Ethiopian 
People's Democratic Revolutionary Party (EPDRP); and (in 
1981) the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Ethiopia 
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(DFLE). The latter group appears to be related to the 
Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM), which is 
beginning to become militarily active in the Amhara- 
dominated parts of Wollo and Gonder. As Schwab has 
observed, these bodies "had (have) virtually no membership 
and were (are) essentially paper organisations" (op cit p 
66). The same cannot be said of the major opposition 
groups in Tigray and Eritrea. In Tigray, the opposition 
began as a broad-based democratic movement, the Tigray 
Liberation Front, which established a strong base in the 
western part of the province. This later split, with a 
new and eventually stronger faction emerging, which was 
named the Tigray People's Liberation Front, the TPLF. 
Like its 'sister' organisation, the Eritrean People's 
Liberation Front (EPLF), the TPLF professes a strong 
Marxist-Leninist orientation, which it is able to put into 
practice in the 85 per cent of Tigray which it claims to 
control (Bennett 1983b). -In fact, there is little 
difference between TPLF socio-economic policies and those 
of the Dergue - land reform, commodity price controls, 
rural developmentr literacy and health, programmes etc, are 
all encouraged through the establishment of mass 
organisations. The TPLF is, however, committed to 
"fighting for the national self-determination of the 
Tigrayan people (as well as) waging a people's democratic 
revolution" (Memo to the 36th session of the United 
Nations General Assembly of September 1981). According to 
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this memorandum, "as this formula does not preclude the 
voluntary unity of Tigrayans with other nations and 
nationalities in a larger state the TPLF is not fighting 
for secession". However, the memorandum goes on to 
observe that unless and until conditions change "the 
people (will) opt for the formation of an independent and 
democratic republic" (ibid). 
The various Eritrean Liberation Fronts are absolutely 
clear as to their aims. They are all seeking outright 
secession from Ethiopia. There are three main groupings, 
the mainly Muslim Eritrean Liberation Front, formed in 
1962, which lost most of its radical Christian following 
to a split in 1970, which in turn led to the creation of 
the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). The EPLF 
is socialist and non-sectarian, whereas the ELF remains 
conservative and muslim. In 1977 the EPLF itself split 
into two factions, and the ELF-Popular Liberation Forces 
came into being (Halliday and Molyneaux op cit; Schwab 
1981). 
Periodic armed conflict occurs between these different 
factions, although short-lived coalitions do occur. There 
is also occasional fighting between Eritrean and Tigrayan 
fronts, the precise reasons often being obscure. This has 
even occurred between the EPLF and the TPLF, despite their 
similar political orientation and co-operation in the. 
past. In one recent case the conflict appears to have 
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been a result of competing ownership claims over some 
armoured vehicles captured during a battle with the Dergue 
forces, in which both TPLF and EPLF forces took part. 
Elsewhere in Ethiopia other liberation fronts and their 
various factions have come into being. Chief among these 
is the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) operating in 
the Ogaden and armed and supported by Somalia. It has 
been linked to the 'Somali and Abo Liberation Front' 
(SALF), which operates in Bale and Sidamo, provinces 
further west. An Oromo Liberation Front has also emerged; 
while the Afar Liberation Front has never really subsided, 
despite the loss of its original leader, Sultan Ali 
Mirrah, a big landowner whose assets were nationalised. 
These predominantly lowland, southern and eastern groups 
are "of little more than nuisance value at the moment" 
(EIU 1985 p 19) as they lack the numbers and firepower of 
the northern groups. However, during the war with Somalia 
in 1977-78 the WSLF and SALF received considerable support 
from the Somalis, with large quantities of arms and extra 
manpower being smuggled across the border in the build-up 
to the offensive. 
2.7 External Relations 
The conflicts within Ethiopia to a great extent explain 
the external political relations of the Mengistu regime. 
To begin with, the USA supported the Dergue, as the 
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Americans had invested considerable sums in the Ethiopian 
armed forces and the economy under Heile Selassie. 
Between 1953 and 1970, some $305 million had been given as 
military aid, making up a half of total US military aid to 
Africa (Schwab 1985 p 10). In return the USA had received 
permission to establish a huge military communications 
base at Kagnew, near Asmara in Eritrea. This base 
contained some 31200 American personnel out of a total of 
6,000 stationed in Ethiopia, and represented a 
considerable investment in the strategically important Red 
Sea region. 
The Carter administration became increasingly disenchanted 
with the Dergue, partly from a genuine concern over human 
rights' abuses, and partly as a reaction to the 
nationalisation without compensation of US and other 
foreign-owned assets. Further developments which made 
Ethiopia of lesser strategic importance were the 
rapprochement with the Arab States of Egypt and Sudan 
(Markakis and Ayelew op cit); and the establishment of a 
more advanced military communications base at Diega Garcia 
in the Indian ocean. Political developments in the Arab 
world implied a need for the USA to discontinue backing 
the Ethiopians against the Eritreans, who enjoyed the 
support of several pro-western Arab States. Furthermore, 
the Eritrean Liberation Forces made significant headway in 
1977, taking seven towns by April and cutting road links 
98 
to Asmara and the port of Massawa. With the Dergue 
embroiled in civil war with the radical left in Addis 
Ababa, it may well have appeared attractive to the US to 
gain the friendship of a soon-to-be independent Eritrea. 
After all, it is the Red Sea coast of Eritrea that is of 
strategic interest, not landlocked Ethiopia. By March 
1977, the Carter administration had suspended aid to 
Ethiopia; a month later American nationals were expelled; 
and shortly afterwards all US aid to Ethiopia was 
terminated. 
The attack by Somalia on the Ogaden in July brought a 
further threat to the regime. The Western Somali 
Liberation Front had been infiltrating thousands of armed 
men into the Ogaden as a preparation for this assault, and 
the Somali government considered that the Addis Ababa 
regime was too weak to resist a major territorial 
incursion. The Dergue was not even able to control the 
activities of the relatively weak EDU in western Gonder, 
and was being assailed from all sides. 
The Somali attack apparently did not meet with the 
approval of the USSR (Halliday 1981; Schwab 1981). The 
USSR had already quickly established a foothold with the 
Dergue, despite its support for the Eritrean Frontst and 
Mengistu had signed trade and aid agreements in Moscow 
during May. For a while, the USSR supplied arms to both 
sides until Somalia expelled its Russian trader aid and 
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military delegates and broke off relations with Cuba. 
Following this action, the USSR wholeheartedly supported 
the Ethiopian counteroffensive, enlisting the support of 
Cuba and South Yemen, and airlifting in heavy military 
equipment and technicians to defeat the Somali forces, 
which was achieved in March 1978. 
At this juncture, the, USA saw a chance to recoup its 
losses in Somalia, although it was unwilling to openly 
support Siad Barre's regime, which was also casting 
covetous eyes on Kenya and Djiboutir both key western 
allies. The USSR meanwhile lost its naval base at Berbera 
in Somalia, but was soon given permission to build another 
on the Dhalak archipelago, on the Eritrean coast. The 
extent of Soviet military support for Mengistu's regime 
has been enormous, amounting to more than $3,000 million 
between 1977 and 1983 alone (Schwab 1985 p 10). This far 
outstrips previous American efforts. 
2.8 The Present Political Situation and Institutional 
Development 
Following the defeat of the urban opposition and 
consolidation of its powerr the depleted Dergue (which has 
has been purged frequently and has increasingly come to 
mean Chairman Mengistu himself) has turned its attention 
to defeating the regional armed opposition and to 
strengthening its power base in those areas to the south 
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and west of Ethiopia which it still substantially 
controls. Thus, in addition to mounting regular and 
massive military operations in Tigray and Eritrea, the 
Dergue has sought to extend state control over the 
population and resources of the country, particularly 
those regions with substantial agricultural surpluses 
(such as Gojjam, Shoa, Wellega, Illubabor and Arsi), or 
those which are of particular strategic importance; such 
as Eritreat Harerghe and Sidamo. To this end, a new phase 
of socialisation of agriculture is occurring - the 
peasantry is being forcibly collectivised into model 
villages. This programme, already implemented in 
Harerghey supplements the resettlement of peasants from 
the rebellious northern provinces. Villagisation and 
resettlement schemes have several advantages. They 
depopulate areas which support some of the most dangerous 
liberation fronts and brings them under direct state 
control on collective farms. They guarantee that an 
increased proportion of the available agricultural surplus 
can be controlled by the State. They can also be 
justified on economic and humanitarian grounds as a means 
of rehabilitating a marginalised peasantry, and as a means 
of extending health and welfare benefits to the 'masses'. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that resettlement and 
villagisation involve coercion, such as the witholding of 
rations, or of outright force, as we shall see in chapter 
10. 
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Table 2.2: Procurement by the Agricultural Marketing 
Corporation, 1976-85 
Agricultural Year 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
Source: Ahmed 1985. 
Amount Procured (000 mt) 
120 
110 
150 
270 
440 
460 
570 
420 
200 
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Resettlement and collectivisation measures supplement 
those already instituted by the State. Of principal 
importance is the Agricultural Marketing Corporation 
(AMC), which buys crops at fixed prices from State Farms 
and from the peasantry. The activities of the AMC are 
discussed more fully below. 
2.9 The Role of the Agricultural Marketing 
Corporation (AMC) 
The Agricultural Marketing Corporation is a parastatal 
organisation whose task is to purchase grain and pulses 
for distribution at controlled prices. Most of the 
purchases are made from peasant farmers' associations. 
There are 11700 collecting centres and 114 purchasing 
centres throughout the country, although there has been a 
concentration of AMC activities in the western provinces 
which produce most surpluses, in particular Keffal 
Wellegar Illubabor and Gojjam. When the AMC began 
operations in 1976-77, the amounts of grain procured grew 
from 120,000 mt to a peak of 570,000 mt in 1982-83 (see 
table 2.2). The food crisis since then reduced 
procurement to below 200,000 mt for 1984-85. The 
reduction in procurement is not merely a result, of the, 
drought, but is also a product of the unwillingness of 
producers to sell grain at low official prices at a time 
when wholesale prices of grain have climbed rapidly in 
deficit regions, and are generally higher than official 
103 
prices in surplus areas. 
official prices are fixed by the Central Planning Supreme 
Committee (CPSC), which is the highest executive body in 
Ethiopia. The CPSC supposedly bases prices on production 
costs as assessed by agricultural research stations. The 
CPSC also sets procurement quotas for each province, in 
consultation with the AMC, Central Statistics office, and 
the Ministry of Agriculture. The quotas are based on 
harvest prospects, which are first assessed during June 
and July and are periodically updated to the main harvest 
in November-December. The AMC subdivides these quotas 
down to awraja (district), woreda (sub-district), and 
kebele (farmers' association) levels. 
The AMC distributes around 60 per cent of its purchases in 
Addis Ababa, with the remainder going to Asmara and other 
towns (Griffin and Hay 1986). Membership of an urban 
association (kebele) entitles card holders to claim a 
ration, which varies according to the occupation of the 
beneficiary and the availability of food. In good years, 
distribution might amount to around 50 kg per month for a 
family, but during 1984 distribution slumped to as little 
as 1 kg per head. Less popular grains such as rice and 
maize are most likely to be available. AMC prices are 
typically at 40-50 per cent of free market levels. The 
majority of urban consumers still have to rely on the free 
market for the bulk of their food supplies - increasingly 
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so since 1982-83. 
Grain prices rose rapidly in many urban markets during 
last six months of 1984. By August, the price of teff in 
Addis Ababa was 170 birr ($1 = 1.04 birr) per quintall 
approximately three times the level of a year previously. 
Queues for privately sold grain began forming in the early 
hours of the morning, and by 1985 starvation among the 
poor in the kebeles was reported in Addis Ababa. 
Thereafter, relief grain was diverted to the cities, 
although earmarked for provincial famine victims. 
In the absence of sufficient domestic procurement, or 
divertible relief grainr the AMC occasionally makes 
commercial purchases on world markets. It can also act as 
a buffer stock for the Relief and Rehabilitation - 
Commission (RRC), releasing grain from regional warehouses 
on condition that it is replaced from donor shipments. 
Such an arrangement was made in mid-1984, when 60,000 mt 
of wheat was 'released' to the RRC. Much of this was sold 
at controlled prices in urban. kebeles in Wollo province. 
2.10 The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission 
This organisation was set up in 1975, as the Dergue's 
answer to the persistent problem of famine relief and 
post-disaster rehabilitation. The commission has some 
7,000 employees and has branch offices in 12 of the 14 
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Administrative Regions of Ethiopia (Holt and Cutler 1984). 
Although the RRC does not enjoy the same degree of 
political status as the AMC, it has a high public profile, 
being the organisation with actual control over about two- 
thirds of the relief materials flowing into Ethiopia. It 
is thought to be virtually free of corruption. However, 
western donors are suspicious of the political control 
exerted over the RRC by the Central Planning Supreme 
Council, which can divert relief goods to other priority 
areas as necessary. 
The RRC is involved in three main areas of famine relief 
and rehabilitation. The first is disaster early warning, 
with the focus being on famine risk. Crop conditions in 
some 530 woredas (sub districts) are monitored each month 
during the cropping season, on the basis of subjective 
assessments which are nonetheless quite accurate at 
identifying risks of famine. These data are supplemented 
with synoptic meteorological reports from some 20 stations 
and by retail price series for major grains in some 30 
markets. In theory, areas at special risk are supposed to 
be visited by a 'disaster area assessment' team which 
carries out an in-depth assessment. In fact, the 
resources of the RRC are so constrained that they are 
hardly expended at all on this activity. Insteadl the 
major foreign donors are likely to be taken on a tour of 
famine affected areas to attract support, although such 
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excursions are often restricted to rural areas controlled 
by the government, which may not necessarily be the worst 
affected. 
The second major area of activity is in disaster relief. 
Much of this activity involves bulk food distribution, and 
is an exercise in logistics. The RRC controls a relief 
transport fleet of some 140 vehicles to assist in this, 
but during major relief operations the fleet has to be 
supplemented with commercial vehicles operated under the 
state controlled trucking organisation, NATRACOR, and with 
small fleets run by various non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). The RRC is also very dependent upon the donors 
for spare parts to keep its own fleet moving. Technical 
help for maintenance has also been provided by Germany and 
Sweden. A network of warehouses has also been constructed 
to store relief materials, partly funded by the World 
Bank. The largest of these is at Nazareth, south of Addis 
Ababa, and has a capacity of 100,000 mt. 
The third major area of activity is rehabilitation and 
resettlement. The latter has become increasingly 
important as a result of government policy, but is not 
generally supported by the large bilateral donors or by 
the NGOs. Eastern bloc countries have instead provided 
aircraft and agricultural equipment to facilitate the 
transportation and resettlement of northern famine victims 
in the south and south-west. Some 200,000 peasants were 
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resettled over 1984-85. The rehabilitation of agriculture 
in the traditionally famine-prone areas is a prefered 
option of western NGOs, although the impact of NGO 
activity can only be slight. 
The RRC also controls a small food reserve project, which 
was begun in 1982 with material support from the World 
Food Programme (WFP) and technical support from the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). The WFP made an 
initial donation of 12,000 mt wheat to the reserve, which 
was projected to grow to 180,000 mt within four years. In 
the event, no further donations were forthcoming. The 
reserve was exhausted by August 1984y representing the 
last efforts of the RRC to meet the demands being made 
upon it by the starving peasantry. 
2.11 Conclusion 
This overview of Ethiopian environment, history and 
political development has been necessarily brief. 
However, it does serve to bring out the main points of 
comparison between the ancien regime and the post 1974 
military regime. Major changes have taken place in the 
relations of production as whole classes have been 
dispossessed of their land and property (we shall discuss 
this fully in chapter 4). The feudal remnants of the 
ancien regime are destroyed or scattered, and are no 
longer an effective force. The opposition to the Dergue 
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is splintered into regionalist factions based on common 
ethnicity although almost all of these groups profess a 
committment to Marxist-Leninism which has much in common 
with the Dergue's policies. This is particularly true of 
the most successful groups, the EPLF and TPLF. 
Yet in many ways, the political situation in Ethiopia has 
not changed very much over the centuries. The political 
landscape is reminiscent of 'the age of Princes', when 
provincial rulers struggled for supremacy. It is 
noteworthy that the most successful 'liberation fronts' 
are in Eritrea and Tigray, provinces traditionally at the 
heart of the old Axumite and Abyssinian empires. The 
peoples of these provinces have gained least from land 
reform, and are traditionally opposed to Amhara rule. The 
majority of Dergue members are Amharas, although Mengistu 
himself belongs to minority Shoan tribe known as the 
Shankella. Equally, there is hostility from northerners 
directed towards the Oromo, who make up the bulk of the 
Ethiopian population but are still looked down upon by 
northerners as conquered peoples. It is significant that 
the great majority of soldiers sent against the 
northerners are Oromos. 
The political aims of the Dergue do not differ 
significantly from those of Heile Selassie and his 19th 
century predecessors. First and foremost, the integrity 
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of the empire must be maintained. It is particularly 
important that access to the ports of Massawa and Assab be 
guaranteed, for otherwise Ethiopia would be landlocked. 
To this end, the Dergue is further developing the 
centralist tendencies observed under Heile Selassie. The 
new mass organisations and the structure of the Workers 
and Peasant's party reflect the need of the Dergue to 
direct the activities of 'the masses' with only notional 
participation from below. In this wayr Ethiopia is 
adopting the Soviet-type structures developed by Lenin and 
Stalin. The WPE is a copy of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union. As in the USSR, the trade unions have been 
brought under central control, state farms have been set 
up, and steps have been taken to begin the process of 
agricultural collectivisation. However, there has been 
opposition to this process. The least tractable of the 
mass organisations are the peasant's associations (PAs), 
which are physically remote from the centre. In order to 
bring the PAs more closely under the control of the 
centre, cadres continue to be trained and despatched to 
the rural areas (Markakis 1981). 
Ultimately, the regime plans to almost completely 
collectivise peasant agriculturer leaving only 0.1 ha to 
households'as individual plots (Wood 1983). This 
transformation is likely to be as far as possible resisted 
by those peasants who have benefited most from land reform 
- they are unlikely to want to give up their individual 
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1, 
rights to land. We shall further discuss the development 
of land tenure systems in Ethiopia in chapter 4. 
The virtual exclusion of workers and peasants from the 
Workers and Peasant's Party of Ethiopia is symptomatic of 
the Dergue's attitudes and strategies for the maintenance 
of power. The attraction of the Soviet version of Marxism 
(Leninism-stalinism) is that it condones centralism and 
imperialism, laying particular emphasis on the 
incorporation of the peasantryt and therefore the 
agricultural surplus, into a centrally-planned economy 
(Keller 1985). The party and other mass organisations 
become instruments of centrist rule. Directives are 
passed down from above, with officials at lower levels 
unwilling to take the initiative unless directly 
sanctioned by 'safe' superiors. The result is a 
bureaucratic system which almost entirely lacks expression 
of initiative at the middle and lower levels and which is 
slow to change. However, the strength of such a system is 
that once instituted, it is very hard to overthrow. While 
urban opposition has been almost completely destroyed, 
those who would like to see more democratic forms of 
socialism are unable to air their views, for fear of being 
denounced by political cadres loyal to the Dergue. There 
seems to be little doubt that the establishment of Soviet- 
style system in the rural areas controlled by the Dergue 
will eventually be achieved. Any peasant opposition will 
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be ruthlessly crushed. 
The situation in those areas where rebel movements are 
flourishing is quite different. The Dergue can establish 
only fleeting control of rural areas, before being pushing 
back through armed opposition to its urban strongholds. 
Under these circumstances,, the country districts have 
become virtual free-fire zones, and the peasantry 
correspondingly hardens its resistance. Neither side can 
win outright, and without radical change at the centre, a 
compromise will not be reached. The wars are set to drag 
on for the foreseeable future. 
Under these circumstances, famine control is not a 
priority for the Dergue. It will always be subordinated 
to centralist goals, notably the feeding of key urban 
populations and the prosecution of the wars. These 
continue at the same time as the Dergue ostensibly carries 
out famine relief operations. Famine will also be used as 
a weapon, both to starve out support from rebel areas and 
to be used as a threat to coerce peasants from rebel areas 
into resettling. At the same time, the regime is able 
both to benefit from the political lobbying of 
humanitarian groups in the West. Western donor 
governments provide the vast majority of relief and 
development aid, although they are still castigated by the 
Ethiopian government and by western humanitarians for not 
doing enough. 
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Through having set up the RRC, and by maintaining its 
public pleas for aid, the Mengistu regime has gained 
credibility by being seen to be tackling famine in a 
systematic manner. Thus it attracts resources which can 
be diverted to priority uses - the priorities being set by 
the Ethiopian government rather than by the demands of 
international humanitarians. The flow of famine relief 
goods takes a certain amount of economic pressure ofýthe 
regime. Free food can be diverted to the army and to key 
urban groups while further having the effect of saving 
valuable foreign exchange which can be spent on arms, 
allowing the Dergue to pursue the civil wars with renewed 
vigour. Any analysis of famine in northern Ethiopia must 
always keep these wider political perspectives in mind, 
while also being cognisant of the deep historical roots of 
the famine process. The latter theme shall be developed 
in the next two chapters; while evidence for the diversion 
of food aid to suit the aims of the State will be 
considered in chapters nine and ten, following a detailed 
exposition of the process of development of the 1983-85 
famine. 
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Chapter 3: The History of Famine in Ethiopia 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we shall consider in detail some of the 
better documented of the frequent famines which have 
occurred in Ethiopia in the past. The review will show 
that while most regions of the country have been famine- 
affected at one time or another, historically famine has 
occurred most frequently in the northern highlands, 
particularly in Wollo and Tigray. Furthermore, while the 
proximate causes of famine are varied - although often 
acting synergistically to attack the rural economy - 
drought and pest attacks are most frequently cited in the 
literature as triggers of crop failure. As a consequence, 
local food availability decline clearly has been a major 
factor in bringing about mass starvation, while in some 
cases an absolute shortage of food at the national level 
of aggregation also occurred. 
In carrying out this review, we shall first consider the 
overall historical record, before proceeding to a detailed 
review of the Great famine of the late 19th century. After 
this we shall discuss four more recent famines which have 
occurred since 1958, all of which have been centred on 
Wollo and Tigray. In doing so, we shall be looking for 
major recurrent themes. These include the proximate 
causes of crop failure; the types of human responses to 
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these; and the response of the State., It will be seen 
that both the causes and consequences of crop failures 
show remarkable similarities during the various famines, 
and that in each case the State fails, often through 
deliberate neglect, to protect its citizens. Thus it 
emerges that food security for the rural masses is not a 
necessary condition for the maintenance of state power by 
the government of the day in Ethiopia. 
3.2 overview 
The most recent Ethiopian famine of 1984-85 is the latest 
of many which have occurred over the centuries. In terms 
of size of area covered and population affected, it is 
probably second only to the great famine of 1888-92, 
during which time approximately one-third of the 
population is thought to have perished. However, the 
historical record of famine in Ethiopia is extremely 
fragmentary, with many calamities being only scantily 
reported, so that we do not have standardised or reliable 
means of comparison. This is true not only of the famines 
of the llth-19th centuries for which there are some 
records, but also of 20th century famines. For example 
there are few documentary accounts of the famines of 1958j, 
1966 or 1977-78. These latter omissions are undoubtedly 
due to lack of publicity of famine conditions, itself a 
function of administrative neglect, if not of outright 
concealment by government. 
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Table 3.1: History of Drought and Famine in 
Ethiopia 
circa "great tribulation hath come upon our land and 
831-849 all our men are dying of the plague, and our 
beasts and cattle have perished, and God hath 
restrained the heavens so that they cannot rain 
upon our land" (Pankhurst 1985 p 11). 
1066-72 Failure of the Nile flood, with ambassadors from 
Egypt being sent to Ethiopia to request the king 
to allow the river to flow. This implies 
drought in Ethiopia, which supplies 90 per cent 
of Nile waters (Wood 1977). 
circa "famine and plague broke out in the land, and 
1131-45 the rain would not fall on the fields, and great 
tribulation came upon the people" (Pankhurst 
ibid p 11). 
1252,, Recorded as famine years by Pankhurst (ibid) but 
1258-59, no details given. 
1272-73, 
circa 
1314-44 
circa "Famine of cereals due to lack of rain" (ibid 
1540 p 28). 
1543-44 "a great famine, a punishment sent on the 
country by the glorious God' (ibid p 33). 
1559-62 Rain failures for three years following the 
killing of the Emperor Geladius, especially in 
Harer. "Prices of grain, salt and cattle rose to 
unprecedented levels' and cases of 
cannibalism were reported (ibid p 34). 
1611 Recorded as a famine year with no details given 
(ibid). 
1625-28 Unusually large locust swarms precipitating 
famine in northern provinces. Mass migration of 
victims in search of relief (ibid). 
1634-35 More locust plagues precipitating famine, with 
accompanying widespread disease epidemics 
(ibid). 
1650,, Recorded as famine years, with no details given 
1653 (ibid). 
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Table 3.1 cont. 
1668 Aa great famine' with exceptional grain price 
inflation and widespread livestock deaths 
(Pankhurst 1985 p 51). 
1678, All listed as famine years by Pankhurst (1961), 
1700,, but no details given. 
1702 
1706 Famine affecting the entire country, with 
starving peasants pleading for aid at the 
imperial court in Gonder (ibid). 
1747-48 Two successive plagues of locusts that 'covered 
the land like a fog' destroy crops. Influenza 
epidemics follow (ibid). 
1752 More famine deaths reported (ibid). 
1772-73 Famine referred to in chronicles as quachne, 
literally 'my thinness' (ibid) 
1788-89 A further famine outbreak 'over all the 
provinces', causing 'great distress (Pankhurst,, 
Lbid, p 52). 
1796 Locust plagues destroying crops in many 
districts (ibid). 
1800 Both men and horses died of famine' (Wood 
op cit). 
1812 Locust plagues causing , partial famine', with 
several thousand deaths in Hammassien (Pankhurst, 
op cit, p 53). 
1828-29 Famine in Shoa following rain failures which 
destroyed both grain and cotton crops. Also 
widespread cattle deaths and a cholera outbreak. 
High food prices, and voluntary enslavement by 
the peasantry (jbid). 
1865 Severe famine in Tigray and Gonder (ibid). 
1888-92 The most devastating famine ever recorded in 
Ethiopia, which affected virtually the whole 
country. The entire period was unusually hot and 
dry, and a rinderpest epidemic carried off 90 per 
cent of cattle. Locusts, caterpillars and rats 
also infested the country at various times. 
Suicides and cannibalism occurred, and wild 
animals attacked dying people. About one third of 
the population is estimated to have perished. 
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Table 3.1 (cont) 
1895-96 Failure of winter and spring rains (wood op cit). 
1899- An unrecorded drought manifested through a fall 
in the 1900 level of lake Rudolph. The Nile 
flood was also unusually low that year (ibid). 
1913-14 Widespread drought in North Africar with the 
effect on Ethiopia indicated by a very poor Nile 
flood (the lowest since 1895). The price of 
grain rose thirty-fold in the north of Ethiopia, 
and there was great starvation in Tigray (ibid). 
1921-22 A similar drought to that of 1895-96. Complete 
failure of the rains between October 1920 and May 
1921 (ibid). 
1932-34 The level of Lake 
serious decrease i 
Ethiopia. Victims 
where relief camps 
(ibid). 
Rudolph dropped, implying a 
n rainfall in southern 
fled to British Somaliland, 
were set up to receive them 
1953 Undocumented drought in Wollo and Tigray (ibid). 
1957-58 More than 100,000 people in Wollo and Tigray are 
reported to have died following drought and 
locust attacks (ibid; Wolde-Mariam 1984). 
. 1964-66 Virtually undocumented drought and famine said to be more widespread than that of 1972-74. 
1972-74 Complete failure of the spring rains following 
two or more years of low rainfall. Northerni 
eastern and southeastern parts of the country 
affected. The RRC estimates the number of dead 
at about 200,000 for Tigray, Wollo and northern 
Shoa. Deaths also reported in Hararghe. 
1977-79 Poorly documented drought and famine in Wollo, 
Tigray, Gonder and northern Shoa, following 
failures of 1977 spring rains and main rains of 
1978. More than 2 million people estimated to be 
affected, and relief operations undertaken. 
1983-85 Rain failures beginning in north and spreading to 
most parts of the country by 1984. Relief 
operations mounted but insufficient to prevent 
mass migration and widespread deaths by mid-1984. 
Massive international response following media 
coverage towards end of 1984. UN estimates death 
toll of 1 milliony with more than 8 million 
victims requiring assistance. Relief operations 
continue into 1986. 
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Table 3.1 lists the drought and famine years mentioned in 
the available literature on famine. Sources include: 
Pankhurst (1961,1972 and 1985), who describes famines 
reported in the imperial chronicles up to 1888-92 (with 
some omissions, notably between 1835 and 1888); Wood 
(1977)t who has constructed a chronology of drought and 
famine based on various sources, and whose work is 
particularly useful in describing the droughts and famines 
of the period 1892-1932; Zewde (1976), who has written a 
useful short review of the historical incidence of famine; 
and other contemporary sources documenting recent famines 
including Holt and Seaman (1976), Mesfin Wolde Mariam 
(1984). Mulugeta Bezzabeh (1980), Azbite (1981) and 
McKerrow (1979). 
Table 3.1 shows that famine has indeed been a frequent 
occurrence in Ethiopia. Although the record prior to the 
17th century is fragmented, 7 famines were reported 
between AD 831 and 1344. A further 3 famines struck 
between 1540 and 1562. During the 17th century it appears 
that 7 famines occurred, with a further 8 episodes of mass 
starvation attacking Ethiopia during the 18th century; 
while to date 8 famines and one drought which may have led 
to famine conditions have occurred during the 20th 
century. 
Although the historic. al record is incompleter it seems 
that the incidence of famine in each century is roughly 
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the same, averaging one famine every 12-14 years. 
However# the periodicity between famines varies. Some 
famines extend for as many as 3-4 years, such as those of 
1625-28; 1888-92; and the most recent famine, which can be 
said to have lasted at least from 1983-85. other famines 
appear to last only for a year or so, such as those of 
1800,1812 and 1953, although this may simply reflect 
incomplete reporting. Sometimes famines follow each other 
in quick succession, such as during the period 1650-1706, 
when there were 7 famines, giving an average of one famine 
every 8 years, while during other lengthy periods, such as 
1706-1747, no famines are reported. 
The periodicity and extent of famines in Ethiopia up to 
the late 19th century strongly resembles that of Mughal 
and early British India, as described by Bhatia (1967) and 
others. However, by the late 19th century, the British 
had instituted the famine codes which were effective in 
preventing mass starvation (although failing to prevent 
pauperisation) in imperial and post imperial India. A 
glaring exception was the Bengal famine of 1942-44. This 
took place in extreme war-related circumstances, although 
it was also built on a foundation of decades of 
environmental degradation and immiseration of the rural 
poor. 
In the Ethiopian case, despite the onset of the 
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devastating famine of 1888-92, no such institutional 
arrangements were subsequently made. Famine victims 
traditionally threw themselves at the mercy of the emperor 
or his representatives, but as Pankhurst has noted: 
Othe machinery of state was far too rudimentary to be able 
to provide assistance to the famine-stricken except 
perhaps in the vicinity of the capital, while the limited 
extent of the market economy, as well as difficulties of 
communication, rendered the purchase of supplies by the 
destitute virtually impossible" (Pankhurst 1961 pp 90-91). 
We might add that grain prices were typically very high 
during Ethiopian famines, and where livestock mortality 
was also high, so too were livestock prices. High grain 
prices are specifically recorded for the famines of 1559- 
62,1567-68,1668,1828-29,1888-92 and 1913-14. During 
the 1913-14 famine, the price of grain was reported to 
have risen 'thirty-fold' in parts of northern Ethiopia 
(Wood, 1977). 
The causes of crop failure, triggering subsequent famine, 
are varied. Drought is a common factor - according to 
Wood, "seven droughts per century can be expected in 
Ethiopia" (wood 1977 p 69). It can also be seen from Table 
3.1 that locust plaguesl were common during the 17th-19th 
centuries, and are still a serious threat today. Other 
pests devastating crops included 'caterpillars' (possibly 
army worm2) and rats. Livestock plagues such as rinderpest 
could also occur. Disease epidemics, particularly 
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cholera, typhusl smallpox and influenza were major killers 
of famine victims. Abnormal modes of social behaviour 
such as suicide (considered a dreadful sin by the 
Ethiopian church and normally uncommon), cannibalism and 
voluntary enslavement were often reported to have taken 
place during famines. Mass deaths resulted in rich 
pickings for wild carnivores, such as hyenas, leopards and 
lions. Pankhurst cites a contemporary eye-witness who 
related that during the great famine of 1888-92 the 
inhabitants of Addis Ababa would be awoken 5 or 6 times a 
night "by the cry of wasaden, wasaden (it's taking me 
away) uttered by people carried off by hyenas" (Pankhurst 
1985 p 88). Thus the collapse of social norms which has 
been taken as part of the definition of famine put forward 
in Chapter 11 and which is so well-described for Bengal by 
Greenough (1982) is confirmed by Ethiopian experience. 
The Great famine of 1888-92 was certainly the most 
devastating ever recorded in Ethiopia, and deserves 
further examination as a background to'the famines of the 
mid-late 20th century. 
3.3 The Great Famine of 1888-92 
This famine well illustrates the multiple factors which 
lead to crop failure and famine in an agrarian society 
which has little control over its environment. The 
principal trigger of crop failure was an epidemic of 
rinderpest which swept through the country between 
122 
November 1887 and January l8qOF decimating the cattle 
population, and also causing widespread mortality among 
wild bovines such as buffalo. The rinderpest is commonly 
thought to have been introduced into Eritrea by the 
Italians, who brought large numbers of horses and mules 
with their expeditionary force. Many of these animals 
came from India, and Pankhurst states that "it appears 
very probable" that this was the source of the epidemic 
(Pankhurst 1985 p 59). A contributory factor may also 
have been the exceptionally hot weather, which may have 
helped reduce the resistance of cattle already ill- 
prepared to deal with an exotic strain of the virulent 
disease, 
Cattle infected with the disease commonly died within ten 
days, with few animals surviving. Mortality was probably 
in excess of 90 per cent, with the few survivors found 
only at the highest elevations. One of Emperor Menelik's 
own herds, consisting of several thousand head, is said to 
have been completely destroyed, while his total losses 
were estimated at around a quarter of a million animals. 
The disease spread as far south as Somalia, and destroyed 
vast herds of wild buffalo and hartebeest. Thus the 
Ethiopian cultivators were deprived of their plough oxen, 
and pastoralist communities of their wealth in cattle, 
making both the production of crops and their acquisition 
through trade extremely difficult for highlanders and 
123 
N 
C4 
a) r-4 .0 to 
E-4 
04 
0 
41 
(D 4 
41 
Fa 
P4 
>1 
41 
.H 
ra 
0 
1 
0 
u 
44 
0 
0 
0 
. r4 
Aj 
(o 
P-4 
44 
0 
CA 
Co 
r-i 
"rl 
U 
"'I 
1: 14 
4-$ 
0 
oq 
L) 
co r-I 
aN 
") I 
OD w 
H P4 
41 
. r. 1 
rcl 
0 
0 
u 
ca 
0 04 =1 ro ro ro 
ol (13 (a (a 
CD (1) a) m Lo 
C14 r-I C14 r-4 ý4 r-I 
CD C) 
CC) I'D 
I 1 00 
CD C) I 
r-4 ýi r-4 ko m N 
ra 
04 ro V 
Ul Ol 
C14 
r-I 
C) Q I 
00 H H H 
Ln 
r-i r-4 r-4 N r-I r-q 
x 
0 
$4 
4J 
(a 4J :3 a) 0 X3 H ý:: m P4 
du 
p4 
.0 
to 
124 
lowlanders alike. 
Although the loss of plough oxen was the most serious blow 
to production prospects, there were concomitant 
agricultural calamities. Drought over 1888-92 withered 
crops in the fields, and swarms of locusts and 
caterpillars appeared in early 1889, and again in 1892. In 
July 1892, "thousands of rats were destroying the crops" 
in the northern highlands (Picard, quoted in Pankhurstj 
op cit p 89). Although locust swarms were frequent in 
other periods, these may have been larger than normal, 
while the appearance of caterpillars was apparently a rare 
and extremely unfortunate event. 
The mass death of cattle and the associated loss of crops 
led to massive inflation in the prices of grain and 
livestock. Pankhurst (1961) presents data showing that 
the price of a measure of barley or wheat rose between 130 
and 200 times during the years 1889-90 (see Table 3.2). 
Livestock prices also rose 20-40 times above pre-famine 
levels. These prices reflected the virtual unavailability 
of grain and cattle in the marketplace. Although there 
was speculation, and some people with stored grain could 
have prospered during the famine, in many cases even the 
rich are said to have starved for want of food at any 
price. Some food was imported, but a tremendous shortage 
of pack animals (also affected by rinderpest) ensured that 
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little could be transported from the ports. 
The resulting famine was of enormous proportions. 
Pankhurst notes that "terrible conditions ... existed in 
all parts of the country", and quotes a contemporary 
observer, describing conditions over the whole 
Tigre/Amhara plateau, as writing that: 
"thousands are dying. The famine is indescribable, the 
well-to-do and the poor are alike carried away by hunger 
and pestilence. Such a famine has never befallen our 
land" (Aragani, quoted in Pankhurst 1985 p 75). 
Conditions were reported to have been just as terrible in 
the southern and western parts of the country. Epidemics 
of smallpox, dysentery, typhus, bronchitis, influenza and 
cholera swiftly appeared as the corpses of men and animals 
remained unburied. Wild animals became fearless, carrying 
away both the dead and the living in broad daylight. 
Mortality was massive, and has been estimated by Wurtz at 
about one-third of the entire population (Wurtz 1898). 
Cannibalism was also reported, with one woman of Wollo 
eating her own child, and another accused of killing and 
eating seven children. 
The demographic effects of the great famine were extreme, 
with the depopulation of vast areas taking place as 
victims migrated in search of succour, only to die by the 
wayside. Wurtz stated that he had been: 
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"ten days journey to the west of Addis Ababa, half way to 
the Abyssinian frontier, and passed whole days without 
seeing a habitation. I was shown the sites of 
considerable villages where nothing remained but thickets 
and grass" (quoted in Pankhurst ibid pp 89-90). 
The lowlands did not escape either - the Awash region was 
thought to have lost 80 per cent of its population. 
Perhaps one of the more remarkable aspects of the great 
famine was that two-thirds of the population survived. It 
is not at all clear from the records of the period how 
this was achieved by the majority of the population in the 
face of such massive destruction of crop-production 
capacity, although it is recorded that farmers were forced 
to harness themselves to the plough, and Menelik himself 
set an example to his subjects by tilling the soil by hand 
and urging farmers to do likewise. Recovery of livestock 
herds was very slow, as the survivors of rinderpest were 
so few in number. Even as late as 1898, the price of a 
cow was reported to be ten times above pre-famine levels. 
The famine had long lasting socio-economic and political 
effects. The difficulties of the Abyssinian empire and the 
depopulation of vast areas of the highlands encouraged 
further Italian colonisation and settlement which was not 
halted until the battle of Adwa in 1896. The difficulties 
of provisioning armies also acted as a brake to Menelik's 
127 
imperial ambitions and necessitated the introduction of a 
special tax on the peasantry for the upkeep of soldiers. 
Although this may have slowed the recovery of the peasant 
sector, it reduced the depredations of the soldiery as 
they marched on campaigns, even through 'friendly' 
territory. The establishment of special granaries for the 
troops was a decisive factor enabling Menelik to raise the 
vast army which eventually defeated the Italians and kept 
Abyssinia independent during the European scramble for 
Africa in the late 19th century. 
The famine also acted as a spur to the permanent migration 
of northern adventurers to the newly captured lands of the 
south, where they could become settlers on or 
administrators of crown lands. Resettlement was actively 
encouraged by Menelik, who acceded to the throne in 18891 
and who was also able to consolidate his own power at the 
expense of the local lords, insofar as available resources 
for the rebuilding of the economy tended to be controlled 
by him. Certainly the agrarian crisis provided an 
opportunity for Menelik to demonstrate his mettle, and he 
was widely admired for his powers of leadership and for 
his compassion and example during the famine. Apart from 
cultivating the soil with his own hands, and personally 
distributing such relief as was available to the poor, 
Menelik introduced austerity measures at the palace. He 
is quoted as commenting to Captain M. S. Wellby, a British 
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traveller, as follows: "Why should I enjoy plenty while my 
people are in want? " Wellby remarked that he doubted 
whether "any European ruler would have denied himself to 
the same extent for a similar cause" (quoted in Pankhurst 
1985 p 101). Certainly the behaviour of Heile Selassie 
did not match that of Menelik during the Wollo famine of 
1973, while the present military government celebrated 10 
years of revolution with extravagant ceremony at the 
height of famine during 1984. 
3.4 Crop Failures and Famines during the Past Quarter- 
_entury 
Although the experience of the great famine was 
exceptional in its severity, it is likely that it is also 
typical in that in most cases of famine the causes of crop 
failure are multiple, and inflated grain prices, mass 
migration and mass starvation follow in the, face of the 
inability or downright unwillingness of the authorities to 
intervene. Bezzabeh, who has carried out a survey of 
drought and famine in Wollo over the period 1949-78, 
argues that: 
"almost invariably people have talked of the Wollo famine 
(of 1973) as having been caused only by the absence of 
rain and all other causes have not been considered. 
However ... the absence of rain has been only one of the 
factors of drought in Wollo. Frost, flooding, hailstorms, 
plant pests and animal diseasest human disease, epidemics, 
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in varying combinations with drought, seriously restricted 
agricultural production, creating famine conditions" 
(Bezzabeh 1980 p 68). 
It is also likely that one could trace the onset of famine 
conditions through to outright famine over more than one 
or two years in most cases. Wolde Mariam (1984) has 
investigated the incidence of famine over the period 1958- 
77 for the whole of Ethiopia? based on records of 
administrative memoranda from officials in famine affected 
provinces and districts (awrajas) to the Ministry of 
Interior in Addis Ababa. He finds that according to this 
criterion there has been famine in one part or another of 
Ethiopia for the entire twenty year period, with an 
average of 20 per cent of the country under famine in each 
of the 20 years. Although the number of awrajas under 
famine varies year by year, the number of awrajas 
experiencing famine appears to be growing. Wolde Mariam 
argues that there is an "irregular but clearly discernable 
pattern" with famine "generally moving clockwise and 
forming a spiral" (ibid p 156). Tigray and Eritrea are 
identified as the heartlands of famine by 1958. Famine 
spread to the southern and eastern lowlands during the 
early 1960s, before moving northwards and westwards. A 
second 'inner spiral' of, famine developed from Wollo 
southwards into Shoa and Arssi and westwards into Keffar 
Illubabor and Wellega during the mid-late 1960s. Lastly, 
e ven the more prosperous western awrajas had succumbed to 
famine by the 1970s. 
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Although Wolde Mariam adopts a rather short time-frame 
within which to examine the spatial and temporal 
dimensions of famine, he brings out two important points. 
Firstly, some regions are historically more vulnerable to 
famine than others, and Wolde Mariam later goes on to show 
that those region which are least commercialised and most 
orientated to subsistence production are most vulnerable 
to famine (a reversal of the common Marxist view, eg, 
Bondestam 1974; Cliffe, 1974). Secondly, he argues that 
famine conditions have spread even to relatively 
prosperous regions in the recent past. If this is true, 
then it may be the case that the incidence and scope of 
famines (or famine conditions) in Ethiopia has been 
growing over the late 20th century. This would accord 
with the list of famines given in Table 3.1. Already the 
totals of recorded famines for the 17th, 18th and 19th 
centuries have been matched or exceeded in the 20th 
century. As we shall see shortlyr there has been a 
virtually unbroken series of crop failures and reports of 
famine-related behaviour, if not actual starvation, over 
the period 1975-85. It may indeed by the case that famine 
conditions have developed every year in Ethiopia in one or 
more districts, whether remarked by officials or not. 
Famine may be a normal state of affairs from the point of 
view of the Ethiopian Stater although individual districts 
will not, of courser suffer unbroken famine conditions, 
for otherwise they would become largely uninhabitable. 
Neverthelessr some districts and regions are historically 
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more famine-prone than others. We can consider the 
detailed record of famines over the past quarter century 
to develop this point. 
3.5 Famines in Recent Times: 1958,1966, 
1972-75 and 1977-78 
Between the mid 1950s and the late 1970s there were 4 
distinct famines in northern Ethiopia. Three of these: 
the Tigray famine of 1958, the Wag-Lasta famine of 1966 
and the Wollo-Tigray famine of 1977-78 are barely recorded 
in the literature. only the famous Wollo famine of 1973 
has attracted much attention from journalists and 
scholars. The reason for this is undoubtedly that the 
dramatic television footage filmed by Jonathon Dimbleby in 
September 1973 was released internationally. This in turn 
attracted a large-scale relief effort. 
It is striking that all of these famines were centred on 
Tigray and Wollo, although famine could extend from these 
core areas, notably into the Eritrean highlands and into 
northern Shoa. A single exception during this period was 
the famine in the south-eastern province of Hararghe in 
1974-75, which is often discussed as part of the northern 
famine of 1972-3, but should really be considered as 
separate. A brief consideration of each of these famines 
will now be undertaken in order to bring out both common 
and distinguishing features of each. 
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3.6 The Tigray Famine of 1958 
Mesfin Wolde Mariam has produced an account of this 
famine, of which he had personal experience. He notes 
that this was wa very devastating famine that the 
population of Addis Ababa knew hardly anything about" 
(Wolde Mariam op cit p 35). Although 1958 is the year 
commonly attributed to the faminey Wolde Mariam states 
that "by the summer of 1958 the crisis was already two 
years old" (ibid). The government began to publicise the 
famine only in September 1959, asking for contributions to 
be made. Collections were got up in various parts of the 
country, but much of the money failed to find its way to 
Tigray for want of organisation on the part of the 
government. The USA despatched 32,000 tons of grain as 
famine relief for Eritrea and Tigray, of which only 7.5 
tons was distributed in Tigray during August-September 
1961. By this time the famine was estimated to have 
claimed 100FOOO lives. 
Wolde Mariam is unclear about the year in which the famine 
ended, although it is possible that unusual levels of 
starvation could have lingered until 1961, when the paltry 
amount of grain was distributed. It is also unclear as to 
the precise precipitating factors triggering the famine. 
Wolde Mariam notes that wat the beginning, drought was 
taken to be the cause of the crop failure" (op cit p 36). 
However, locusts and hailstorms are reported to have 
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caused substantial damage in the districts of Adwa and 
Tembien. Later, epidemics of smallpox, typhus, measles 
and malaria are said to have occurred. 
The famine does not seem to have been confined to Tigray. 
Mulugeta Bezzabeh (1980) classifies 1958 as a drought year 
for Wollo and records that some 9,000 lives were lost as a 
result of famine over 1958-59. Wood (1977) lists 1957 as 
a year of famine for both Wollo and Tigray. He also says 
that food aid from the USA rotted at Massawa port as a 
result of bureaucratic delays. Wolde Mariam's data on 
food aid distribution further suggest that the famine 
occurred in Eritrea as well as Tigray. 
3.7 The Wollo Famine of 1966 
This famine was as little publicised as the 1958 famine 
discussed above. Often called the Wag-Lasta faminer in 
fact this famine affected several districts of Wollo, 
including Ambassel and Dessie as well as Wag and Lasta. 
The famine was apparently drought-induced, and Wood 
records "a virtually undocumented drought" for 1964-65 
Nsaid to be more widespread in Ethiopia than that of 1973- 
75" (Wood 1977 p 70). Bezzabeh (1980) also reports 1965 
as a drought year for Wollo, noting that deaths recorded 
by local administrators as due to famine totalled 644 in 
1965,15F550 in 1966 and 394 in 1967. Thus the officially 
recorded death toll was greater than that of 1958-59. 
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According to Wolde Mariam, a police report was sent to the 
Ministry of the Interior in October 1965, warning of 
famine. The Deputy Governor of Wollo informed the 
Ministry in February 1966 that "large numbers of people 
were leaving their villages in search of work and food" 
(Wolde Mariam op cit p 37). By August-September 1966 
starvation deaths were reported for Wag, Lasta and 
Ambassel awrajas. A report stating that 21730 people had 
died of starvation in one sub-district of Ambassel was met 
with a request from the Ministry of the Interior for the 
names of the dead (ibid). - 
By September 1966, over a year following the first reports 
of famine, a sum of 220,000 birr was made available by the 
Emperor to the Ministry of Finance for the purchase of 
relief supplies. It took 12 months for transport of grain 
into Wollo province to be arranged, and there were further 
delays in transportation to various awraja centres within 
Wollo. Throughout the kremt season (June-September) of 
1967 people continued to succumb to starvation. Relief 
operations were virtually non-existenty although there is 
a detailed account of medical relief operations at Korem 
over the period July-December 1966, published fourteen 
years after its compilation (Azbite 1981). The report 
notes that the western sub-districts of Sekota and Dehana 
of Wag awraja were worst affected by the famine. Some 
60,000 people were estimated to have died in Wag awraja 
over the previous 3 years. This number represents one 
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third of the estimated district population of 180,000.3 At 
the time of the relief operation, the famine refugee 
population in Korem was 20,000, four times greater than 
the normal population of the town, which was then 
estimated to be 5,000. Azbite notes that crowds of 
refugees "created a dreadful problem insofar as public 
health was concerned, since faeces, urine and all sorts of 
garbage accumulated to extremes" (ibid p 8). Epidemics of 
dysentery, relapsing fever and typhus occurred during the 
period of operation of the medical teams, with number of 
hospital admissions peaking in August and September 1966. 
Some grain distribution was attempted by the local 
authorities, making use of bulgar wheat donated by the US 
government. This was not done strictly on the grounds of 
need, for Azbite writes that: 
"There was no good organisation for efficient distribution 
to the needy ones. These were the poor refugees such as 
mothers with many children and without a father, or 
fathers with children without a mother, those who were 
already starved, helpless old people, and debilitated 
refugees. The grain was given to everybody, especially to 
town people who had property and were strong, because they 
could push out the poor ones and get in front, or else 
they were known by the registrar, as they were from the 
same town. The needy ones who were weak were unable to 
push through the mob' (ibid p 16). 
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Furthermore, the registration procedure was time-consuming 
as the Ministry of the Interior had provided a very 
detailed form to be completed by each supplicant. Azbite 
himself managed to cut through some of the bureaucratic 
red tape and improve the speed of relief food 
distribution, although the form filling was only dispensed 
with on one occasiont when the visit of a 'high dignitary' 
allowed the distribution of sizeable rations to almost 
4,000 people in one day, a notable exception to the normal 
rate of off-take. 
In fact, the bulk of the relief food allocated to Wollo 
was not given away. Instead, it was offered for sale to 
impoverished famine victims who had by now disposed of 
their assets. Despite the extremely low prices, of 15-18 
birr per quintal (less than half 'normal' prices), only 
12.5 per cent of the 10,000 quintals of grain allocated to 
Wag and Lasta were sold over a 14 month period. The 
remainder rotted in the storehouses, incurring high 
storage charges. Eventually the grain was rendered unfit 
for human consumption and was sold "at a ridiculously low 
price" to merchants and bakers, who presumably 
nevertheless themselves sold it for human consumption 
(Wolde Mariam op cit p 39). 
3.8 The Wollo Famine of 1973 
This famine has been much discussed, yet not very much 
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detail is actually known about its development because 
relief workers and researchers only arrived in the area 
towards the end of the crisis, by which time the drought 
had broken and many of the victims had already died or had 
managed to return to their homes to resume farming. It 
seems that the region worst-affected by rain failures and 
crop failures was "a strip of land some lOkm wide and 
100km in length running along the eastern escarpment north 
of Bati up to the eastern slopes of the Zobil chainw (Holt 
and Seaman 1976 p 5), although western Wollo and parts of 
Tigray and Shoa were also reported to have been affected 
(ENI 1974; Sen 1981). Both highland farmers and lowland 
pastoralists suffered from the effects of drought. 
Although as many as 1,500 destitute Wollo peasants marched 
into Addis Ababa and camped in front of the Parliament 
building as early as February 1973, drawing the first 
public attention to the crisis (Brietske 1982 p 126); 
migration to roadside towns peaked in August 1973, when an 
estimated 60,000 people wwere crowded round relief camps 
which could not deal with a third of their number, and 
many more flooded into the townsw (Holt and Seaman op cit 
p 4). By September 1973, when the first shipments of 
foreign relief began arriving in Wollo, the numbers of 
destitutes had fallen to around 15,000. 
Although there had previously been several years of poor 
rainfall (Wood 1976)r the Wollo famine was triggered 
principally by a failure of the main kremt rains in 1972, 
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followed by another failure of the spring belg rains, 
which are normally responsible for up to 50 per cent of 
crop production in parts of Wollo. A study carried out by 
the Ministry of Agriculture in November 1972 warned of 
famine, but this warning was hardly heeded by either 
provincial or local government (Shepherd 1975). A 
National Emergency Relief Committee was set up in April, 
but "most of its activities were directed towards 
attacking press reports of the famine. Protests from 
Wollo were met with gunfire' (Brietske op cit p 127). News 
of the famine was eventually leaked by a young UNICEF 
official in July, and he was subsequently fired from his 
post. A British television crew gained access to the 
famine area in August 1973 and were able to release film 
contrasting virtually uncontrolled famine with feasting in 
the Imperial Palace. The film provoked a wave of 
indignation and compassion from the general public both 
outside and within Ethiopia and helped expose the 
weaknesses of the Imperial regimer which was to fall 
during the following year. 
Deaths from the 1973 Wollo famine are variously estimated 
from 40-80,000 (Miller and Holt 1975) up to 200,000 
(Shepherd 1975). Rivers et al (1976) estimate that in 
excess of 100,000 people died over the period 1972-75 from 
starvation and related diseases. Their estimate includes 
deaths in south-eastern Ethiopia, principally in the 
province of Harerghe, which occurred following the failure 
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of the short rains in the Ogaden for two years in 
succession (September 1973 and 1974). The second rain 
failure in the Ogaden saw pastoralists in an extremely 
vulnerable position, with few livestock reserves and 
facing grain prices of 2-3 times normal levels (RRC 1974). 
Holt and Seaman report that in Harerghe "thousands of 
people' moved into some 17 relief centres, several of 
which existed in name only" (op cit p 7). mortality and 
morbidity seem to have reached a peak during April-May 
1975, and by September 1975 the camp population was static 
at around 70-80FOOO people. 
Unfortunately, such was the concentration of foreign 
donors and the new Ethiopian regime on Wollo that the 
developing famine in Harerghe was virtually ignored. 
Despite the rapid recovery of the northern famine areas 
during 1974t 70 per cent of the 137jOOO tons of relief 
food received between November 1973 and December 1974 went 
north (Rivers et al 1976). This source goes on to note 
that "Harerghel where famine was at its height, received 
only 8 per cent" (of the available relief food - op cit p 
352). Hence there was a serious delay in relief 
distribution in both regions succumbing to famine over 
1973-75. 
3.9 The Drought and Famine of 1977-79 
This famine is remarkable because its early stages appear 
140 
to have escaped the notice of the international relief 
organisations, despite the warnings of the newly- 
established Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. 
Following inadequate belg rains in the spring of 1977, the 
main kremt rains were delayed and continued late into 
October, creating conditions for the spread of the fungus- 
borne disease ergot and causing premature germination of 
crops before harvesting (McKerrow 1979). Locusts and 
other pests also contributed to the destruction of crops 
by late 1977. Areas affected included the highlands of 
western Wollo, Tigray, northern Shoa, and parts of Gonder, 
particularly in eastern districts. However, the mass 
starvation which began to occur towards the end of 1977 
was not identified as a problem by the newly-created 
global Early Warning System of the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation until the spring of 1978. According to 
McKerrow "by June 1978 (famine conditions) were rapidly 
becoming comparable to the period preceding the famine of 
1973" (ibid P 131). - 
The relief system was severely constrained by the 
government's need to procure military supplies to fight 
Somali invaders in the Ogaden, Eritrean secessionists, and 
urban insurgents. The only port open was Assab, which 
became severely congested. Only 3,000 tons of grain per 
month could be moved through the port, which represented 
half the normal figurer and which by way of contrast 
represented a mere one day's port offtake during the 1985- 
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86 famine relief operations. Nevertheless, by May-June 
1978 some 20,000 tons of both locally produced and 
imported grain were distributed to 600,000 beneficiaries 
through 14 distribution centres in western Wollo alone. 
Rain failures again occurred during 1978, leading an FAO- 
headed multi-donor mission to conclude that the 1978 
harvest would be no better than that of 1977. By 
September-October 1978, at the end of the rainy season, 
"the situation in the highlands was extremely critical" 
(ibid p 132). An estimated 2.1 million people were 
'drought affected', more than half of them in Wollo 
province. Fortunately, sufficient grain shipments arrived 
from mid-October onwards to avert a catastrophe. There 
was some recovery of the rains in 1979, allowing a degree 
of rehabilitation to take place. 
The events of 1977-78 can be seen as a good example of the 
unfortunate concatenation of events identified by Currey 
(1984) as characterising famines - in this case the co- 
existence of badly timed rainfall, pest attacks and war. 
The latter constrained both the supply of information 
about the famine and the supply of relief goods. However, 
the famine of 1977-78 may in part be attributed to the 
failure of institutional arrangements set up to prevent 
famine following the overthrow of Heile Selassie. 
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3.10 Conclusion 
It seems from the historical record that famine has been a 
common occurrence in Ethiopia, although often ill- 
reported, even in the latter part of this century. The 
proximate causes of famine, those that trigger the process 
culminating in mass starvation (as discussed in chapter 
1), appear to be crop failures and loss of livestock, 
themselves caused by rain failures, pest attacks and 
warfare, with these factors often acting repeatedly and in 
combination. of these trigger events, pest attacks are 
perhaps most frequently mentioned in the historical 
record, often occuring in tandem with rain failures. The 
most common scourge appears to have been the locust, 
considered by Pankhurst to be "one of the peasant's 
greatest enemies, and a major factor depressing his 
standard of living in former times" (Pankhurst 1966 p 64). 
Locusts seem to have been particularly prevalent in Tigray 
and Eritrea, and plagues are frequently recorded during 
the 18th and 19th centuries. However, the incidence of 
locust attacks appears to have fallen since the early 20th 
century, and armyworm has become a more frequently 
reported devourer of crops. Nevertheless, Pankhurst notes 
that locusts can attack year after year in a certain 
locality, and then disappear for up to thirty years before 
returning. Indeed, locusts were reported to be breeding 
in strength in parts of Tigray and Eritrea in 1985-86, 
following the most recent famine (REST, 1985). 
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In view of the reported frequency of famine, from a 
national perspective it may not seem to be an abnormal 
eventil and this may partly explain the traditional 
reluctance of the authorities to institute relief 
operations. Famine was seen by both the peasantry and the 
aristocracy as an act of God, a punishment of man for his 
sins, and prayer was advised as the most efficacious 
remedy. However, from a local perspective, famine might 
still be seen as an unusual event, for even in famine- 
prone regions such as Wollo and Tigray individual 
communities would not always be hit by generalised crop 
failures. The extraordinary diversity of production 
conditions in Ethiopian agriculture has already been 
remarked upon in Chapter 2, and will be further discussed 
in the case study of the most recent famine which is 
detailed from Chapter 6 onwards. 
Before doing so however, it is important to go beyond mere 
description of. famines of the past to an analysis of the 
root causes of vulnerability to famine of individual 
peasant households. This exercise shall be carried out in 
the next two chapters. 
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Notes 
I 
There are four species of locust indigenous to Africa 
and the middle east: the brown, red, desert and 
migratory locust. Two of these, the migratory locust 
(Locusta Migratoria) and the desert locust 
(Schistocera Gregaria) are indigenous to Ethiopia. Of the 
two, the desert locust is the more widespread, and is 
therefore more difficult to control when exceptional 
breeding conditions occur. 
Locusts have a seven stage development cycle, going from 
egg to adult through five phases of growth in the whopper" 
stages. The insects can be relatively easily controlled 
using modern pesticides if they are poisoned at the 
"hopper" stage before they are capable of flight. Once 
swarms develop, locusts become highly mobilet very 
destructive of vegetation and difficult to control. Swarm 
densities are approximately 50 million per km2, and 
locusts can consume their own weight of food (2 grams) in 
a day. Thus, the total destruction of crops in areas on 
which swarms settle is easily assured (see Ford and 
Wright 1986). 
2 The African armyworm is the caterpillar larva of a moth 
(spodoptera exempta) which is widespread in Eastern and 
Southern Africa. The moths are carried long distances by 
winds, and so outbreaks can occur over a wide area and can 
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quickly spread. 
3 If we make the crude assumption of a constant rate of 
deaths over the period, this gives an estimated average 
death rate of 143 per thousand per annum. This is lower 
than the estimated mortality rate of 190 per thousand 
recorded by a team from the Ethiopian Nutrition Institute 
which surveyed five awrajas in Wollo during 1973 (ENI 
1974). on the basis of comparison of the survey results 
with demographic data provided by CSO, the ENI team 
considered that 181 deaths per thousand were attributable 
to famine. Although the Lasta death rate in 1978 is 
relatively low according to the above crude calculation, 
it is an assumed constant rate over three years. The true 
rate was probably much higher for a shorter period over 
1977-78. 
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Chapter 4: 
The Historical Roots of Famine: 
Land tenuref taxationy and rural development in 
pre and post revolutionary Ethiopia 
4.1 Introduction 
Early accounts of the agricultural economy of Ethiopia 
describe a situation of actual or potential plenty. In 
1520, the Portuguese cleric, Father Francisco Alvares, 
wrote that "it seems to me that in the whole world there 
is not so populous a country or one so abundant in crops' 
(quoted in Pankhurst 1966 p 45). When Alvares visited 
Maichew, now in the heart of the Tigrayan famine zone, the 
inhabitatants told him that were it not for pest attacks 
and hailstorms "there would have been abundance for ten 
years" from one crop (ibid). As it was, losses in one 
year could easily be recouped in the next. Similarly, 
James Bruce, an 18th century visitor, remarked upon the 
abundance of produce, but noted that after rents, taxes 
and tribute had been paid to the landlord and the State: 
"the quantity that comes down to the share of the 
husbandman is not more than sufficient to afford 
sustenance for his wretched family" (ibid). 
This historical contradiction of penury for many in the 
midst of actual or potential plenty will now be analysed. 
It will be shown that the conditions of land tenure were 
extremely onerous for the majority of peasants. Rental 
payments and taxes were high, yet the landlords and the 
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State failed to reinvest sufficient surplus to encourage 
the development of agriculturef except in a few localities 
and at a very late stage, historically speaking. As a 
consequence, the bulk of rural producers lived in penury, 
and became ever more vulnerable to famine. 
The later emergence of capitalism and the effects of the 
abrupt transition to socialism on the agricultural economy 
will also be considered. It will be shown that the impact 
of capitalism on agriculture was almost negligible for the 
majority of rural producers, although locally it could be 
very important, and could lead to the marginalisation of 
poorer peasants and pastoralists. The effects of 
capitalism were more pronounced in terms of their impact 
on national foreign exchange earnings, and through the 
development of wage labour opportunities for some of the 
peasantry. The transition to socialism initially incurred 
benefits to the majority of peasants through increased 
access to land as the large estates of the ancien regime 
were nationalised, and as the burdens of rental payments 
and taxation was reduced. However, there is now evidence 
that rural taxation is again back to high levels, while 
investment in agriculture remains a low priority. Income 
earning opportunities for the peasantry are also 
dwindling, with controls on trading being introduced and 
with reduced seasonal wage-labour opportunities on the 
nationalised plantations. 
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4.2 The Influence of Tenurial Relations in Land 
The most important constraint on the fulfilment of the 
production potential of Ethiopian agriculture prior to 
1974 was the variety of tenurial arrangements, all of 
which to differing degrees involved the extraction of 
substantial surpluses from the peasantry in the forms of 
agricultural goods and corvee labour. These surpluses 
would rarely be reinvested in agricultural production or 
land conservation, but instead would be used to maintain 
the extravagant lifestyles of the nobility. small numbers 
of artisans were supported, but they were traditionally 
scorned as non-cultivators, and devoted much of their time 
to the production of luxury goods for the nobility. 
The various tenurial arrangements are often lumped 
together and described as 'feudal' by analysts of pre-1974 
Ethiopian political economy (e. g. Cliffe 1974; Bondestam 
1974). However, there are important features 
distinguishing Ethiopian 'feudalism' from classic European 
'feudalism'. These differences will be considered once 
the variety of forms of tenure have been described. 
At the heart of the Abyssinian empire, among the Amhara 
and Tigrayan peoples of Wollor Tigray, Northern Shoat 
Highland Eritrea, and Gojjam, the riste system of tenure 
predominated. Under this system, rights to landr rather 
than identifiable parcels of land, were inherited by the 
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great majority of peasants (Markakis 1974). Riste rights 
were passed on through both male and female lines, to an 
extent of some 10-12 generations, after which genealogical 
memories began to fade. As riste rights could be claimed 
over such a long period, and through ambilineal descent 
(through both male and female lines), endemic litigation 
became a feature of highland society. Clever and 
energetic individuals could pursue their claims through 
the courts and with the aid of sufficient 'witnesses' 
could amass considerable amounts of land. In his classic 
study of the riste system among the Amhara of north- 
eastern Gojjam, Alan Hoben notes that the amounts of land 
controlled by an individual in his or her lifetime would 
vary, and there was no guarantee that the land would 
continue to be controlled by the "owner's" offspring 
(Hoben 1973). According to Hoben, social mobility becomes 
"a real possibilityw when individuals can obtain extra 
land through successful litigation. The riste system is 
perhaps more conducive to social mobility than may at 
first appear. 
The peasants enjoying riste rights were known as gebbar, 
literally 'one who pays tribute'. The person to whom the 
tribute was paid was known as a gultegna. A gultegna 
acted as a tax-collector who was also empowered by the 
emperor to extract labour services from the peasantry on 
behalf of the state, and to act as local magistrate and 
administrator. He would be allowed to keep a proportion 
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of the taxes (usually about a third) as a reward for this 
service. A gultegna would also invariably have riste 
rights of his own, in which case, taxes collected from 
riste lands would pass to the gultegna and not to the 
state (Mulugeta Bessabeh, 1980). Peasants working on the 
riste land of others would become share-cropping tenants, 
yielding up to three-quarters of their produce in the form 
of rents and taxes, which became virtually 
indistinguishable in that both were immediately due to the 
landlord. 
other forms of land tenure included semon land, which was 
held by the church and from which all taxes and tithes 
accrued to the church rather than the state. Tenancies of 
semon land were supposedly less onerous than those of gult 
lands, and so were in greater demand among the peasantry 
(Markakis 1974). Another form of tenure, granted to 
servants of the state in lieu of salary or pension was 
known as maderia land. This was usually given for the 
lifetime of the incumbent, or for a fixed shorter period. 
Holders of maderia land paid all taxes to the government, 
but had the right to rent out the land to tenants. 
Two other forms of government-held lands existed. These 
were known as mengist and gebretel (Gilkes 1975). The 
former were lands claimed by the state but not yet 
allocated. Much of the mengist land was in fact used by 
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pastoralists who could be dispossessed when the government 
saw fit. Gebretel was land reclaimed for non-payment of 
taxes. It could be re-registered by the former tenant if 
back taxes and an equivalent fine were paid; otherwise it 
would be allocated as gult or maderia land to new tenants. 
A form of communal tenure also existed in parts of Eritrea 
and Tigray. This was known as shehena or diesa. Under 
this system, land would be allocated by the village 
headman to each household at regular intervals; usually 
from 3-7 years in duration. Each household would get 
equal shares of good, moderate and inferior land. Unlike 
the riste system, households leaving the village would 
lose their claim to land, and upon returning would have to 
wait for the next reallocation. The origins of this 
system are not properly known, although Gilkes (1975) 
considers that it is a legacy of Italian rule, being 
forcibly introduced during the occupation in areas of 
former riste tenure. Presumably this facilitated land 
registration and tax gathering. The shehana/diesa system 
strongly resembles that imposed under the land reforms of 
1975. 
The above types of tenure formed the basis of the 
A northern' systems of landholding; which may broadly be 
distinguished from the 'southern' forms in territories 
newly-conquered during the great expansion of the 
Abyssinian empire under Menelik II. The newly-conquered 
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lands were originally under a variety of communal forms of 
landholding typical of pre-capitalist societies, whereby 
the allocation of cultivation and grazing rights was made 
by village chiefs or elders. The highland empire 
converted these communal forms of tenure into vast estates 
over which individual gult holders had rights of ownership 
and the collection of taxes. Thus the cultivators of 
these lands were transformed into tenants. Many of the 
gult estates were awarded to retainers of the emperor who 
had fought during the conquest. Even the meanest soldier 
was entitled to substantial amounts of land. Thus the 
emigration of peasants from the smallholdings of the 
impoverished and overpopulated northern highlands was 
encouraged by the state, so that recent attempts at 
resettlement are not without precedence. 
Many of the gult estates were too large to be managed by 
gultegna alone. The local chiefs would therefore be 
appointed as balabats, who would act as intermediaries and 
would be given small land grants or a portion of the 
surplus (including labour) extracted from the tenants as a 
reward for their services. In this way, a process akin to 
subinfeudation was encouraged. Gult estates could be 
given on either a hereditable or lifetime basis. 
The major forms of tenure described here had many local 
variations, Gilkes notes that as many as 110 different 
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types of tenure existed in Wollo alone; while Gebrewold 
(1981) states that up to 200 types were recorded in 
Ethiopia as a whole, making the land tenure system there 
among the most complex in the world. However, there weie 
regional differences in the incidence of tenancy, which 
are apparent from Table 4.1, which gives estimates of the 
numbers of tenants in relation to the total rural 
population by province (excluding Eritrea and Bale) during 
the closing years of Haile Selassie's reign. in the 
provinces of Tigray, Gojjam, Gonder and Wollo the 
incidence of pure tenancy is low, ranging from 7-17 per 
cent of the farming population. Even when lands which are 
part-'owned' and part-rented are taken into account, the 
total number of tenants ranges only from 15-40 per cent of 
the rural population in these provinces. At the other 
extreme are the provinces of Arssil Gemu Goffa, Harerghe, 
Illubabor, Keffa, Sidamo, Shoa and Wellegal where the 
incidence of pure tenancy is high, ranging from 37-73 per 
cent. It seems from the table that the great majority of 
those renting land in the southern provinces are pure 
tenants; whereas in the northern provinces a greater 
proportion of total rentals involve tenants who have 
rights to land on their own account. 
The north/south division is not an absolute one - each of 
the major types of tenancy existed in both areas, indeed 
in his study of the conditions of agricultural production 
in modern-day Ethiopia,, ' McCann believes that the extent of 
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pure tenancy in the northern highlands has been 
underestimated (McCann, undated). However, it provides 
enough of a generalisation to explain why the fissiparious 
tendancies of the northern regions were not commonly found 
in the south. In the southern case, the support of the 
state was needed to keep conquered peoples under the 
dominion of the gultegna. In the north, the powerful 
holders of riste-gult rights could appeal to the regional 
sympathies of peasants jealously guarding their own riste 
rights. Peasant rebellions in the north were frequent, 
and often reflected attempts by the modernising state to 
replace the tax-collecting gultegna with salaried 
administrators. Hoben describes revolts over taxation 
occuring in Gojjam as recently as 1968 (op cit). Such 
revolts were encouraged by the strong vertical ties of 
lineage and tribe in the north; whereas horizontal ties of 
class-interest were more apparent in the south. The 
latter situation arose because the southern landlords and 
intermediaries, regardless of their tribal origin, 
ultimately depended upon the armies of the centre for 
control over their tenants (Markakis. op cit). 
It was remarked earlier that the various forms of land 
tenure are often characterised as 'feudal' on the grounds 
that a nobility and a strong church were able to extract 
substantial surpluses in kind and labour services from the 
peasantry. Ellis (1976) has criticised this notion on the 
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grounds that the peasants were not serfs, being free to 
move, whether through invoking riste-rights or as pure 
tenants. There were further differences between the 
Abyssinian system and European feudalism. In Ethiopia, 
peasants were also warriors, and could gain rank and 
favour through their exploits on the battlefield; whereas 
under European feudalism warriors were a separate class. 
A further differentiating characteristic was that Gult 
rights were also controlled by the emperor, and could not 
be awarded by other members of the nobility. However, 
Ellis does note that just as in medieval Europe: "the 
predominating factor in the traditional land tenure of the 
northern provinces has been the perpetual struggle for 
power between the emperor and the nobles" (ibid p 278). 
Further similarities with feudalism are apparent in the 
ways in which the surpluses were controlled and 
distributed. The main beneficiaries were the local nobles 
and landlords, including the church. The state faced 
varying degrees of difficulty in extracting its share of 
tribute, depending upon the amount of control it was able 
to exert over any given region at any given time. This 
obviously fluctuated with the fortunes of the emperor, a 
state of affairs which is reminiscent of the struggles 
between the crown and the baronies in medieval Europe. 
In the northern provinces, the poorest producers 
cultivating under these conditions would be the pure 
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tenants, working on gult estates. However, their numbers 
would be far fewer than those who also enjoyed riste 
rights. Although pure tenancy was commoner in the south, 
the relative abundance of land, and the generally more 
favourable production conditions in the newly-settled 
areas ensured that the poorer tenants could subsist more 
easily, even under the domain of the landlord and the 
centralising state. 
4.3 The Demands of Warfare on Peasant Produce 
There are three ways in which warfare can make claims upon 
the peasantry. Firstly, soldiers and revenue are needed 
to equip and provision armies. Secondlyp food and food 
stores need to be controlled in areas in which campaigning 
is taking place. Thirdly, agricultural production 
activities will be disrupted during campaigns, and 
agricultural produce confiscated or destroyed. This is as 
true today as it was in medieval Ethiopia. 
The constant strife among the petty kings and nobles of 
the northern provinces, particularly during the 'age of 
princes , of the 18th and early 19th centuries preceeding 
the reunification of Ethiopia by Emperor Tewoderos during 
the 1840's, led to frequent military campaigns. The large 
peasant armies raised by the various factions were not 
paid a regular wage, and were expected to fend for 
themselves during campaigns. As a result, armies preyed 
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upon the peasantry, even in 'friendly' territory. 
Pankhurst considers that storage of surplus grain acted 
"merely (as) an invitation to the soldiers to ravage the 
area or the tax gatherers to increase their exactions" 
(Pankhurst 1966 p 47). Furthermore, he argues that civil 
war was "the perpetual scourge of Abyssinia". being 
particularly bad during the 'age of princes', when as much 
as a quarter of the population was involved in military 
activity. Even under Menelik, when internecine strife was 
much reduced, warfare continued to make demands upon the 
impoverished northern peasantry. The first Italian 
invasion took advantage of the weakened state of the 
economy following the great famine. However, despite the 
difficulties of provisioning his vast peasant army, 
Menelik eventually defeated the Italian aggressors at the 
famous battle of Adwa in 1898. It has been argued that 
one of the decisive factors affecting the outcome was 
Menelik's recently- intr oduc ed policy of providing 
centralised grain stores and the introduction of regular 
wages paid to the soldiery, which reduced the sudden 
impact of army provisioning among the peasantry. 
4.4 The Demands of Reliqon on the Peasantr 
The northern peasantry is highly Christianised and is 
deeply religious. As part of the practise of. orthodox 
Ethiopian Christianityl some 180 saints' days must be 
observed. On these days, complete fasting takes place 
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from dawn to sunset, and often no work can be carried out, 
as "it was widely believed that to work on such days would 
cause terrible storms" (Pankhurst 1966). Although the 
agricultural cycle in the highlands is quite flexible, 
allowing planting over a long period, the availability of 
rain is not guaranteed. It is therefore likely that the 
proscription of work on holy days did (and still does) at 
times interfere with agricultural production. In 
addition, the high incidence of fasting has been put 
forward as a partial explanation for undernutrition and 
low labour productivity in the highlands (Redda 1984). 
While the effects of fasting are difficult to quantify, it 
does seem reasonable to suppose that they would have an 
overall negative effect on agricultural productivity 
through the debilitation of producers, even if the effects 
were partial. 
4.5 The Conditions of Aqricultural Production 
A striking feature of land tenure in Ethiopia has always 
been the small size of the plots of the vast majority of 
the farming population. Table 4.2 presents data compiled 
by Gilkes on the situation during the closing years of 
Haile Selassie's reign. It can be seen from the table 
that the small size of holdings is a feature of all 
provinces, although some stand out as extreme cases. In 
Wollo, for example, 80 per cent of farmers hold less than 
one hectare, and in Sidamo the proportion is even higher, 
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Table 4.2 Size of Holdings by Province 
Province Percentage of total holdings 
up to 10 hectares 10-20 ha 20-30 ha 30+ ha 
Arssi 31 29 20 20 
Gonder 70 22 5 3 
Gemu-Goffa 92 6 2 0 
Goijam 54 30 10 6 
Harerge 76 16 5 3 
Illubabor 69 21 3 7 
Keffa 76 19 4 1 
Shoa 45 27 13 15 
Sidamo 91 7 1 1 
Tigray 68 21 6 5 
Wellega 65 24 7 4 
wollo 80 14 4 2 
Average 68 20 75 
Source: Gilkes (1975), table 15, p 121. 
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at 91 per cent. only in Gojjam, Shoa and Arssi do 
significant numbers of peasants hold plots totalling in 
excess of 2 hectares, at 10-20 per cent of the farming 
population in these provinces. Furthermore, Gilkes notes 
that: "on top of these small farms there is an enormous 
amount of fragmentation, and although the amount does vary 
from province to province the majority of holdings are 
held in two, three or four parcelsw (op cit p 121). 
The trend towards land fragmentation and the dwindling 
average size of holdings has undoubtedly accelerated since 
the revolution. Population growth, environmental 
degradation and land redistribution have all played their 
part in this process. Population growth has obviously 
increased the demand for holdings, while environmental 
degradation has reduced the amount of land available to 
households. Land redistribution has reduced the average 
size of holdings by doing away with the massive gult 
estates, shifting the distribution curve leftwards. 
However, it should be noted that land fragmentation can be 
to the advantage of the peasant; allowing him (or her) to 
exploit different environmental niches and to spread risk 
of crop failure, especially where land is held at 
different elevations. On the other hand, time and energy 
are wasted in trudging between plots; and valuable capital 
assets like oxen are not used to their full advantage 
unless shared with neighbouring farmers. 
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It is traditionally supposed that the division of labour 
in Ethiopian agriculture is quite rigid. Certainly, jobs 
such as bush clearing, ploughing and sowing are 
traditionally considered to be mens' tasks, while women 
are supposed to confine themselves to tasks such as 
manuring, grinding, wood and water collection, childcare 
and cooking. However, recent studies (Poluha, undated; 
Tadesse, undated; and Tamrat 1983) have shown that there 
is considerable sharing of agricultural tasks, with both 
men and women being involved in a whole range of work 
activities. In fact, women appear to spend more time than 
men on the majority of farming activities, including land 
preparation, weeding, harvesting and threshing, 
transporting, storing and marketing produce, and care of 
livestock. Although many tasks are shared, women actually 
have a greater workload than men. Yet men make the 
production decisions - as Tamrat notes, "the majority of 
women do not participate in decision-making with regard to 
what crops to grow, which crops to weedr when to weed 
etc. " (op cit). Additionally, Poluha reports that 
although both sexes are involved in marketing, men usually 
sell the high-value products, particularly livestock, 
while women trade in lower-value commodities, such as 
poultry and grain. 
Production methods among the highland peasantry are quite 
primitive. Although plough cultivation is undertaken, the 
traditional wooden plough (maresha) does little more than 
163 
scratch the soil. This means that the same piece of land 
has to be ploughed four or five times for crops such as 
teff, which need extensive land preparation, (Abate and 
Kiros 1980). A further constraint for poorer households 
has always been the limited availability of oxen (McCann 
1985). Where rainfall is scattered, and ploughing time 
limited through religous observance or lack of oxen, then 
optimal planting conditions cannot always be achieved, 
even within the constraints of the available technology. 
The dependence of the farmer upon rainfed agriculture also 
brings into question the poor level of development of 
irrigation technology. Although irrigation is sometimes 
practiced along the margins of rivers and streams, 
irrigation technology is for the most part simple. The 
reasons for this state of affairs have barely been 
discussed in the literature. Certainly the extravagance 
of the nobility, and the deeply conservative nature of the 
orthodox church, do not seem to have encouraged enquiry 
and experimentation within the traditional modes of 
production. Radical change in the forces of production 
awaited the limited introduction of capitalist agriculture 
using foreign techniques to boost productivity. 
4.6 The Impact of capitalism on Traditional Agriculture 
Although the process of modernisation had begun under 
Menelik II, the Imperial State was only subjected to 
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substantial capitalist penetration following the defeat of 
the Italians in 1941. From-the 1940s onwards, foreign 
capital was encouraged to move into both the industrial 
and agricultural sectors of the Ethiopian economy, and was 
awarded substantial tax concessions and profit 
repatriation opportunities as incentives. A modest 
manufacturing base developed in the 1950s and 1960s, which 
gave rise to the small 'working class', principally 
located in Addis Ababa, which was later to be so 
influential in bringing down the Imperial regime. Growth 
of manufacturing industry was quite rapid, especially 
during the 1960s. Between 1961 and 1971, the gross value 
of production grew almost sixfold, from Eth. $114.4 m to 
Eth. $625.9m (Markakis and Ayelew 1986 p 47). However, the 
growth of the labour force was much slower, with the 
number of industrial workers rising from 28,314 to only 
51,312 over the same period. Furthermore, Brietske notes 
that during the 1970's, "employment per industry actually 
declined by 3.5 per cent while production continued to 
increase rapidly -a logical outcome of a heavy dependence 
on imported capital-intensive technologies" (Brietske 1982 
p 263). 
Most industrial activity was devoted to food processing 
and a certain amount of import substitution, and quite a 
variety of multinational corporations became involved in 
these areas of the economy. These included the Dutch 
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company HVA in sugar refining; Shellf Agip, Total and 
Mobil in petroleum distribution; and British Leyland and 
Fiat in vehicle assembly. Meanwhile, the American company 
TWA formed Ethiopian airlines,, while other famous names 
became involved in activities as diverse as life 
insurance, computing, drug manufacturing, meat packing, 
and textiles. Japanese and Indian interests were well 
represented, along with the Americans, British, Italians 
and Dutch. 
The growth of the formal trading sector was paralleled by 
an expansion of informal sector activity. Much of this 
was devoted to petty trading. Brietske estimates that as 
much as three-quarters of the people now engaged in 
"commerce" in Ethiopia are hawkers or stall-keepers. Many 
of these traders are concentrated in Africa's largest 
marketplace - the Mercato in Addis Ababa. 
The formal manufacturing sector also spawned its informal 
counterpart. Small workshops devoted to the repair and 
maintenance of machinery, especially vehicles, employed an 
unorganised labour force on low wages. However, workers 
in the formal sector were little better off. Heile 
Selassie had banned the formation of trade unionsr so 
wages, although generally higher than in the informal 
sector, tended to lag behind prices. 
The establishment of an industrial base in Addis Ababa was 
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augmented by the growth of capitalist commercial 
agriculture in favoured locations - notably in the Awash 
Valley, south east of Addis Ababa, and in the Setit-Humera 
region of Western Gonder. By 1973, about one-third of the 
200,000 ha of irrigated land in the Awash Valley had been 
developed for the production of agro-industrial crops 
(Bondestam 1974; Cliffe 1974). Fully 70 per cent of these 
investments were foreign-owned, and rewards were high. 
Returns to recurrent expenditure on cotton cultivation 
could be as high as 67 per cent a year, and other 
investments in crops such as sugar could be recouped 
within 3-4 years (Bondestam op cit). Consequently, 
foreign investors were eager to develop commercial 
plantations. 
Unfortunately, the Afar pastoralists native to the area 
were displaced by the new mode of production. This 
occurred in two ways: firstly, some of the best grazing 
lands were rented by the government to foreign companies 
for plantations (Bondestam ibid), and secondly, flood 
control and diversion of river water for irrigation 
ensured that less grazing was available in those areas not 
given over to plantations (Sen 1981). The marginalisation 
of the Afar tribes was not achieved without conflict, for 
they invaded the plantations with their cattle during the 
1973-74 drought. The Afar were among the groups suffering 
most during the famine, having lost their fallback 
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grazing. Bondestam estimates that 25-30 per cent of the 
Afar died during the famine, out of a total population of 
around 100,000. 
Although many of the Afar were impoverished by the impact 
of comprador capitalism, some prospered. Notable among 
them was Sultan Ali Mirah, who was a major investor in the 
commercial schemes. As a result, he amassed a vast 
fortune and kept his Sultanate intact in the face of 
foreign economic penetration. Other beneficiaries were 
the 41500 permanent workers who enjoyed relatively high 
wagest although again being unable to unionise, and the 
30,000 peasants who were able to supplement their incomes 
as seasonal workers. A further 50,000 found regular 
employment as coffee workers in Keffa. Bondestam observed 
that "during the peak season they wander in thousands down 
from the highlands to earn their daily bread by picking 
cotton for a few months, and then return either to 
subsistence agriculture or to the towns" (op cit p 437). 
Although both Bondestam and Cliffe are scathing about the 
detrimental effects of commercial agriculture on the Afar, 
they seem to ignore the benefits of expanding seasonal 
wage labour opportunities for the highlanders, and also to 
ignore the substantial foreign exchange savings made from 
reducing the importation of basic wage goods like cotton 
and sugar. Moreoverr foreign exchange was earned from the 
export of agro-industrial commodities. A certain amount 
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of infrastructural development was further accomplished as 
a direct result of commercial development. 
Another form of capitalist development of agriculture was 
fostered by foreign development agencies. Among the first 
was the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)f 
which set up a project in Chilalo region of Arssi province 
in southern Ethiopia. The Chilalo Agricultural 
Development Unit (CADU) injected a typical 'green 
revolution' package of improved seeds and complementary 
agricultural inputs, including credit and mechanisation, 
into traditional peasant agriculture. The benefits were 
supposed to be targetted towards the poorer peasantsf but 
the effect was the opposite of that intended. The 
programme began in 1967 and by 1970 some 20 per cent of 
tenants in the district had been forced off the land to 
make way for more than 120 commercial farmers; half of 
whom were entrepreneurs from outside the district (Stahl 
1974). Furthermore, tractors and combines were beginning 
to displace labour. As Markakis and Ayelew note: "It was 
also discovered that CADU facilities and credit had been 
monopolised by large farmers, and that the additional 
income generated in the district had benefited primarily 
the traders, landlords and local officals. 0 (op cit p 58). 
Thus the relations of production remained largely 
unchanged - agriculture was being commercialised, but the 
benefits were accruing to the traditional elitest who 
169 
simply increased their demands upon their more industrious 
tenants. Consequently, the Swedes withdrew their support 
for CADU and became firm advocates for land reformp a 
policy with which they made little headway under Haile 
Selassie. 
Other agricultural development schemes were attempted. In 
Wollamo awraja in Sidamo province, a project virtually 
identical to CADU was implemented in 1971. During the 
same year, a 'Minimum Package Programme' (MPP) was begun 
with funding from the Swedes, the Danes, the World Bank, 
FAO and USAID. Beginning with nine projects, the MPP had 
expanded into a further 27 areas by 1973. The programmes 
were designed to provide similar services as the CADU and 
WADU projects, but at lower cost. They were also supposed 
to appeal to the 'smaller' farmers - defined as those with 
20 hectares or less. Unfortunately, the criteria for 
credit provision'were strict, and many small farmers were 
in fact excluded for lack of literacy and assets. In some 
cases, large landowners would register their tenants as 
project beneficiaries; and then would acquire the improved 
seed and fertiliser for their own use (Gilkes 1975 pp 124- 
125). A certain amount of mechanisation outside the 
project areas was also encouraged by the spread of new 
farming techniques; and this inevitably led to evictions 
and the conversion of tenants into wage labourers. Gilkes 
remarks on this trend becoming evident around Shashamene 
in southern Shoa, during the early 1970s. 
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The development of agrarian capitalism was nevertheless at 
a very early stage in Ethiopia at the time of the 
revolution, being confined to a few localities in a few 
regions. Its impact on internal markets for land and 
labour remained slight, although agricultural exports 
probably did expand quite considerably. Some observers 
have attempted to ascribe far too much to its effects, for 
example Cliffe seems to argue that the 1973-74 famine was 
primarily a result of the transition to capitalism, 
stating that: "the famine, sparked off by the failure of 
rain, is thus a product of this complex set of factors 
operating not on an unchanged, feudal pattern of landlord 
exploitation of tenant-peasants but on a transitional 
situation produced by the impact of the harsh, impersonal 
relations of the money economy". Yet the majority of 
famine victims at the time were not southern tenants, or 
even dispossessed Afar, but were riste cultivators from 
Wollo and Tigray; and in 1974-75, Harerghe pastoralists 
barely affected by capitalism. Given the history of 
famine in these areas well before the impact of 
capitalism, one is inclined to agree with Fitzgerald 
(1980) who argues that the adverse impact of capitalism, 
or even of commercialisation of agriculture under existing 
relations of production have been overgeneralised. It 
will also be recalled that Mesfin Wolde-Mariam (1984) 
found that 'over the period 1958-77, famine was least 
likely to be encountered in those awrajas which were most 
economically advanced. Furthermore, the marxist 
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overstatement ignores the beneficial effects of 
improvement in the forces of production, with agrarian 
capitalism increasing the earning capacity of those riste 
cultivators who were able to keep their land while having 
access to extra seasonal wage labour opportunities. 
Agrarian capitalism would also have expanded foreign 
exchange earning capacity, thereby improving the balance 
of payments position. This potential contrasts with the 
extremely poor performance of the state farms created on 
the former commercial estates after the revolution. we 
may now consider how the transition to socialism has 
further affected the resource base and income earning 
opportunities of the vulnerable Ethiopian peasantry. 
4.7 The Imoact of Post-Revolutionary Reforms 
The 1974 revolution created opportunities for the radical 
transformation of Ethiopia's economy and society. 
Foremost among them was a land reform whereby all land was 
nationalised and peasant households were given usufructory 
rights to parcels of land, with the maximum size of 
holding being set at ten hectares. At the same time, 
peasants were ordered to form associations on the basis of 
800 hectare units (rather than on the basis of a specified 
population size). To assist in the campaign (zemecha)t 
and to improve literacy among peasants, some 60,000 high 
school and university students were sent to the 
countryside for two years (1975-76). This move also 
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helped to dissipate opposition to the Dergue, as students 
were among those most ideologically and-actively opposed 
to the military government. The PeasantlAssociations 
(PAs) were also designed to politicise the peasantry and 
to ensure that the land reforms were carried out 
successfully. They were to be instruments of rural 
administration and development. 
Despite considerable opposition in some areas from 
supporters of the ancien regime (for a detailed example of 
opposition in Wollo province, see Mulugeta Bezzabeh, 
1980), PAs were widely established. By 1980, there were 
25,000 associations covering some 5 million households. 
These varied in activity from having virtual paper status 
to being capable of orga nising major projects such as 
service cooperatives and road building (Wood 1983). In 
general, the peasant associations were welcomed by the 
majority of tenants, who initially gained a great deal 
from land reform. However, riste cultivators had less to 
gain and may have resisted land reform (although not tax 
reform) in some areas - notably those such as Gojjam which 
were traditionally hostile to attempts by the centre to 
register agricultural land and tax the agricultural 
surplus. Also, richer peasants would inevitably attempt 
to be well-represented on the PA committees, and would 
then be in a position to allocate some of the best land to 
themselves (Brietzke op cit). 
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Thus, the hand of an emerging 'kulak' class was 
strengthened by the removal of the powerful gultegnas and 
their replacement with a new rival elite, represented by 
the Peasant Association committees, albeit under the 
nominal control of the centre. A further negative aspect 
of land reform is said to be the lack of incentive for 
peasants to improve their land in those areas where 
regular land redistribution takes place, as the trustee 
can never be sure that he or she will retain improved land 
(Aseffa 1986). 1 
An immediate result of the land reform was a fall in the 
marketed agricultural surplus, as peasants who no longer 
had to hand over large portions of their produce increased 
their own consumption (Ghose 1985; Gebrewold 1981). 
Consequentlyt the government was faced with a need to 
develop and control agricultural surpluses for foreign 
exchange and to ensure that urban populations would be 
fed. This was done in a number of ways. State farms were 
set up on fallow or virgin land and were devoted to the 
production of both foodcrops and agro-industrial crops, 
notably in the latter case cotton and coffee. Expansion 
of these was particularly rapid over 1979-81, augmenting 
the original commercial farms which were now nationalised. 
The state farms have taken the lion's share of modern 
farming inputs, for example, Ghose presents figures 
showing that with only 4 per cent of cultivated area, 
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state farms were allocated 76 per cent of available 
chemical fertilisers and 95 per cent of improved seed 
varieties over 1981-2 (op cit p 134). At the same time, 
the government attempted to encourage the formation of 
producer cooperatives, believing that these would be more 
efficient than individual smallholder production. In 
fact, yields on producer cooperatives have been 
substantially lower than on peasant farms. State farms 
have been most productive in terms of total contribution 
to national output relative to area planted; but in terms 
of returns to inputs it is likely that equivalent 
investment in peasant farming would have been more 
productive. 
Another means of processing agricultural surpluses was 
introduced through the establishment of the Agricultural 
Marketing Corporation in 1976. This parastatal body 
purchases foodcrops for distribution at controlled prices 
(see Chapter 2). Most of the purchases are made from 
traders, state farms and peasant associations through a 
network of collecting and purchasing centres throughout 
the country. Recently, procurement has fallen to around a 
third of the peak levels achieved in 1982-83. 
The reduction in procurement has not been merely a result 
of extensive crop failurest but has also been a product of 
the unwillingness of producers and merchants to sell grain 
at low official prices, especially at a time when open- 
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market wholesale and retail prices have been climbing 
rapidly, particularly in regions suffering an overall 
grain deficit. This situation contrasts with the rapid 
growth of marketed output from the peasant sector over 
1977-82 (Ghose op cit). During this period the price 
differential between official and open market prices was 
much less then during the years of food crisis. Indeed, 
in some cases the prices offered by the state were quite 
attractive to sellers in surplus regions, so peasants and 
traders were much more willing to sell agricultural 
products to the AMC. Severe restrictions on inter- 
regional trade, implemented through state control over 
truck fleets through its transport agency, NATRACOR, have 
made it difficult for traders to respond to market signals 
in deficit regions. However, a certain amount of informal 
trade is still carried out; mostly using pack animals and 
mostly within areas of the country where state control is 
largely peripheral. Peasants themselves will turn to 
trade in an attempt to augment dwindling incomes caused by 
crop failures. 
Taxation of rural producers has also steadily increased in 
recent years, despite a honeymoon period immediately 
following the land reforms when peasants enjoyed 
relatively high disposable incomes with the eradication of 
landlordism. While there is little or no information on 
current levels of taxation available from official 
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sources, Clay and Holcomb (1985) have gone-into the 
subject in some detail in interviews in Sudan with 
refugees from southern Ethiopia who have fled resettlement 
and villagisation. They have made the following 
noteworthy statement: 
"All those interviewed pointed out that the new government 
had promised to eliminate taxes and payments to landlords. 
This promise, along with endorsement of peasants' 
initiative in expelling southern Amhara landlords and 
their Oromo collaboratorst accounted for the initial 
positive response by the local population to the Dergue 
and its policies. The breaking of these promises, 
however, accounted for the peasants' bitterness and sense 
of betrayal. outrage was so strong that all respondents 
remembered with precision the exponential rise in baseline 
taxes. The first tax payment required was a E$7 land tax 
in 1977. This land-use fee jumped to E$20 the following 
year. After this, the land tax rose from E$30 in 1980 to 
E$50 in 1984" (ibid p 139). 
In addition to land taxes, a whole range of other taxes 
and 'contributions' are now made. These include 
contributions to the peasant# youth and women's 
associations; payments for roads, construction of schools 
and other facilities; fees paid for various committee 
expenses, and contributions to 'revolutionary' campaigns 
such as wars, resettlement and villagisation. The average 
tax and fee burden for the agricultural year 1983-84 of 12 
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farmers interviewed by Clay and Holcomb was E$188. As the 
researchers observe: "The totals ranged from E$102 to 
E$250 per household and were based on AMC prices - 
notoriously low - for grain and equivalent values for 
livestock and confiscated household goods. " (op cit 
p 140). The real market value of contributions was 
therefore 2-3 times higher and can be compared to the 
estimated incomes per caput of the sample households of 
E$720 pa. Indeed two-thirds of respondents had been 
forced to sell livestock in order to pay taxes, including 
oxen. others lost livestock and other assets through 
confiscation by government for use by other farmers being 
resettled or collectivised. 
Soil and water conservation activities have also been 
implemented through the Ministry of Agriculture and in 
collaboration with Peasant Associations in selected 
districts. The largest project involves large scale tree 
planting and terracing and is run on a 'food-for-work' 
basis with the support of the World Food Programme (see 
Holt 1985). Apart from contributing to a hoped-for 
improvement in soil fertility, the Wollo project has been 
an important source of income for peasants threatened with 
starvation in recent years (Yeraswerk and Solomon 1985). 
The ecological aspects of vulnerability to famine will be 
discussed in the next chapterr following which the 
interrelationship between economic, environmental, social 
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and political factors will be considered in a case study 
of the most recent famine. 
4.8 Summary 
In this chapter, we have investigated some of the major 
factors contributing to the enduring vulnerability of the 
Ethiopian peasantry to famine. The most important 
influence on the impoverishment of an industrious people 
on a potentially rich natural resource base has been the 
systematic exploitation of the tenant by the landlord. 
Even where peasants have enjoyed partial access to their 
own holdings through inheritancer the landlord and the 
State have been able to exact considerable levels of 
taxation, with combined rents and taxes making up some 
three-quarters of the household's produce in some cases. 
Under such conditions, the peasant had little incentive to 
extend his area of cultivation or to undertake land 
improvements. The feudal lords and the central government 
similarly made few attempts to encourage investments in 
traditional agriculture, beyond allowing minor experiments 
in rural development by foreign governments. However, the 
development of certain favourable lowland locations for 
commercial capitalist agriculture was promoted by the 
State in the interests of generating increased foreign 
exchange revenues. This was done by inviting foreign 
companies onto land which had been alienated from its 
pastoral inhabitants. Consequently, the vulnerability to 
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famine of certain pastoral groups, such as the Afar, 
increased. However, the new plantations did provide 
substantial ancilliary income-earning opportunities for 
the highland peasantry. 
The 1974 revolution initially brought some relief to the 
peasantry in the form of reduced rents and taxes. A 
network of Peasant Associations was also set up which held 
out considerable promise for agricultural extension work 
and for the organisation of labour for investment in 
public works. However, the priorities of the new 
government remain the same as those of the old - the 
consolidation of the empire and the maintenance of the 
priviliges of an (expanded) eliter this time made up of 
military personnel and bureaucrats rather than the 
nobility. Agriculture continues to be neglected, while 
the demands of warfare and the construction of a new 
socialist state have ensured that taxes would be raised to 
levels approaching those of the ancien regime. These 
priorities have aggravated the problem of increasing 
fragmentation of peasant holdings through rapid population 
growth, which seems set to result in increased land 
degradation in densely-settled areas and to reduce 
aggregate food availability. Whether or not this 
supposition is borne out by the available evidence is the 
subject of the next chapter. 
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Note 
1 However, in other respects the PAs have been a 
progressive force. As instruments of data gathering and 
famine relief they appear to have discharged their duties 
competently and fairly in many cases (Holt and Cutler 
1984). 
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Chapter 5: 
The roots of famine: 
Environmental degradationt drought and crop production, 
1961-84 
Introduction 
In this chapter, we shall consider the causes and 
consequences of soil erosion and related land degradation 
in Ethiopia. It will be seen that although estimates of 
the extent of soil erosion are crude, recent work suggests 
that the problem is far advanced in the overcultivated 
highlands. The reasons for this state of affairs are 
complex, and little sociological work has so far been 
carried out to account for the propensity of highland 
farmers to degrade their own environment. Here we shall 
follow Blaikie's (1985) approach in order to unravel the 
social processes underlying the physical processes causing 
soil erosion. Blaikie directs our attention to questions 
about which groups or classes of people are contributing 
most to land degradation, -and about the circumstances 
under which it occurs. He argues that the poor are often 
forced to degrade their environment because they are 
overburdened with rents and taxes, and are unable to 
reinvest surplus product in the land. Before examining 
the evidence for this thesis, we shall consider the 
geographical extent and physical impact of the problem. 
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5.2. The causes, extent and impact of soil erosion 
in Ethiopia 
It is often asserted that the Ethiopian highlands are 
suffering from acute problems of soil erosion. For 
example, Hancock quotes UN estimates that around 1.6 
billion tonnes of soil are lost every year from wind and 
water erosion (Hancock 1985 p 75). This estimate is 
higher than that of Mesfin Wolde Mariam (1972), who stated 
that the highlands lose about 960 million tonnes of soil 
annually. The difference between the two estimates may 
indicate that the annual rate of soil loss is increasing. 1 
Little detailed knowledge of the extent of erosion 
problems appears to exist. The most useful source is the 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Land Use Planning 
Project (FAO/ALP 1984), which divides the country into a 
number of agro-ecological zones and describes agricultural 
conditions and natural vegetation in each. Four 
categories of cultivated land are identified: state farms; 
intensively cultivated; moderately cultivated; and 
perennial crop cultivation. 
Intensively cultivated land makes up some 10 per cent of 
land area, with 70 per cent of this area under a wide 
variety of annual crops. The remaining 30 per cent is 
left fallow or is unutilisable for agriculture. The 
report notes that overgrazing. and overcultivation have led 
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to widespread soil erosion: 
"Grazing land is excessively overstocked during the 
cropping season. Thus, the vegetative cover in these 
areas hardly ever grows more than a few centimetres, even 
at the peak of the wet season. Crop harvesting is not 
completed until well into the dry season, at which time 
the crop stubble, weeds and other vegetation are dry. At 
the beginning of the harvesting season, livestock move 
progressively into the previously cropped land for 
aftermath grazing as this is harvested, often at a faster 
rate than the crop harvesters. Consequently, by the end 
of the harvesting activities, the aftermath is nearly 
exhausted. This cycle leaves very extensive areas 
completely bare by the middle of the dry season - in both 
the areas which have just been cropped and those which 
have been fallow during the ending season. The result is 
tremendous erosion at the onset of the rainy season, and 
well into it. " (ibid p 6). 
The land-use study assesses the main areas of intensive 
cultivation as lying in Arssi, Shoat eastern Gojjam and 
eastern Gonder; western Tigray and western Wollo. The 
report goes on to note that "some of the worst eroded 
areas in the country are within this mapping unit in 
northern Shoat western Wollo and western Tigray" (ibid). 
These areas are among those traditionally most famine- 
affected in Ethiopia. 
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Moderately cultivated landr making up about 11 per cent of 
the country, is less intensively used but is also 
suffering from erosion. This will presumably worsen in 
future with increasing population growth and migration 
from overpopulated areas. Some of the migration is 
spontaneousl and part of an historical expansion of 
population southwards and westwards; while some is 
organised by the State, often on a very large scale. 
While large-scale migration is a relatively new 
phenomenon, it seems likely that it will contribute to the 
reproduction of ecological conditions existing in the 
homeland areas of the migrants. Soil degradation is 
likely to occur rapidly on lowland tropical soils which 
are not suitable for intensive cultivation of the kind 
practised by highland peasants. 
A rather more detailed study of soil erosion has been 
carried out by Wright (1984) as part of the comprehensive 
Ethiopian Highlands Reclamation Study. Wright describes 
the main process of soil erosion in the highlandsl which 
(to simplify somewhat) begins with abrupt deforestation. 
This is followed by physical damage to the soil from heavy 
downpours during the rainy seasont and is compounded by 
the loss of plant nutrients, particularly from perennial 
plants., Overcultivation and overgrazing (as described 
earlier) reduce the ability of the soil to readjust to the 
new farming environment, which it is capable of doing if 
the change in land use from forest cover to intensive 
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agriculture were to be more gradually introduced. Wright 
also discusses soil erosion in terms of a somewhat wider 
time horizon whereby so-called soil degradation could be 
seen as part of a long-term process of renewal of the 
soil. Some degree of soil erosion is always necessary for 
soil renewal. 
, 
Nevertheless, the intensity and extent of erosion in the 
Ethiopian highlands does seem to be exceptional. Although 
conditions vary widely by soil typer topography and agro- 
ecological zone, Wright calculates that 52 per cent of 
highland soils "show significant signs of accelerated 
erosion" (ibid p vii), whereby the rate of soil erosion 
exceeds that of soil renewal. of this proportion, a 
little over half suffers "seriously from the effects of 
accelerated erosion", and a little under half "show 
moderately or slightly accelerated erosion which is 
growing rapidly worse in many areas" (ibid). In physical 
terms, the higher rates of soil erosion could amount to 
2 50-200 tons per hectare per annum. 
These findings are supported by Mesfin Wolde Mariam's 
(1984) wide-ranging study of the causes of famine in 
Ethiopia. Mesfin has assessed the quality of the physical 
environment by compiling five variables on a district-by- 
district basis. These include: the ratio of mean annual 
rainfall to the mean annual temperature; the number of 
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rainy days over a 120-day period; a coefficient of 
variation of annual rainfall; a soil rating; and the 
proportion of cultivable land to total land area. When 
these composite indices are related to the incidence of 
famine, a highly negative correlation is obtained, with 
the null hypothesis (that there is no relationship between 
the incidence of famine and the quality of the physical 
environment) being rejected with more than 99 percent 
confidence. In other words, there appears to be a strong 
relationship between the incidence of famine and the 
poverty of the environment. 
The widespread incidence of severe soil degradation in 
highland Ethiopia can be explained in large measure by the 
historical legacy of the excessive extraction of surplus 
produce from the peasantry. We have seen from the 
previous chapter that as late as the 19th century the 
peasantry was potentially rich, but was constrained from 
cultivating in full measure mostly because the bulk of the 
wealth produced would be siphoned off by the balabats, 
gultegna and other intermediaries through a process of 
subinfeudation running all the way up to the provincial 
rases and to the emperor. While during earlier periods of 
relative abundance of land this situation would not have 
led directly to problems of soil erosion - except perhaps 
in that manpower which might otherwise have been used for 
on-farm investment would have been diverted to other ends 
such as corvee farm labour or warfare - it became 
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increasingly problematic as the population grew to reach 
the physical limits of cultivation given existing 
technologies and modes of social organisation. The 
landlords failed to invest part of the available surplus 
in productive agricultural activities, instead frittering 
away the fruits of peasant labour on conspicuous 
consumption and incessant warfare. The relative 
stagnation of the Ethiopian type of feudalism ensured that 
technologies remained backward and a Boserupian-style 
agricultural revolution, whereby the intensification of 
agricultural techniques begins when the land frontier is 
reached (Boserup 1965), did not occur. Under such 
circumstances,, in Blaikie's words: 
"surpluses are extracted from cultivators who then in turn 
are forced to extract 'surpluses' from the environment 
(stored up fertility of the soil, forest resources, long 
evolved and productive pastures, and so on), and this in 
time ..... leads to degradation and/or erosion" (op cit 
p 124). 
We should note here that the socio-economic circumstances 
causing soil erosion in Ethiopia are rather different from 
those which are usually shown to be the ultimate causes of 
soil erosion and land degradation in most LDCs. In the 
European colonies, much of the best land would be 
appropriated by the colonising power for use by settlers 
or by foreign companies to grow export crops. 
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Consequently, the indigenous population would be forced to 
farm on a dwindling land area. Classic examples of this 
process were (and are) to be found among the Kikuyu of 
Kenya and in southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). We have seen 
from the previous chapter that the commercial exploitation 
of favoured lands was encouraged in Ethiopia from the 
1940s onwards, with predictable adverse effects on the 
indigenous peoples, except where certain local rulers were 
able to become comprador capitalist farmers. However, the 
impact of such development was limited in terms of 
physical size of the areas covered by commercial farms, 
although the effects on markets for agricultural goods and 
labour were quite far reaching. Economic dualism 
resulted, with a rapidly growing capitalist agricultural 
sector having access to cheap peasant labour, especially 
on a seasonal basis, which was in turn subsidised by the 
produce of the peasant's own farms. At the same time, 
surpluses were being extracted from the peasantry by 
'feudal'landlords (who might also be comprador 
capitalists). Yet agricultural capitalism was a double- 
edged sword. It acted as a safety-net for peasants who 
were able to find wage-work, especially if they had 
suffered crop failures on their farms. 
The 1974 revolution did not change the objective 
conditions of the peasantry very much. Although the 
landlord/tax gatherers were swept away, renewed demands 
were made upon the peasantry by the military government. 
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Taxes were first dramatically slashedr and then gradually 
raised to the quite punitive (and often arbitary) levels 
which now exist. New taxes in the form of compulsory 
purchases of grain at fixed prices were introduced. Trade 
restrictions were imposed, introducing a new squeeze on a 
peasantry which was traditionally heavily involved in 
small-scale commerce. Warfare actually increased, adding 
a further dimension to movement restrictions, and 
contributing to the destruction of produce. Worse still, 
the heavy demands of the military budget ensured that 
funds which could have been at least partially restored to 
the peasantry through rural development projects were 
unavailable. only limited attempts at rural development 
were made, mostly through projects implemented with 
foreign aid. However, the establishment of a rural 
network of peasants associations (PAs) did give 
opportunities for collective decision-making and action to 
solve the problem of soil erosion at local level. Yet the 
PAs do not seem to be fulfilling this function 
particularly well, probably because the committees of rich 
peasants controlling them do not see it as necessarily in 
their interests to do so. The PAs exist primarily to 
facilitate the flow of surplus from the peasantry to the 
state bureaucracy. 
To conclude then, soil erosion and land degradation in 
Ethiopia should be seen as the outcome of a long history 
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of excessive surplus extraction from the peasantry. 
Investment in agricultural capital and techniques was 
prevented by conspicuous consumption on behalf of the 
aristocracy and their intermediaries. This is not to 
suggest that the peasantry did not adapt to changing 
circumstances - experimentation with different cropst crop 
mixes and cultivation methods would certainly have occured 
(cf Richards 1985). Yet the scope for agricultural 
intensification was slight without the aid of capital 
investment in the land and in improved techniques of 
production. Adaptation therefore took the form firstly of 
extending the land frontier up to the limits of 
cultivation and secondly of intensifying land use using 
existing farming techniques while not investing in the 
maintenance of soil fertility. A picture then emerges of 
periodic climatic disruption impinging upon a fragile 
resource base farmed to overcapacity at a given level of 
technology. In a localised sense, then, the famines of 
the northern highlands may be seen as Malthusian crises. 
Population has exceeded the carrying capacity of the land 
at a given level of technology and social organisation. 3 
5.3. The Impact of Drought 
Meteorologists tend to distinguish three broad 
definitional categories of drought: meteorologicall 
hydrological and agricultural (Farmer and wigley 1985; 
Glantz 1987). Meteorological droughts refer to the 
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reduction of rainfall below the long-term mean over a 
specified period and to a specified extent. For example, 
a meteorological drought may be considered as seasonal or 
annual precipitation of more than 25 per cent below the 30 
year average. Different cut-off points are adopted 
depending upon the opinion of the analyst or the purposes 
of the definition. 
Hydrological drought refers to low levels of rivers, 
lakes, reservoirs, wells, waterholes and other sources of 
groundwater. These levels are determined not only by 
levels of precipitation; but also by levels of offtake for 
human and agricultural use, and by rates of evaporation. 
The levels of offtake are likely to change over time, 
especially with increasing population and changes in land 
use - for example through the introduction of irrigated 
agriculture. 
Agricultural drought occurs when crops fail to get enough 
moisture (from whatever source) at the proper times during 
the growing season. Againt there may be different cut-off 
points adopted to determine agricultural drought for 
example the World meteorological Organisation lists 59 
indices of agricultural drought (Hounam et al 1975). 
However, Farmer and Wigley note that "in human terms, 
agricultural drought is a moisture deficit on a sufficient 
scale to cause disruption of the rural economy. In an 
extreme agricultural drought, crops fail and animals, and 
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perhaps people, die" (op cit pp 24-25). This statement 
concurs with our notion that drought can act as an 
exogenous shock to the economyr precipitating a series of 
events leading to famine. Similarly, Glantz (1987) speaks 
of the 'second and third-order' effects, such as grain 
price increases, the need for extra food imports, and an 
acceleration of rural-urban migration in addition to the 
obvious first-order effects of drought, such as withered 
crops, reduced pasture and forage, and dry watering 
points. 
Meteorological, hydrological and agricultural droughts are 
all obviously related phenomena and are respectively 
characterised by low average levels of precipitation, 
groundwater and moisture availability for crops. However, 
even under drought conditions precipitation may vary 
widely over time. For example, hailstorms frequently 
destroy standing crops in the Ethiopian highlands despite 
a previous dry-spell. During droughts, what little rain 
there is may fall heavily over a short space of time. 
Timberlake (1985) describes 'the destructive impact of 
rain on overused soil during one week in May 1984" in 
Wollo. He writes that: 
"the rains ... bounced off (the) compacted vegetationless 
watershed soil. The water ran off quickly in flashfloods, 
carrying away soil and precious seeds towards the lowland 
deserts to the east, or towards the Nile basin to the 
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west. After a night of rain, I looked, out from a hilltop 
to see massive erosion, hills looking as if they had been 
dynamited, mud and rocks from the fields of hill farmers 
strewn over the fields of valley farmers" (op cit, pp 21- 
22). 
Thus it may be more appropriate to speak strictly of 'rain 
failures' rather than drought when discussing conditions 
in the semi-arid tropics. In general, the variability of 
precipitation rises as its overall incidence falls. The 
term 'drought' tends to imply to the layman that virtually 
no rain falls, or else that available rainfall is weak and 
vacillating. 
5.4. The Incidence and Causes of Rain Failure in Sub- 
Saharan Africa 
Sub-Saharan African is not well-served with regularly 
reporting meteorological stations. Gaps in coverage in 
central and eastern Africa are a particular constraint on 
data collection (UCAR 1985). Nevertheless, data series 
exist, particularly for West Africa, which in some cases 
go back to the 1890s. These time series have allowed 
meteorologists to construct generalised classifications of 
agro-climatic zones. The western part of Ethiopia 
impinges on four of these zones: the Sahelo-Saharan; the 
Sahel; the Soudan and the Soudano Guinean zone (Nicholson 
and Chervin 1983). These four zones coincide with the 
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region which is commonly referred to as the Sahel. 
The characteristics of precipitation in each zone are 
described by Nicholson (1980) and are reproduced in Table 
5.1. It can be seen from the table that the further north 
is the zone, the lower is the mean annual rainfall. The 
coefficient of variation of rainfall also rises with the 
increase in latitude; while the length of the rainy season 
shortens. Nicholson has plotted annual rainfall 
departures from the mean for each zone, using time-series 
data from stations in each region going back in some cases 
to the beginning of the century. These data series are 
reproduced in figure 5.1. 
It can be seen from the figure that for each zone average 
rainfall declines sharply towards the end of the period. 
In the case of the two most northerly zones, this decline 
began in the late 1950s. The recovery of the rains during 
the mid 1960s was short-lived, while the apparent recovery 
during 1973-75 was below the long term mean. These 
findings are confirmed by Lamb (1985) whose sub-Saharan 
rainfall index is compiled from 20 stations (see Figure 
5.2). Although Lamb locates the genesis of the drought in 
1969, he argues that it has continued unabated since then. 
The famine of 1984 therefore followed 17 years of 
meteorological drought. 
The length and severity of the recent drought has led to a 
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Figure 5.1: Annual Rainfall Departures for 4 North 
African Zones 
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debate among climatologists as to whether the changing 
weather pattern is the result of a permanent shift of 
climate. Although it is clear from written historical 
records and from analyses of past lake and river levels 
that protracted hydrological droughts occurred in the past 
(see Nicholson 1978 and Maley 1981) as Farmer and Wigley 
observe: "the recent rainfall decline is unprecedented in 
duration, intensity, spatial character and seasonal 
expression' (op cit p 2). Whether this is part of a very 
long term cycle or represents a fundamental shift towards 
drier and more variable precipitation conditions simply is 
not yet known with any certainty. 
For those who argue in favour of the case for a long-term 
shift in climate, the actions of man are are held to be a 
prime culprit. These anthropogenic factors include 
deforestation, overcultivation and overgrazing, all of 
which reduce the amount of vegetation on the earth's 
surface. This in turn increases the reflectivity (albedo) 
of the surface, which raises atmospheric temperature and 
reduces the opportunities for cloud formation. 
Evapotranspiration, a major component of available 
atmospheric moisture, is also reduced. The lack of plant 
cover allows accelerated soil erosion through the 
increased force of infrequent but heavy downpours. A 
further effect may be that of added atmospheric dust 
curtailing solar radiation, which would have much the same 
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impact as increasing surface reflectivity. To these 
anthropogenic factors could be added the global effects of 
the temperature increase attributed to the 'greenhouse 
effect'. This is the result of the burning of fuels 
(particularly fossil fuels in the industrialised 
countries) which raises the amount of carbon dioxide in 
the atmosphere. This in turn increases the absorbtion of 
solar radiation, raising the soil temperature, and hence 
atmospheric temperature. Concentrations of carbon dioxide 
in the atmosphere are increasing at the rate of 0.5 per 
cent every year (Timberlake 1985). Some climatologists 
believe, on the basis of computer modelling, that this 
will raise Average temperatures in the tropics by some 2- 
30 centigrade by early next centuryl while at the same 
time increasing climatic variability. 
While the relationship between these effects and the 
incidence of drought is open to debate, a further factor 
which has recently received attention has been the 
relationship between 'El Nino' and the incidence of 
drought in sub-Saharan Africa (Ropelwski and Halpert 
1986). The term "El Nino" (Spanish for "Christ-child") 
refers to the warm water which appears off the coast of 
Peru in late December each year. The term "southern 
oscillation" (SO) refers to the pressure differential 
which exists between the Pacific and Indian oceans - when 
pressure is high over the Pacific ocean it tends to be low 
over the Indian oceanr and vice versa. A fairly high 
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degree of correlation between pressure at mean sea level 
in northern Australia and equatorial Africa has also been 
observed, indicating a further connection westwards. 
During 1982-83, sea surface temperatures in the eastern 
Pacific were exceptionally hight registering 1-50 
centigrade above normal. This caused a sharp and early 
fall in the So index to record low levels. In turn this 
forced a shift eastwards in the convectional currents, 
known as Walker cells, which dominate weather patterns in 
the equatorial belt. - As a result,, moisture-laden winds 
circulated eastwards of their normal position, and both 
Africa and Australia suffered severe drought. 
The precise causal mechanisms behind the ENSO phenomenon 
are not well-understood, and they are undoubtedly complex, 
involving interactions between ocean currents and 
temperatures and atmospheric pressure. Some of these 
complex inter-relationships are outlined by the World 
Meteorological Organisation: 
"In the typical ENSO phase with a falling SO index, 
pressure rises over the Indonesian region. The pressure 
gradient along the equator decreases, and in the case of 
unusually strong events such as that of 1982-83, actually 
reverses. This is accompanied by a relaxation in the 
Pacific trade winds. The easterly winds in the western 
equatorial Pacific diminish, then change direction, 
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blowing from west to east. This dramatic change in the 
drag on the ocean surface, which normally persists for a 
period of several months, sets in motion a complex 
dynamical response in the ocean resulting in major changes 
in the equatorial current system and a change in sea 
level..... The combined effect is to create a much thicker 
mixed layer and warm ocean surface off Ecuador/N. Peru - 
the El Nino anomally ..... ENSO brings heavy inter- 
tropical rains to the central and eastern Pacific and 
tends to leave the rest of the equatorial belt relatively 
dry" (WMO 1985). 
Thus meteorological drought in the Sahel could'be at least 
partly attributable to the ENSO phenomenon, which occurs 
approximately every 2-7 yearst but which was exceptionally 
severe during 1982-83, and appears to have had a global 
effect on climate. 
5.5. Rain Failures, CropFailures and Famine in Post- 
Revolutionary Ethiopia 
The record of agricultural production for the years 
following the revolution has been unfortunate. Table 5.2 
lists the main features of the situation reports compiled 
for the years 1975-85 by the FAO's Global Early Warning 
System. It can be seen that not a year has passed without 
climatic or war-related catastrophe in several provinces. 
Notable events include the Ogaden drought of 1975-76; 
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warfare in the Ogaden and in Eritrea in 1977; and the 
onset of severe drought in the northern provinces in the 
same year. Although there was some respite over the years 
1978-79, serious rain failures persisted in the north over 
the period 1980-83, and had become almost nationwide by 
1984. There was a considerable improvement in rainfall 
conditions over 1985, but widespread loss of assets and 
demographic disruption reduced the ability of famine- 
affected populations to rehabilitate themselves. 
Throughout the decade there are numerous reports of pest 
attacks, hailstorms, flooding etc. contributing to crop 
failures. Thus it is clearly inappropriate to attribute 
the 1984 famine solely to sudden drought, as its roots lie 
in the persistent crop failures of the previous decade, 
which were precipitated by a number of factors, and were 
presumably aggravated by environmental degradation. As 
table 5.2 indicates, the northern provinces of Eritrea, 
Tigray, Wollo, Gonder and Shoa have been continually hit 
by crop failures, and it is therefore not surprising that 
in these areas famine conditions were most widespread 
during the 1984 emergency. 
In view of these reportedly severe crop failures, we shall 
now consider the effect on cereals production, both 
nationally and in regional terms. In this way we may 
begin to discern the extent to which a major cause of 
famine has been an absolute decline in food availability 
(FAD). This is important given Sen's rejection of FAD as 
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a cause of the 1973-74 famine in Wollo. 
5.6. Trends in cereals Production and imports: 1961-1984 
Data are available from the Central Statistical Office 
covering some 22 crops. FAO has compiled these data and 
has aggregated cereals production for each year. As 
cereals typically make some 85 per cent of the diet of the 
peasantry, it is reasonable to use cereals data as a 
measure of food availability for the population. However, 
we should at the outset add a note of caution. Before 
1982, when the FAO introduced a reporting system based on 
crop-cutting and systematic sampling procedures, the 
estimates of agricultural production were carried out by 
MOA officials on the basis of 'eyeball" estimation of crop 
production. These estimates were also likely to be 
adjusted to suit the purposes of the district and 
provincial administratorst before finding their way to 
Addis Ababa. Consequently, the data series are for the 
most part extremely suspect (Ghose 1985). 
In table 5.3 the data are divided into two series: 1961- 
71 and 1972-84. It can be seen that cereals production 
per caput, using revised population data from the 1984 
census, has fallen slightly over the period 1961-84, at - 
0.76 per cent per annum. However, over the period 1970- 
84, no change in the trend rate of growth has taken place. 
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Nevertheless, the long-term trends conceal considerable 
year-to-year variation in cereals production per caput. 
This was at a relatively high level in the early 1960s, 
peaking at 164.5kg per caput in 1964, and at its lowest 
during the 1970s, with production falling to as little as 
111.2kg per caput in 1977. This was a famine year,, 
although food shortages were not widely reported (see 
chapter 3). The well-known famine years of 1974 and 1984 
record the next lowest levels of cereals production per 
caput, at 115.3kg and 112.2kg respectively. 
Production figures for the 1970s and early 1980s appear to 
be less stable than during the 1960s. Between 1961 and 
1971 the range of cereals production per caput was from 
138.8kg to 164.5kg, giving a low coefficient of variation 
(c. v. ) of 0.041. During the period 1971-1984 the range was 
from 111.2kg to 169.9kg giving a c. v. of 0.17. The c. v. 
for the whole period 1961-84 was 0.165. 
It might be expected that food imports would be negatively 
correlated with total crop production. In fact, the 
reverse appears to be the case. The correlation 
coefficients for aggregate production and imports are 0.51 
for the period 1961-71; and 0.50 for the period 1971-84. 
The correlation coefficient for the whole period 1961-84 
is 0.66. The linear regression coefficient of imports on 
production is also positive, at 0.44. Hence'there is a 
strong association between growth in production and growth 
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in imports. However, the coefficient of variation for 
imports is exceptionally high, at 1.113 for the whole 
period. This compares with a relatively low c. v. for 
production (0.165) over 1961-84. 
5.7. Trends in area cultivated and cereals yields: 1961-84 
Under the conditions of agriculture so far described, we 
might expect area under cultivation to expand with rising 
population, and yields to fall as soil loses its 
fertility. However, according to the aggregate data, the 
reverse is true. Between 1961 and 1984, area under 
cultivation fell by an average annual rate of -0.85%, from 
about 5.5 million hectares (m. ha) and to below 4.5 m. ha by 
the middle 1970s, with only 1979 and 1982 being notable 
exceptions (see Table 5.4). By 1984, area planted was 
down to 4.57 m. ha. The rate of decline appears to have 
slowed somewhat in later years: the annual growth rate 
for the period 1961-70 was -1.12% p. a. compared with -0.84 
for the period 1970-84. 
Again contrary to the trends one might expect, cereals 
yields have been rising, albeit slowly, from 0.71 mt/ha in 
1961 to 1.04 mt/ha in 1984, with 1982 being an exceptional 
year during which yields of 1.34 mt/ha were recorded. 
Trend growth rates of yield for some crops have exceeded 
the rate of growth of population (see Table 5.3). Millet, 
maize and sorghum have shown the highest rates of growth 
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of yield. However, the trend rates of growth conceal 
considerable regional and temporal variations. There was 
Pe5j6,1A( 
a serious decline in cereals yields during the earlY-mid 
1980s, as we shall see shortly. 
5.8 Cereals production and net food availability 
per caput: 1969-84 
Table 5.5 shows indices of cereals production per caput 
and net food availability per caput (from all sources). 
Average-production for the years 1969-71 is taken as a 
basis for comparison. During the period under review, two 
periods of famine (1973-74 and 1983-84) took place. 
Additionally, the year 1978 saw substantial'famine relief 
operations following harvest failures in parts of the 
northern provinces during 1977. In view of Sen's (1981) 
criticism of the notion of Food Availability Decline (FAD) 
being a major causal factor in the development of the 
famines of 1973-74, it is worthwhile reconsidering this 
view using the FAO data. 
We should note that food production data refer to the belq 
and meher harvests of the calendar year, and include a 
certain amount of carryover into the next calendar year. 
For example, the 1972 figure includes the belg harvest of 
July/August 1972 and the meher harvest of October 1972- 
January 1973. The production figures therefore. inform us 
of domestic food availability for the major part of 1973; 
as well as of the outcome of crop conditions for 1972. 
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Sen used the same periodisation in order to calculate 
domestic food availability. 
Net food availability (also called net food consumption in 
the FAO data series) is assumed availability/consumption 
once seed, feed, waste, stock transfers and exports have 
been subtracted from domestic production plus imports. 
The allowance for all factors other than exports is 
calculated at 20 per cent of gross production. The figure 
for net availability is given in calories per head, using 
the latest estimates of population size, which allows 
aggregation of food sources having different caloric 
values, such as cereals, pulses and meat. 
Again, the majority of food stated as available in a given 
year will in fact only physically be available to the 
consumer towards the end of that year, or during the 
following year. An exception may be imports, which-make 
up only a small fraction of total food availability'. 
The overall situation for the years 1972-84 is as follows. 
Per caput food availability is below the 3-year average 
1969-71 from 1972 until 1978. After 1978, food 
availability is at the same levels or above those of 1969- 
71 with the exception of 1983. Cereals production follows 
broadly the same pattern, except for 1981,1983 and 1984r 
which are below the base 3-year average. The data may be 
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considered in more detail by referring to specific periods 
of famine or near-famine. 
1973-74 
Famine occurred in 1973 in Wollo, and in 1974 in Hararghe. 
National food availability per caput is poor in 1972 and 
1973 (at 7 per cent below the base years in each case) and 
very poor in 1974, when it was 18 per cent below the base 
year. Cereals production was only marginally affected in 
1972 and 1973, but was very poor in 1974. However, 1975 
is not usually considered as a famine year, although local 
food shortages were reported. An exception was the 
aftermath of the Ogaden drought, which led to famine in 
1974, with relief operations continuing into 1975. 
1977-78 
1977 was the worst year on record for cereals production, 
with the index falling 22 per cent below the base level. 
Food availability is also poorl'at 89 per cent of 1969-71 
levels. Famine conditions were reported in parts of the 
northern provincest but the government and donors mounted 
a relief operation during early-mid 1978 which appears to 
have averted mass starvation. Thus a fall in national 
food availability does appear in this case to be 
associated with famine conditions. 
1983-84 
Although starvation has reported in some areas during 1981 
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and 1982, major problems surfaced only in 1983 and'1984. 
Food availability to the relief system collapsed during 
mid 1984, but this is not really reflected in the indices 
of food availability for either 1983 (97) or 1984 (100). 
In fact, the 1984 figure is inflated by massive food 
imports towards the end of the year. There was also an 
extreme shortfall in cereals production during 1984, with 
the index falling by 21 per cent from the base level. 
Howeverr this did not lead to an escalation of famine in 
the following year, as food aid shipments were continued 
all through 1985 (see table 5.2). 1 
It is important to note that the cereals production figure 
for 1982 was high, at 17 per cent above base levels, while 
food availability was apparently adequate. This gives no 
indication of the onset of famine conditions which 
developed during 1983. 
A further important factor contributing to famine during 
1973 and 1984 was the failure of the belq crop in parts of 
the highlands. Unfortunately, FAO data do not distinguish 
between the main and secondary harvests. 
In conclusion, it appears that food availability decline 
in terms of national aggregate statistics cannot precisely 
distinguish famine years from non-famine years. It is 
likely that trends in regional production will prove more 
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Table 5.6: Indices of Regional Cereals Production, 
1979/80 - 1984/85 (1979-80 = 100) 
Region 80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 c. v. GR 
Arssi 102 120 133 110 104 0.13 0.3 
Bale n. a. 88 112 101 77 n. a. n. a. 
Gamu 108 77 116 97 56 0.24 -7.8 
Goffa 
Gojjam 95 95 116 99 94 0.08 0.04 
Gonder 77 83 127 87 75 0.22 -1.9 
Harerghe 55 60 76 55 32 0.36 -14.4 
Illubabor 55 69 114 126 61 0.34 1.5 
Keffa 83 57 56 98 62 0.23 , -3.8 
Shoa 90 75 102 88 63 0.17 -5.7 
Sidamo 91 74 113 103 88 0.14 0.4 
Wellega 62 74 90 83 58 0.21 -4.7 
wollo 129 108 102 77 22 0.41 -23.0 
Note 
GR = average annual growth rate 
c. v. = coefficient of variation 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Addis Ababa. 
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revealing. Regional production data are available for the 
years 1979-84, and will be considered in the next section. 
5.9 Changes in regional cereals production: 1979- 
80 to 1984-85 
Data concerning cereals production are available for 12 
administrative regions (excluding Eritrea and Tigray, 
where sufficient data cannot be collected by the 
authorities) for the period 1979-80 to 1984-85. This 
series begins with the last reasonable year before severe 
rains failures developed in parts of the north, later 
spreading across the country (see table 5.2). The period 
ends with the catastrophic rain failures of 1984 which 
affected most parts of Ethiopia. 
It can be seen from table 5.6 that there is considerable 
variation in regional experience of short-run changes in 
cereals production. Annual average growth rates of 
cereals production vary from 1.5 per cent (Illubabor) to - 
23.0 per cent (Wollo) over the 6-year period. However, in 
no province does the short-run rate of growth exceed that 
of the national population growth rate (2.9 per cent). 
Although there are no data showing regional population 
size or growth rates over the period with which to assess 
changes in production per caputy we can safely assume that 
the dramatic fall in availability of cereals by 1984 
evidenced in the production figures would be even worse if 
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population growth rates were taken into account. 
Again considering the data in Table 5.6 in general terms, 
we can see that while cereals production suffered over 
1980-82 in comparison with 1979, there was some recovery 
in 1982-83. Levels of production begin to slip again 
after this point, with the decline accelerating into 1984- 
85. By then, production had fallen by 78 per cent in 
Wollo, 68 per cent in Hararghe; by close to 40 per cent in 
Illubabor, Keffa and Shoa; by more than 40 per cent in 
Gemu Goffa and Wellega; and by 20-25 per cent in Bale, 
Gonder and Sidamo. Only Gojjam and Arssi provinces were 
relatively unscathed with the latter region the only one 
to consistently raise production above the levels of 1979- 
80 throughout the period. 
On the basis of 'food balance sheet' calculations, food 
shortages would have been expected for most of these 
regions over most of the period, although there are 
exceptions. Gonder shows a relatively good production 
index for 1982-83 which conceals severe deficits, for 
western Gonder was in surplus while the east was in 
deficit. The same is broadly true for Wollo over 1980-831 
where northern districts were suffering severe shortages. 
Nevertheless, there clearly has been a severe decline in 
food availability over the early-mid 1980s for nearly all 
administrative regions of Ethiopia. This contrasts with 
Sen's (1981) analysis where he finds no serious shortfall 
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Table 5.7: Average Annual Growth Rates (per cent) by 
Region in Area Cultivated and Yield of Cereals 
Crops in Ethiopia, 1979/80 - 1984/85 
Region Area Cultivated Yield 
Arssi 2.32 -1.88 
Bale -4.26 12.39 
Gemu Goffa -2.17 -5.75 
Gojjam 0.24 -0.22 
Gonder 4.54 -6.09 
Harerghe -5.13 -9.76 
Illubabor -1.47 3.04 
Keffa -0.18 -3.78 
Shoa -0.24 -5.47 
Sidamo -0.65 0.96 
Wellega 1.82 -6.30 
wollo -4.24 -19.50 
Source: Derived from statistics supplied by the Central 
Statistical Office, Addis Ababa 
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in food production and overall food availability in Wollo 
province preceding the famine of 1973. Circumstances have 
changed considerably over the past decade. 
5.10 Changes in area cultivated and yields of cereals by 
region: 1979-80 to 1984-85 
Given that climatic conditions were generally unfavourable 
for crop production, and that soil erosion has become a 
serious problem in parts of the highlands, we might expect 
a decline in both area and yields of cereals to have taken 
place in the worst-affected areas, at least in the short 
run. Annual average growth rates of yield for the period 
1979-80 to 1984-85 are presented in Table 5.7, and it can 
be seen that there has been a decline for all provinces 
except Bale, Illubabor and Sidamor all of which are in the 
relatively underpopulated south of the country. Area 
planted has also increased, especially in the provinces of 
Arssi, Gojjam, Gonder and Wellegat which are provinces 
with extra land available for cultivation. The most 
dramatic declines in rates of growth of area planted and 
yield are in Hararghe and Wollor which suffered 
particularly badly from rain failures, as we have already 
seen from the data presented on regional variations in 
production. 
5.11 Summary 
From the preceding analysis, it seems that data on 
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national food production show very little decline over the 
past 25 years. While it is true that famine and near- 
famine years have sometimes coincided with years of 
relatively poor cereals production, and food availability, 
if the shortfalls had been equitably distributed, it is 
unlikely that there would have been famine. At the same 
time the long run growth rates of yield are encouraging; 
although area cultivated is falling slightly. 
Neverthelessl there are considerable areas of Ethiopia, 
predominantly in the north and central highlands, where a 
continuation of soil erosion and poor weather conditions 
have reduced the ability of the local populations to 
support themselves through agriculture alone. These 
regional variations are to some extent reflected in the 
data series available for each administrative region, 
particularly over recent years. However, data are 
unfortunately no longer available for Eritrea and Tigray, 
reportedly among the worst-affected administrative 
regions. 
Disaggregation down to the level of administrative regions 
is helpful, but still conceals enormous variations. A 
case in point is Gonder, in which famine-affected 
districts are adjacent to surplus-producing districts. 
There is clearly a need for the compilation of data on the 
basis of agro-climatic and socio-economic zones, rather 
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than in terms of strictly administrative boundaries. 
Consequently, much of the information available on 
processes likely to contribute to famine in Ethiopia is 
qualitative. For example, no quantitative data are 
available concerning the effects of soil erosion on 
yields. Yet it is frequently stated that soil erosion is 
a major cause of crop failure. Similarly, we have, little 
empirical knowledge about the relationships between 
deforestation, soil erosion and climatic change. Yet it 
does appear that rain failure is becoming the norm, rather 
than the exception in parts of highland Ethiopia. on the 
other hand, wide variation-in rainfall conditions may 
always have been a feature of the lowlands. 
Rain failures lead to crop failures, but these in turn do 
not necessarily lead to famine. Rain failures must be 
prolonged and associated with a squeeze on alternative 
income-generating options for the affected peasantry 
before leading to famine. The way in which the various 
factors interact is the subject of the case study of the 
famine of 1984-85, which is presented in the next three 
chapters. 
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Notes 
The basis of these estimates is not clear from either 
source. 
2 As a consequence, Wright recommends that some 6 million 
hectares should be completely withdrawn from 
cultivation and should be reafforested; while a 
further 8.5 million hectares should be turned over to 
permanent pasture. An additional 12.5 million hectares 
should benefit from conservation management techniques, 
including terracing. Wright recommends that farming 
households displaced in this process should be 
resettled in the underused highland valleys, which make 
up some 7 per cent of Ethiopia's land area. He states 
that if this is not done "perhaps within 20 years one 
third to one half of the total area of the Ethiopian 
highlands may become a landscape suited for little more 
than nomadic grazing" (op cit). 
3 However, it does not appear to be the case that 
Ethiopia as a whole is short of cultivable land. The 
ALP report concludes that "despite the large area of 
the country with considerable rainfed agricultural 
potential, only a small proportion is actually under 
crops" (op cit p 14). of land not under crops, 19 per 
cent is considered unutilisable, 12 per cent is forest 
or bushlandr and 51 per cent is given over to grazing 
or browsing. 
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Note 3 cont. 
Much of the land which would therefore theoretically be 
converted to rainfed cropland is lowland pasture. As the 
soils in these regions are generally more fragile than 
those of the highlands, as rainfall regimes may be even 
more variable in the lowlands, and as human and animal 
diseases constrain cultivation, then the real scope for 
extending cultivation may be somewhat less than expected. 
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Chapter 6: The Incidence and Causes of Crop Failures in 
1980-84 
Introduction 
It is the purpose of this and the following two chapters 
to test the hypotheses derived from the general model of 
famine put forward in chapter 1. Although we have 
characterised famine as arising from a concatenation 
process, involving both a failure of alternative income- 
generating activities among the peasantry and a failure of 
the state to provide relief, within this framework a 
sequence of events can be identified which appears from 
the literature to be common to most famines. Even where 
specific features of the sequence differ from reality in 
any given case, it provides a framework for analysis. 
Thus we shall be enquiring as to the causes and extent of 
crop failures; their effects on the markets for food, 
labour and household assetsl especially livestock; and the 
directiony extent and outcomes of mass migration. 
The most recent Ethiopian famine had its genesis 
predominantly in areas which are physically remote and 
administratively inaccessible as they are also war zones. 
one result of these factors has been that the famine is 
poorly documented, at least up to the point of mass 
migration when relief measures were instituted. This 
chapter will therefore begin with a description of data 
sources and methodologies of data collection before 
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proceeding with the analysis. 
6.2. Data sources and methodologies of data collection 
Several data sources will be consulted in our analysis of 
incidence and effects of severe and repeated crop 
failures. These include: 
(i) Data compiled by the Early Warning System of the' 
RRC. These principally relate to crop conditions 
and food prices in administrative regions under the 
control of the government, which are monitored by 
staff of the Central Statistical Office. - 
Data on general conditions reported by non- 
governmental organisations working in the regions. 
Formal and informal reports from visitors to the 
famine zones in Ethiopia. 
The information provided by 100 famine migrants 
from Tigray, Wollor Gonder and Eritrea, who were 
interviewed by the author and a colleague (Jeremy 
Shoham) in December 1984. 
Much of the data presented here and in the following two 
chapters was furnished through the latter survey of 100 
Ethiopian refugees in two camps located in the Eastern 
Region of Sudan, close to the Ethiopian border. The two 
camps were Tukulabab and Wad Sherife, whose location is 
shown in Figure 6.1. ' The survey was carried out during 
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December, the month of peak famine migration from Tigray 
(see table 6.1). Between November 1984 and October 1985 
340,000 Ethiopians were registered as having crossed the 
border and received some assistance from the authorities. 
A further 200,000 are estimated to have entered Sudan and 
remained unregistered (Angela Berry, United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees, personal communication, 
January 1986). 
Conditions in the camps were extremely bad. In Tukulabab, 
the vast majority of refugees were without shelter, and 
were forced to camp under acacia trees or to huddle behind 
rocks. Water was in short supply, and food rations were 
erratic and inadequate. Geldof, who visited Tukulabab at 
the height of the influxt has made the following comments: 
wTo call the place a camp would have been a misnomer. It 
was just a mass of people who had sat down in one place. 
Their only shelter came from ragged bits of cloth they had 
spread between bushes to provide some shade from the 
sun ... there were two European doctors working there, in 
total despair. The place was a burning reflector of heat 
by day and freezing by night. As well as all the 
intestinal diseases which the relief workers had to cope 
with in Ethiopia, here they had a high incidence of 
pneumonia and malaria. They showed me into what they 
pitifully called the camp store. There were fifteen bags 
of flour for 27,000 peoplew (Geldof 1986 p 316). 
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In Wad Sherife, there was more shelter available, but 
there was a similar desperate lack of water, food and 
medical care. Fully 50,000 people had clustered into a 
camp designed for 5,000. Later, in March 1985, Wad 
Sherife's population was to peak at around 130,000 before 
refugees were transported to new camps being set up 
further inside Sudan. It is pertinent to note that 
according to the Centre for Disease Control in Atlanta, 
Georgia, the death rates in the eastern Sudanese refugee 
camps at the time of the survey were the highest ever 
recorded during a refugee emergency (RPG undated, appendix 
6,, p 20). 
Under these circumstances, and with minimal financial and 
manpower resources, the author was unable to undertake a 
lengthy survey. Instead, a short but carefully structured 
survey was carried out, designed to extract sufficient 
information to test the basic hypotheses derived from the 
general model of famine developed in chapter 1. A delay 
in carrying out the survey (through applying for 
sufficient funds, official permission etc. ) would have led 
to a missed opportunity to gather data on the famine. 
Nevertheless, there is clearly a case for a better- 
equipped, more detailed and wide-ranging survey to be 
carried out in future amongst settled refugees. This 
would help to verify the data and analysis presented here. 
However, a degree of verification is available from Clay 
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and Holcomb's survey of famine refugees at Wad Kowli, 
carried out under very similar conditions in March 1985. 
These researchers also carried out surveys among earlier 
settled refugees at Tawawa and Fau II camps. 
The interviewees at the two camps were grouped by choice 
according to their place of origin. Accordingly, the 
author and a colleague, assisted by interpreters, carried 
out systematic sample surveys, stratified by origin of the 
migrants. The questionnaire is reproduced in the 
appendix. Certain awrajas such as Enderta (in central 
Tigray) were responsible for providing the majority of 
refugeesr while others, such as, Shire (in Western Tigray) 
provided very few. This was obviously because some 
awrajas were far more afflicted with crop failures and 
famine conditions than others. Sample sizes, as 
determined by awraja, therefore varied. - 
At the same time, the camps did not have well-defined 
boundaries, and so it was impossible given the time and 
resources available to map accurately their extent and to 
divide them into sections according to the home awrajas of 
the refugees. Furthermore, the camps were growing daily 
with each new influx. Tukulabab was later closed, and new 
arrivals from Tigray were diverted to Wad Kowli camp 
further south. Wad Sherife remains a transit camp at the 
time of writing. Accordingly, the interviewers sought out 
the location of groups of migrants with the advice of 
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interpreters and health workers. once a group from a 
specific area had been located, every third household 
would be interviewed along the line of a randomly chosen 
direction. 
Although interviewees would be identified in this manner, 
the research attracted considerable attention from the 
refugees themselves. Consequently, many interviews would 
be conducted in the presence of a crowd of people from 
other households, who would often interject with their own 
observations and opinions. While this process was often 
beneficial for elucidating general information, such as 
with recall data on grain prices for example, it would 
sometimes slow down the interview schedule. Neverthelessr 
the sampling and recall methodology employed was 
considered to be the only method practicable under the 
circumstances. 
Clay and Holcomb have identified the home villages of 
Tigrayans fleeing to Wad Kowli camp, and have weighted 
these according to the number of migrants coming from each 
place (see figure 6.2). The geographical spread of 
respondents is exactly the same as those interviewed in 
our sample. The majority (90 per cent) of the 80 
households interviewed for the purposes of this study at 
Tukalabab were Tigrayans, with a minority coming from 
northern Gonder and northern W0110. All 20 respondents 
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interviewed in Wad Sherife were Eritreans. 
The survey provided new information on grain prices, based 
on recall. Interviewees were asked about the retail 
prices of different varieties of grain during the post 
harvest season and during the rainy season. Prior to the 
survey, the author estimated the degree of variation in 
response to questions on grain prices (a quantifiable 
variable) as plus or minus 25 per cent. Assuming a 95 per 
cent confidence interval, according to the standard 
formula 1 this implied a required number of respondents 
from each market of only -fWo. In the event, the 
majority of markets identified were visited by more than 
one respondent. An important feature of these data is 
that respondents' recall of grain prices was remarkably 
uniform for the previous two-year period. For example, in 
one case eight respondents from the same area (Hentalo in 
Enderta awraJa) all reported exactly the same grain prices 
for harvest 1984. The greatest variation in response for 
price data for a given place and period was in fact 25 per 
cent, which only occured in one case and was within the 
variation anticipated prior to the actual interviews. 
It has been possible to check the accuracy of recall of 
the interviewees in a few cases. For exampler Kirsty 
Wright, a freelance journalist, reported that the price of 
teff in Tsediar Tigray was 200 birr in July 1983. Three 
respondents interviewed by the author in December 1984 
237 
came from Tsedia. Each reported that the price of teff 
there was 200 birr during the kremt season of 1983. 
Unfortunately, Wright's price data are too scanty to 
cross-check for other markets. English et al (1984) also 
reported average market prices of a few grains for 
southern and western Tigray during the harvest period of, 
1983. They report an average price of 200 birr for teff 
in the south, whereas respondents from specific markets 
named by the team, such as Harekor reported prices around 
25 per cent higher than those listed by the Oxfam team. 
However, the team was generalising about prices over a 
wide area, and therefore proper comparisons cannot be 
made. As we shall see in chapter 7F grain prices can vary 
widely even in markets a few kilometers apart. Prices may 
also be expected to vary ac-cording to the relative 
bargaining power between buyers and sellers, even in the 
same marketplace. 
There has also been a problem with the identification of 
certain markets. Some 30 per cent of the markets 
mentioned by interviewees were not subsequently located by 
the author on available maps. Nevertheless, this left 
some 50 data points with which to construct price maps. 
These data shall be discussed in chapter 7, following a 
consideration here of the actual extent of rain failures 
and crop failures in Ethiopia in the period preceding the 
famine. 
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6.3. Recent Rain Failures in EthioiDia 
As we have seen from chapter 31 rain failures and 
associated crop failures have been a common feature of the 
ecology of post-revolutionary Ethiopia, just as in 
imperial times. These calamities have been particularly 
prevalent in the north, and only the years 1975-76 appear 
to have been relatively free from climatic disorder. This 
state of affairs tends to confirm Lamb's opinion that the 
"droughtsw of the past two decades are part of a long-term 
phenomenon, within which they are not necessarily abnormal 
events. 
Although precipitation continued to be erratic and 
somewhat deficient after the 1976 season, it was only from 
1980 onwards that rain failures began to become 
persistent. A United Nations Coordinating Committee for 
Relief and Rehabilitation visited the country following 
the 1980-81 harvest. Their report of March 1981 noted 
that: "hailstorms, frost, floods and pests had an adverse 
effect on the crops of northern Shoar Gonder, parts of 
Tigray, and western Wollow (UNCCRR 1981 p 13). it is 
interesting to note that 'drought' is not yet mentioned as 
a causal factor in crop failurer although the widespread 
crop failures of the early-mid 1980s are popularly 
attributed to drought. Nevertheless, over 1982-84 in 
particular, delayed and insufficient rainfall, allied to 
pest attacks, was to be the major cause of crop failure. 
Insufficient rainfall was also a feature of agricultural 
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conditions in lowland Ethiopia over 1980-81. 
In the event, rain failures continued to spread, and were 
chronic in parts of northern Ethiopia over 1982-84. The 
delay in the main kremt rains of June-September 1982 was 
particularly damaging to cultivation. The National 
Meteorological Services Agency (NMSA) put out a special 
bulletin on July 20th, stating that there had been a one 
month delay in the onset of kremt rains, and that "in the 
light of this we would like the concerned authority to pay 
attention to the northern parts of Ethiopia, especially to 
northern Shoal Wollo, Tigray and parts of Gonder" (NMSA 
1982). These were essentially the same areas as those 
highlighted by the UN report of March 1981. 
During 1983, the situation appeared to improve somewhat. 
As Workineh Degefu notes: "the onset and withdrawal, as 
well as the amount and distribution of precipitation, 
during both belg and kremt seasons were generally good" 
(Workineh Degefu 1987 p 32). However# he goes on to note 
that cumulative rainfall totals in the north, particularly 
in parts of Wollo and northern Shoal were below normal. 
Other sources argued that rain failures in the north 
continued to be widespread during 1983. After remarking 
on the onset of drought in central and eastern Tigray from 
1980 onwards, English et al stated that: "the shortfall in 
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rain continued through 1983 showing a marked shift towards 
later, more intensive rains in a short period of time, 
rather than the usual spread over a 2-3 month period" 
(op cit p 13). Wright (1983) reported no rain as of 
August 1983 in central and southern Tigray when she 
surveyed areas under famine conditions. Even during the 
middle of the rainy seasont acute shortages of drinking 
water were reported in many parts of Tigray and Eritrea 
from NGOs working in the drought-affected districts (CRDA 
1983). These shortages were to intensify and spread over 
the coming months. 
The delayed and insufficient rains in the north were 
followed by unseasonal rains at the beginning of the 
harvest season, in October. These gave way to a long dry 
spell throughout the country (Workineh Degefu op cit). 
The, belg season of February-April 1984 was a complete 
failure, leading to widespread deaths of livestock already 
suffering water and pasture shortages following the dry 
season. Forest fires also began to break out owing to the 
exceptionally dry conditions. Rains reappeared in May 
1984, but by now it was too late for farmers to plant belg 
crops and some long-maturing varieties of maize and 
sorghum. The agricultural calendar was thrown out of 
kilter. Rains continued into June instead of giving way 
to the normal dry spell preceding the main kremt rains. 
As Workineh Degefu notes: "this unusual climatic pattern 
confused the farmers, and as a result they were unable to 
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Figure 6.3: Ethiopian Rainfall Departures 
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perform their usual agricultural activities" (jbid p 32). 
The confusion continued with the kremt rains instead of 
reaching their peak in late July, a dry spell ensued, 
damaging crops during their flowering stage. 
The seasonal departures of rainfall from the norm have 
been compiled by Rasmusson from NMSA data and are shown in 
figure 6.3. It can be seen that in 1984 the north and 
east of the country consistently suffered from rainfall 
deficits amounting to as much as 60 per cent below the 
norm; whilst longitudinal data suggest that in 1984 
northern Ethiopia suffered its largest rainfall deficit 
since 1953 - that is over a 31 year period (figure 6.4). 
The deficit appears to have exceeded that associated with 
the 1974 famine. 
The rain failures of 1984 were exceptionally severe and 
were associated with a number of climatic anomalies, which 
have also been described by Workineh Degefu (ibid). These 
included anomalous surface conditions during the belg 
season, such as seasonal Arabian and Saharan anticyclones 
being out of position; and blocked or less intensive rain- 
producing airstreams at the middle and upper tropospheric 
levels2. During the kremt season the jet stream was weak 
and appeared less frequently over the Horn of Africa; the 
Indian monsoons were weak; and airflows from the south and 
east were fewer and weaker than normal. Thus the rain 
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failures in the Horn of Africa were part of a much, more 
widespread climatic disruption. However, it is difficult 
to ascribe precise weights to each of these effects in 
producing the exceptional decline in rainfall. Far too 
little is known about weather and climate in north-eastern 
Africa at this stage. 
6.4 The Incidence and Extent of Crop Failures over 
1982-84 
We have seen from the data presented in chapter 5 that 
1982 was a year which saw some recovery in agriculture 
with national cereals production apparently being at 
record levels. Nevertheless, there continued to be 
pockets of crop failure in several provinces. The RRC 
early warning system noted that "serious food shortagesw 
were expected in eastern Gonder, northern Shoa, most parts 
of Tigray, northwestern and central Wollo, and unspecified 
areas of Eritrea. Crop failure was specifically blamed on 
drought in Gonder, Tigray and Wollo; while pest attacks 
were mentioned as contributing to crop failures in other 
regions, such as parts of northern Shoa, northern Sidamo, 
Wellega and Gojjam. Hailstorms were reported as having 
damaged crops in Illubabor. The RRC estimated that more 
than 3 million people would be affected by these 
calamities (EWPS 1984a). 
In contrast to meteorological reports, the rain failures 
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Table 6.2: RRC Estimates of Harvest Losses: Comparison-of 
1984 with 1983 (per cent) 
Administrative Region and Awraja Percentage Loss 
Gonder: Gayint -40 
Wegera -20 
Semien -25 
Libo n. a. 
Gonder Zuri n. a. 
Chilga -10 
Debre Tabor n. a. 
Wollo: Ambassel -80 
Yeju -85 
Raya and Kobo -90 
Wag -90 
Lasta -70 
Wadla Delanta -55 
Dessie Zuria -65 
Kalu -80 
Were Himeno -80 
wereilu -70 
Borena -60 
Source: Early Warning and Planning Departmentr RRC. 
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of 1983 were reported by ground sources to be much worse 
than those of the previous year. For the first time, the 
RRC published estimates of the overall shortfalls 
experienced in each crop-producing awraja in those areas 
where they were able to monitor crop conditions through a 
network of enumerators, who were in turn informed by 
peasant association committees. The estimates were 
disturbing. In Gonder and Wollo, the drop in production 
in comparison with the 1982 harvest season ranged from -10 
per cent to -90 per cent (see table 6.2). Wollo was the 
worst affected province of those monitored (Tigray and 
Eritrea were excluded), with no awraja recording less than 
a 55 per cent fall in production. 
These estimates indicated an extreme situation,, and were 
greeted with disbelief by many donor agency 
representatives, although other sources such as satellite 
imagery and NGO reports were available to contribute to 
the estimates of crop failures in the region. However, 
the estimates of areas and numbers of people affected by 
crop failures in Tigray and Eritrea were largely 
guesswork. The Ethiopian government does not regularly 
control more than a small part of these provinces, perhaps 
not more than 15 per cent or so (Bennett, 1983b), and it 
is necessary to consider other sources for verification of 
crop damage and food shortages in rebel areas. These are 
provided by reports of the Eritrean and Tigrayan rebel 
organisations: the Eritrean Relief Association (ERA) and 
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Figure 6.5 
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the Relief Society of Tigray (REST). 
ERA reported that apart from small pockets in the south, 
west and northeast, the whole of Eritrea was drought- 
affected in 1982-83 (ERA 1983). Bennett (1983a) noted 
that while central Tigray and southern Eritrea were 
drought-affected, the western provinces of Shire and Axum 
were experiencing good harvests in 1982. An Oxfam team 
(English et al, OP cit) stated that the drought in Tigray 
had intensified over 1983 and had spread westward into 
Axum, while the population of Shire was under increasing 
pressure from migrants arriving from the east. These 
field reports were given added weight by the satellite 
imagery available from Landsat. Staff of the 
International Livestock Institute for Africa (ILCA) in 
Addis Ababa were concerned at the appearance of large 
areas of poor vegetation cover in the cropping areas of 
central Tigray, north-western Wollo, the Wollo-Gonder 
border and along the eastern escarpment marking the 
boundary of the highlands. These various sources are 
summarised in figure 6.5. showing a substantial measure of 
agreement. However, the satellite data are incomplete, 
owing to interruption by cloud cover, and the lack of 
surveillance of vegetation conditions in southern Wollo. 
Furthermore, there is a critical lack of ground-level 
information about the extent of pasture failures in the 
lowlands of eastern Eritrea, Tigray and Wollo. 
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Table 6.3: Indices of Crop Production in Wollo, Gonder 
and Ethiopia, 1981-84 
Region Crop Production Index 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
wollo 100 83 49 46 
Gonder 100 106 149 96 
Ethiopia 100 108 104 88 
Source: Early Warning System, Special Report, "Food 
Situation in Ethiopia, 1981-85: Trend Analysis 
Report" (table 1), RRC, Addis Ababa, 1985. 
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Surveillance of these very large and sparsely populated 
areas is very difficult for both official and rebel 
authorities, while the correct interpretation of Landsat 
imagery requires a consistent and reasonably lengthy 
series of wet and dry years so that changing conditions in 
this marginal arid and semi-arid environment can be 
monitored properly. 
Quantified estimates of crop production are carried out by 
the Central Statistics office (CSO) on the basis of crop- 
cutting surveys in each region. while the CSO considers 
that these surveys generalise over too big an area to be 
used for accurate famine warning, they can be used to give 
an indication of the food situation by administrative 
regions and for the country as a whole. It can be seen 
from table 6.3 that according to these data Wollo suffered 
an enormous decline in crop production between 1981 and 
1984, with the production index falling from 100 in 1981 
to as little as 46 by 1984. In Gonder, on the other hand, 
there was a large increase in production between 1981 and 
1983, with the index rising from 100 to 149. However, by 
1984 production had fallen below 1981 levels. A similar 
pattern seems to have been established for Ethiopia as a 
whole, with production per caput rising slightly above 
1980 base year levels in 1982 and 1983, before falling 
quite sharply in 1984. 
The severe crop failures of the 1983 season were followed 
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by a disastrous failure of the short (belg) rains in 
February and March 1984. Although the belg season 
contributes only 5-10 per cent of national crop 
production, it is locally important in parts of Wollo and 
eastern Gonder, where it can amount to as much as half of 
total cereals production. The belg season is also vital 
for replenishing waterholes and pastures over the long dry 
season. The failure of the belg rains was followed by yet 
another delay in the main (kremt) rains. This was the 
last straw which broke the back of vulnerable peasants and 
pastoralists in Wollo, pushing them into famine. In May 
1984, the RRC put out a special report on the belg rain 
failure and its effects on production. The report stated 
that all the major belg producing areas of Wollo, Shoa and 
Bale had been affectedt and that the peasants facing food 
shortages would be unable to sell sufficient livestock to 
cover their losses, as their animals had weakened or died 
as a result of drought. Furthermore, the detrimental 
effects of lack of food and water for oxen would weaken 
them for ploughing during the coming main kremt season 
(EWPS 1984b). 
In the event, the kremt rains also failed. In Wollo, 
sowing took place in June and July, but shortages of rain 
in August killed most of the early growth (EWPS 1984c). 
According to the RRC, in Tigray the kremt rains began in 
mid-July, but stopped after two weeks or so in central and 
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eastern regions. Western areas of the province 
experienced better rainfall conditions but were hit by 
widespread pest attacks. In Gonder, rainfall conditions 
were generally better than in previous years, but awrajas 
bordering Wollo continued to be badly affected. In 
Eritrea, kremt rains were reported to have failed in all 
awrajas except Seraye, which suffered from armyworm 
infestation. In Shoal the northern awrajas of Menzna 
Gishe and Yifatna Timuga suffered failures of both belg 
and meher crops. 
6.5 The Socio-Economic Impact of Crop Failures 
While these rain failures, pest attacks and resultant crop 
failures were unprecedented in extent and duration, 
affecting many regions of Ethiopia (although undoubtedly 
at their worst in the north), at the individual household 
level, the impact was still patchy, even in the heartlands 
of famine. If production failures were so widespread, how 
was it that more people did not migrate out of the famine 
zones? As we shall see presently (in chapter 8) the 
victims, often previously quite wealthy by local 
standards, were forced to seek wage work, sell assets etc. 
However, other households must have been buying the assets 
and employing labourers. Unfortunately, very little 
information is yet available on the "gainers' during 
famine - even less than is available on the "losers". 
This study itself concentrates on the losersy because 
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access for research purposes to the famine areas within 
Ethiopia was denied to the author by the authorities. 
However, isolated observations do support the notion that 
substantial social differentiation existed even in the 
middle of areas which were supposedly hard-hit by famine. 
For example, McCann, who worked during the famine in the 
Tegulet and Bulga woredas of Northern Shoa has observed 
that: 
"the effects of famine are distributed unevenly. 
Households with a pair of oxen, a short rain crop in the 
fields, and healthy children are found within 500 metres 
of households with no livestock, malnourished children, 
and heavy debts. The range of nutritional and economic 
well-being is astonishingt especially given the biblical 
imagery of universal starvation offered by media reports 
and television cameras. Major contrasts in the effects 
also appear between altitude zones one or two hours walk 
apart. In May, the green fields of maturing barley in the 
zones above 2r500 metres were in stark contrast to the 
dry, drought-stressed plantings below 21000 metres. " 
This state of affairs stems from both environmental and 
social factors. To begin with, rainfall is highly 
variable, both over time and space. In the Ethiopian 
highlands, altitude is obviously a major variable 
influencing the distribution of rainfall. At the same 
time, access to good land and sturdy oxen varies widely 
between households, for there is still substantial 
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economic and social differentiation among the peasantry, 
the land reform notwithstanding. There is also an element 
of luck, as well as established resource endowment for 
some households. They may escape rain failure or pest 
attacks, while close neighbours suffer. 
The differential impact of the apparently widespread 
0 shocks' to the economy, whether rain failures, pest 
attacks or warfare, is confirmed by the interviews carried 
out with escaped victims of enforced resettlement by Clay 
and Holcomb. The escapees appear to have formed a cross 
section of society from the famine areas. Interviewees 
were divided into two groups, those from Tigray and those 
from Wollo. Tigrayan respondents dated their best years 
of agricultural production at between 1981 and 1983. Clay 
and Holcomb note that: 
OThe 1984 production for the two groups differed. For 
those from Tigray who harvested their crops in 1984,14 
per cent had no harvest, 38 per cent had a small harvest, 
35.5 per cent an average harvest and 14 percent a good 
one... Individuals from Wollo had less produce and fewer 
reserve animals. About 20 per cent of all those 
interviewed reported a small harvest and 5 per cent an 
average harvestw (Clay and Holcomb ibid pp 82-83). 
While the two groups may not be synonomoust given that 
Tigrayan resettlers are more likely to be captured while 
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going about their everyday business, whereas people from 
Wollo and other provinces chosen for resettlement are more 
likely to be from the poorer sections of society (see 
Chapter 10), it does seem clear that only a minority 
suffered severe crop failures. Moreover, this minority 
managed to survive successive years of crop failure before 
succumbing to starvation. 
6.6. Crop Failures: The Experience of the Refugee Sample 
It is beginning to emerge that estimates of the incidence 
of crop failures can give only a very broad guide to 
regions which are likely to face famine, rather than the 
actual population groups likely to be affected. Neither 
can rainfall and crop monitoring, even where substantially 
accurate, tell us very much about when people are likely 
to be forced to move away from their homes, which is a 
distinctive feature of famines (Currey 1981). Wood (1976) 
noted that the peasants he interviewed had survived up to 
six years of successive crop failure during the 1972-73 
famine in northern Ethiopia, and a team from the Ethiopian 
Nutrition Institute (ENI) recorded during the same period 
that "most of the farmers (had) not had a harvest for more 
than three years: 92 per cent in Ambassel and Raya & Kobo, 
and between 57 and 70 per cent in other awrajas" (ENI 1974 
p 37). 
It is also the case that famine migrants over 1983-84 had 
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experienced long years of crop failure. Wright (1983) 
interviewed displaced farmers from Tigray and Northern 
Wollo, none of whom reported adequate harvests since 1974- 
75, in the wake of the famine a decade ago. The famine 
migrants interviewed for our present study also reported 
that the drought was of long standing. When pressed to be 
more specific about the timing of their last adequate 
harvest, 87 per cent of the respondents from Tigray, 
Gonder and Wollo stated that the drought began between 
1978 and 1981 (see Figure 6.6), although several farmers 
were still adamant that they had not had an adequate year 
since the early 1970s. Respondents from Eritrea reported 
a somewhat later onset of drought, with all those replying 
to the question locating the years of crop failure between 
1980 and 1982. Either Tigrayan agriculture is more 
resilient than that of Eritrear or the latter has been 
generally more war-affected (see below). 
While the drought had obviously been of long-standing,, 
crop losses in the later years were very severe. Figure 
6.7 gives the total crop yield reported by 70 migrant 
household heads from Tigray. As we have seen, 87 per cent 
of Tigray respondents located the drought as beginning or 
becoming particularly bad between 1978 and 1981. Most 
respondents gave actual yields for their last good year as 
compared with 1983 and 1984. These reported yields have 
been aggregated, and the yields for 1983 and 1984 have 
been expressed as a percentage of the earlier figure to 
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Figure 6.7 
Index of Total Grain Production -' Last Good Harvest ' 
Ind 
L 
11 
Last Good 1983 1984 
Harvest * Year 
*87% of respondents locate this between 1978 and 1981 
--C... - -. - SS pSS .-- 
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give some means of comparison of the severity of the 
shortfalls. Accordingly, aggregate crop production in 
1983 was reported as being only 10 per cent of that in the 
pre-drought period; and for 1984 it was down to 7 per cent 
of this figure. It is therefore clear that the highland 
peasantry has developed considerable resistance to severe 
crop failures through its various coping strategies, and 
we have hypothesised that these would include asset sales, 
labour migration, borrowing and consumption of famine 
foods (see chapter 8). Moreoverr it is also clear from 
the very late migration of the majority of victims of the 
current famine, at or just prior to harvest 1984F that 
adequate rainfall during the previous Kremt season could 
have prevented widespread faminey although the drought 
would have left a substantial section of the peasantry 
with considerably depleted farm and household assets. 
Resistance to crop failure varies by region and among 
different groups of the peasantry within regions according 
to the availability of alternative sources of income. We 
should note that in parts of Ethiopia when the man/land 
ratio is particularly poor, a single serious crop failure 
may precipitate famine. An example is given by Wollaita 
and Kembata Hadiya awrajas in northern Sidamo and southern 
Shoa. Here holdings are extremely small and households 
are crop dependent to a greater degree than in the north. 
Little wage labour, petty commodity production or petty 
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trading is available as alternative sources of income. 
Consequently, one serious failure of the belg (short) 
rains in, 1984 led to famine within a matter of months. 
6.7. Pest Attacks as Contributorv Factors in Crop Failures 
Early reports on crop failures and related famine 
conditions in northern Ethiopia tend to emphasise the role 
of rain failures in causing crop failures, whereas pest 
attacks are treated rather as secondary factors. Bennett 
(1983a) does not mention pest attacks at all in his early 
review of the famine situation in Tigray, although Wright 
(1983) mentions that as early as the period 1975-80 
eastern escarpment and lowland areas had experienced 
"locust raids and crop pests' (ibid p 3). She further 
reports pest attacks in other areas of Tigray, notably the 
west and centre, from 1980 onwards, although the type of 
pest is not specified. Wright also states that anthrax 
and rinderpest became widespread, contributing 
substantially to livestock deaths, particularly among 
cattle. However, the lengthy report on famine conditions 
in Tigray over 1983-84 compiled by English et al (op cit) 
makes no mention of pest attacks. 
official sources gave passing mention to armyworm 
infestation as a cause of crop failure in several summary 
reports put forward over the same period by the RRC. For 
example, in 1982 armyworm were reported to be damaging 
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crops in Wollo, and in 1984 in Tigray. However, the 
emphasis in the official reports is again on rain failure 
rather than pest attacks as the prime agent of damage to 
crops. 
It is therefore striking that the Tigrayan famine refugees 
and escapees from resettlement camps interviewed by Clay 
and Holcomb (ibid) cited pest attacks as the major cause 
of crop failure on their own farms. For example, the 
majority of the predominately Tigrayan refugees 
interviewed at Wad Kowli and FAU II camps cited armyworm 
as the main cause of crop failure, followed by armyworm 
and drought acting together. Howeverr the majority of 
interviewed victims of resettlement from Wollo (68 per 
cent of the sample) stated that drought had been the major 
cause of declines in production. Thirty per cent of 
Tigrayans interviewed in the latter sample believed that 
production declines were caused by armyworm; another 
thirty per cent attributed them to drought; while a 
further thirty per cent attributed crop damage both to 
drought and armyworm. In both cases, a minority 
attributed crop damage to attacks by the army, or to 
government policies. 
It is in fact likely that rain failures and armyworm 
attacks act synergistically to damage crops. Tucker 
(1984) has tested this hypothesis by comparing data on the 
timing and extent of rainfall with the reported incidence 
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of armyworm attacks in eight zones of Tanzania and Kenya. 
He discovered that in three out of the eight ecological 
zones identified there is a statistically significant (at 
the level of significance of p>0.05 or better) inverse 
relationship between rainfall quantity and the number of 
outbreaks reported; while there is also a significant 
relationship between overall rainfall conditions and total 
outbreaks for all eight zones. As Tucker uses rather 
crude categories of high and low rainfall, due partly to 
the paucity of data, then it may be the case that a' 
comparison between poorly-timed, as well as deficient 
rainfall seasons with subsequent outbreaks of armyworm 
infestation would lead to a significant relationship being 
established for even more districts. Unfortunatelyr both 
the quality and quantity of data available do not allow 
this exercise to be undertaken for Ethiopia. 
6.8. The Effects of Warfare on Aqricultural Production 
Military offensives in Tigrayr Eritrea and rebel-held 
areas of Wollo and Gonder are annual events, taking place 
principally during the harvest season to maximise freedom 
of movement for the attacking forces and consequent 
economic damage. Additionally, airborne attacks and other 
more limited ground attacks take place regularly. Attacks 
are particularly concentrated on the agriculturally- 
surplus areas, such as Shire and Tembien districts of 
western and southern Tigray, and can involve up to 70,000 
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troops, supported with armoured vehicles and tanks. An 
offensive on this scale was undertaken in Tigray in 1983; 
while in 1984 the focus of government attempts to dislodge 
the rebels shifted to Eritrea, where the Dergue initially 
suffered heavy losses. In 1985, a renewed government 
offensive in Eritrea eventually succeeded in recapturing 
much of the ground gained during the following year. As a 
consequence of such actions, towns on the edge of disputed 
territory are constantly falling in and out of government 
hands, with rebels occupying them for a short period 
before withdrawing under concentrated air and ground 
attacks. Towns such as Lalibela and Sekota in Wollo, and 
Sheraro in Tigray, regularly suffer this fate. 
The year 1983 also saw the introduction of a wide-ranging 
conscription law allowing the recruitment of any male 
civilian between the ages of 18 and 30 years for two 
years' military service. At the same time a reserve force 
for those aged 30-50 years was created. Consequently, 
many men, particularly from rebel areas, were afraid to 
put themselves ar risk of conscription, and stayed away 
from garrison towns as much as possible. 
It should be noted that the capture of towns by rebel 
forces may be useful for the peasantry, despite the 
incidental destructive effects on farming. Towns are 
centres for the projection of state power, from which come 
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the tax collector, the administrator, the recruiting 
sergeant and the agent of the marketing parastatal. Towns 
may therefore be viewed as parasitical by the poor 
peasant, and their overthrow may be seen by the peasant as 
a benefit. 
The losses from military offensives can be substantial. 
Wright considers that "hundreds of thousands of hectares 
of crops" have been destroyed in the wars in Tigray (op 
cit p 7). Bennett (1983a) quotes TPLF sources as stating 
that during the 1981 offensive grain losses in urban 
godowns amounted to 6,000 tonnes, mostly through 
incendiary bombing. on the other hand, we have already 
noted that the specific impact of warfare on agricultural 
production was said to be limited by the two sets of 
respondents interviewed by Clay and Holcomb. Among the 
famine refugees, only 11 percent stated that attacks by 
the Ethiopian army were the major cause of their personal 
experience of famine; while 14 per cent of resettlement 
victims from Wollo considered both drought and "the 
Dergueo to be the major cause; although a further 18 per 
cent considered government policies to be the major 
factor. While these categories are vague, it does seems 
clear that no one factor can be considered in isolation, 
as "drought" (rain failures), pest attacks, warfare and 
government policies (such as compulsory grain purchases, 
taxation and trade restrictions, all of which may be 
lumped together as being a result of wthe Dergue") act 
265 
a) tT r-i ra 4J CN CA 
(n C14 C14 ON 
P4 
(D 
F-4 
44 
Al 
(a 
ýc 
44 
0 
104 
x 
r4 
of 
. In ro E-4 
r" 
fa r- OD 
41 
l 
CN r-I CN C14 00 
U) 0 
4. ) Ei 
0 
0 4 
144 W 
N cn 00 CN LO 
0 W 
z 
I-W C) C14 -1 r- ro 
z 
0 
Q) 
r-I 04 
r-I Ln C) r--l 
-4 r-4 CN 
44 
tp 
r.: 4J 
. ri ., j 
V ý1: 
F_: 
=S rn 
0 3: 
w 
0 > 44 44 44 
41 0 00 :3 
r. U) Q" 41 U) a) Z to 
F-i rA o o 0 to ro a) CD . -I r-l .,. 1 0.14 ri > 4. ) 41 >1 41 r-I 0 
.0 0u U 4J 0 0 0 %. 4-) w (D 
W &4 to to r-I U CL4 w 4J 04 4j 04 Q) ra W W 
f(% U) to 0 U) 0> (a 41 4-) 0 a) W a) w (1) W -ý-4 0) 0 
1 
0 0 
Z rJr4 W Q P4 QU r-i ro E-4 z r-i cn 
266 
synergistically to depress crop yields. lievertheless, the 
famine refugees interviewed for the purposes of this study 
invariably pointed out that their major reason for fleeing 
Ethiopia wan the drought# followed by warfare and 
government policies. Unfortunately# the question about 
the causes of crop failure was not put systematically# so 
comparison with the findings of Clay and Holcomb is not 
possible. 
flowevere the famine refugees in Tukulabab and Wad Sherife 
were questioned about the effects of war on their 
households. The results are presented in table 6.4. Of 
the 67 respondents from Tigray# 21 (31 per cent) said that 
they were not affected by warfare# with a further 15 (22 
per cent) saying that they were afraid of bombing and were 
Prevented from entering certain towns. Some of those 
interviewed had been reduced to carrying out essential 
agricultural activities only at night* Destruction of 
houses was reported by 15 per cent of the Tigrayan sample, 
with destruction of crops and/or livestock, and the deaths 
of family or neighbours being reported by 31 per cent of 
the sample, The Eritreans had been generally more 
eXtennively affected by war# with ten respondents 
reporting varying degrees of losses* three reporting 
movement restrictions# and only two saying that they had 
had no problems. 
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The ravages of war and the problems associated with moving 
both people and relief goods at night have been well 
documented elsewhere (e. g. Bennett 1983a and 1983b; Wright 
1983; English et al 1984). What is perhaps most 
surprising about the war, in Tigray, the province which was 
worst hit of all the drought areas of Ethiopia, is that 
trade and aid continued much as usual during the drought. 
This will become clear from the economic activity 
described in the next two chapters. The war has been an 
added factor driving the highlanders to destitution, but 
does not seem to have been as important a factor as rain 
failure and crop failures. Only the Eritrean refugees 
appear to have been severely affected by actual 
destruction of livelihoods through the activities of the 
Ethiopian government. 
6.9. Summary 
It seems from the available evidence that the rain 
failures, commonly called droughtl which have afflicted 
Ethiopia's northern provinces have been longstanding. The 
origins of the recent dry spell can be traced from at 
least 1980 for many parts of the region, and in some cases 
the onset of rain failures and poor harvests is said to 
have begun much earlier. Indeed, it could be argued that 
there never really was a recovery from the last severe 
rain failures of the early 1970s. 
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Nevertheless, rain failures were not the sole source of 
crop failures. Pest attacks were apparently frequent and 
devastating, although not well documented. Warfare has 
also played its part, although direct destruction of crops 
and property is perhaps less widespread than one might 
suppose from some reports, At least, the majority of 
peasants interviewed for this study have not reported crop 
losses through warfare, although many experienced movement 
restrictions which would have helped to undermine the 
regional economy, and hence their chances of survival. 
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Notes 
There is a 95% chance that a single observation will 
lie in the interval: + 2f2 
nE 
where: 
ý= the true difference between the two 
population means 
c: r= standard deviation 
n= sample size 
Given that there is a 95% chance that the error in the 
estimate of d) is less than + 2r2 , then the 
nE 
maximum likely error (e) can be substituted for 
& in 
the equation. 
Hence, e 2ý6 
En 
e2 = 4T x2 
n 
n 86ý 
e2 
The standard deviation is unknown and must be 
estimated (Healy and Osborne 1983 pp 8-9). 
2 The troposphere is the lowest level of the atmosphere, 
extending from sea level to an altitude of 15 
kilometers. It is the weather layer in which the bulk 
of atmospheric circulation occurs. The lower 
troposhere is also contiguous with the biosphere, a 
zone extending 9 km upwardst which is inhabitable by 
living things. 
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Chapter 7: The Effects of Crop Failures on Grain Prices 
Introduction 
According to the general model of famine introduced in 
chapter 1, crop failures may be expected to have an 
inflationary effect on grain prices. It is well 
understood that in a South Asian context the retail prices 
of staple foodgrains generally rise to exceptional heights 
during famines, thereby reducing the real value of labour 
power (when paid in cash rather than in kind) and other 
assets or commodities exchanged for food, so that the poor 
become unable to purchase sufficient food to maintain 
themselves. Additionally, Sen (1981) has shown that 
certain classes or groups of the poor suffer more than 
others, when they depenp almost exclusively on one or 
other "entitlement base" for subsistence. For example, 
during the Bengal famine of 1942-43, wage labourers, 
fisherman, and some artisans suffered disproportionately, 
while other group's of the poor, particularly small farmers 
who grew much of their own food, were less affected. 
Sen mak6s a different case for Ethiopia. In his analysis 
of the Wollo famine of 1972-73, he argues that grain 
prices did not rise very far or for very long during the 
famine. Sen uses wholesale prices from the provincial 
capital of Dessie in southern Wollo to support his case, 
arguing that Ethiopian subsistence farmers derived their 
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food entitlements substantially from their own productionr 
and were unable to buy food when their crops failed. 
There was little excess of effective demand over supply, 
so prices remained relatively normal. 
Seaman and Holt (1980) argue, on the other handy that 
grain prices rise to exceptional heights during famines. 
Expecting this to be the case, they collected grain prices 
in. Wollo during the last months of the famine, but found 
that these were within 15 per cent of pre-drought levels. 
It seemed, therefore, that Sen's analysis was correct. 
During the course of this study, it also seemed at first 
that Sen's analysis was substantiated. Grain prices in 
drought-affected parts of Wollo and Gonder in the majority 
of the 20 markets monitored by the RRC early warning 
system did not demonstrate particularly high prices during 
1982 and much of 1983. However, reports from Tigray 
province (Bennett 1983a; Wright 1983) stated that 
exceptionally high retail prices of foodgrains did prevail 
there during 1982-83. For example, Wright reported that 
as of July 1983 the price of sorghum in central Tigray 
varied from 140 birr per quintal to 200 birr per quintal, 
while in western parts of the province (which produced a 
surplus) sorghum was selling for only 70 birr. Teff was 
even more expensive in southern Tigray, at 200-240 birr in 
local markets. Unfortunately, the data collected by 
travellers into Tigray was very sparse. Despite this 
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constraint, the author (Cutler 1984a) hypothesised that by 
late 1983 high grain prices (about three times normal) 
would be typical at the centre of the famine zone, and 
that on the basis of unseasonal upward movement of grain 
prices in western Tigray and the far north of Wollo, crop 
failures and associated famine conditions were spreading. 
The refugees fleeing famine conditions at the centre of 
the zone would themselves export famine as they retained 
sufficient effective demand through asset sales to raise 
the prices of dwindling grain supplies at the periphery. 
7.2. Seasonal Variation in Grain Prices in Highland 
Ethiopia 
In order to substantiate the above case, it was first 
necessary to establish what seasonal variation in grain 
prices typifies a normal year. Unfortunately, there has 
been a dearth of data for Wollo, Tigray and northern 
Gonder for pre-drought years. Only one reasonably intact 
price series exists for this area, which is reproduced in 
figure 7.1. showing the pattern of prices of teff, 
barley and maize for Agame awraja in Tigray in 1977. There 
is a clear bimodal seasonal variation in prices, with 
grain supplies being in relatively short supply during the 
kremt season, which influences a price hike from June 
until August, after which grain prices fall in 
anticipation of the harvestr which begins in late October. 
Inflation does not seem to be a factor, with prices 
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falling to below post-harvest levels of the previous year. 
7.3. Price Behaviour following Crop Failures 
Retail price behaviour of foodgrains during years of 
severe crop failure is rather different. Instead of 
falling 2-3 months in advance of the harvest, grain prices 
tend to rise steadily before levelling off or dipping 
slightly at harvest, and then continue to climb rapidly in 
the post harvest season. Figure 7.2 demonstrates this 
pattern for teff in two markets (Korem and Alamata) in 
northern Wollo during 1983. Note that at this time price 
behaviour inýmarkets outside the famine zone (Dessie and 
Gonder in figure 7.2) was relatively normal. In Dessie, 
slight seasonal variation is apparent, and the rise in the 
price of teff is far lower than in Korem and Kombolcha. 
If we compare the rate of inflation of teff prices in the 
post-harvest months of February 1983 and February 1984, it 
can be calculated that the price of teff rose by 51 
percent in Korem, and by 46 per cent in Alamata; whereas 
in Dessie it rose by only 8 percent. In Gonder, the price 
of teff actually remained static over the period, with no 
increase being recorded.. It is notable that the most 
rapid inflation of teff prices in the two northern markets 
took place over a relatively short period, during the 
kremt season between May and September, traditionally a 
time of relative shortages of grain. 
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With the spread of crop failures and the migration of 
peasants looking for cheaper food sources, food prices 
began to rocket in the majority of markets in the region. 
A good example is given by Dessie and Gonder markets, 
which were said to be unaffected by the famine of 1973-74. 
As we have already observed, during 1983 the price of teff 
was unremarkable in both markets, not demonstrating a 
marked rise during the kremt season, and falling at 
harvest time as we would expect during a normal year. 
Presumably, this was the case because both Dessie and 
Gonder were drawing much of their grain supply from 
adjacent western regions which were in surplus. However, 
by 1984 crop failures bad become unusually severe and 
widespread throughout the region. By October the price of 
grain in Dessie had jumped to around three times that of 
late 1983, with much of the rise accounted for during the 
failed belg and kremt seasons (see figure 7.2). A price 
hike of similar proportions occured in Gonder some six 
months later, following the belg harvest failure of 1984, 
although the late response seems to imply that this market 
was even further removed from the famine zone. 
By contrast, Korem and Alamata markets in northern Wollo 
demonstrated marked price hikes some 9 months in advance 
of Dessie. Therefore, it seems that there was a 'ripple' 
effect on grain prices as the famine zone spread. Price 
hikes in the worst-affected areas of Tig; ay and remote 
parts of northern Wollo occured earlies t, during 1982 in 
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some cases. Much later, in 1984, markets throughout Wollo 
and Gonder began to reflect the catastrophic crop-growing 
conditions following the failure of b oth belg and kremt 
seasons. We shall now examine this trend in more detail, 
considering both official and unofficial sources of data. 
7.4. Grain Price Behaviour in Wollo and Gonder during 
1984 
The extraordinary rise in the price of foodgrains during 
1984 is evident from the official price data series, 
collected on behalf of the RRC by CSO enumerators in 20 
markets in Wollo and Gonder. Unfortunately, price data 
collection stopped from March to July 1984 owing to the 
demands of the national census, which was the first of its 
kind in Ethiopia. This gap in data collection is a 
critical one for students of the Ethiopian famine, because 
it evidently coincided with the first large increases in 
grain prices in markets previously relatively unaffected 
by crop failures and related famine conditions. 
Nevertheless, some idea of the pace of inflation over 1984 
can be extracted from the fragmented data series. These 
are considered below. 
In table 7.1, the data are divided into three periods. The 
first, February to August 1984, compares the post-harvest 
period (February), when prices would normally be at their 
lowest (see figure 7-1), with August, the month during the 
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Table 7.1: Inflation of Teff Prices in 20 Wollo and 
Gonder markets: February 1984 - April 1985 
wollo Feb 84-Au g 84 Aug 84-Feb 85 
Alamata 105% (to Sept. ) 0% 
Bati 178% 19% 
Dessie 60% 79% 
Haik 109% 38% 
Kombolcha 108% 36% 
Korem 88% (to Sept. ) 3% 
Lalibela 41% 54% 
Mekaneselam 102% 43% 
Tenta 79% (from Jan. ) 37% 
Wegeltena 58% 60% 
Weldiya 35% 55% 
woreilu 67% 44% 
Gonder Markets 
Feb 84-Feb 85 
105% 
197% 
148% 
188% 
148% 
94% 
118% 
243% 
145% 
153% 
109% 
140% 
Addis Zemen 105% 8% 121% 
Aykle 18% 18% 39% 
Dabat 43% 50% 114% 
Debarak 47% 48% 118% 
Debre Tabor 35% 22% 86% 
Gonder 36% 30% 77% 
Koladiba 21% A g. M-0 82% 
Nefas Mewcha 58% 55% 144% 
Price/month Feb 84 Aug 84 Feb 85 
median 72 birr 127 birr 199 birr 
mean 73 133 176 
C. V* 0.41 0.44 0.37 
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kremt rainy season when prices would normally be expected 
to be at their highest. August is also the month during 
which price data collection was resumed in most areas 
following the census. The second periodisation runs from 
August 1984 to February 1985, during which months one 
would normally expect grain prices to fall. The third 
periodisation refers to the change in grain prices over 
the whole year, February 1984 to February 1985. 
If we consider markets in Wollo first, it is immediately 
apparent that the overall increase in grain prices during 
the first period was generally very high, ranging from 35 
per cent in the central highland market of Weldiya to 178 
per cent in the eastern lowland market of Bati. Inflation 
rates over the second period are somewhat lower, ranging 
from zero in Alamata to 79 per cent in Dessie. It is 
interesting to note that markets like Korem and Alamata 
which experienced early price hikes in 1983 were also the 
first to experience disinflation. However, the deflation 
one normally associates with pre-harvest price behaviour 
is absent in all markets. Inflation rates over the whole 
year, February 1984 to February 1985 are generally high, 
ranging from 105 per cent in Alamata to 243 per cent in 
Mekaneselam. In other words, teff prices rose between two 
and three times in Wollo during 1984. 
Conditions in Gonder were generally less extreme, although 
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they too were varied. Prices rose at roughly the same 
rate during both the pre and post August periods, although 
markets closest to Tigray and Wollo in the north and east 
- such as Dabaty Debarak, Nefas Mewcha and Addis Zemen 
suffered the most extreme inflation. Markets adjacent to 
crop-surplus areas in the south and west such as Aykle, 
Koladiba, and Debre Tabor experienced smaller increases 
in teff prices. This suggests that the crop failures in 
Wollo, eastern and northern Gonder, and much of Tigray 
were indeed very severe during 1984. 
As usual under Ethiopian conditions, the variation in 
grain prices at any given time is wide. According to 
table 7.1 the coefficient of variation of t'eff prices in 
the 20 markets was 0.41 in February 1984, and rose 
slightly to 0.44 in August, before falling again to 0.37 
in February of the following year. The eventual drop in 
the coefficient of variation is to be expected as grain 
price inflation became widespread with the outbreak of 
famine throughout the region, whereas earlier it had been 
confined to fewer markets. 
7.5. Regional Grain Price Behaviour over 1983-84: 
Analysis using official and Unofficial Sources Combined 
Given the apparent lack of integration of markets in 
northern Ethiopia, it has been postulated (Cutler 1984a) 
that it should be possible to construct a map of grain 
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Figure 7.3 
Price Map of Northem Ethiopia 
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prices for each season which would delineate quite 
precisely the extent of famine conditions. In order to do 
this, it was necessary to establish what grain prices 
actually prevailed during 1983-84 in markets not covered 
by the RRC network. This was done through the interviews 
with famine migrants in Sudan. The refugees themselves 
distinguished a bimodal seasonal pattern of prices, as 
suggested by the data presented in figure 7.1. They 
recalled precisely the prices of several different cereals 
by season over the previous two years and sometimes prior 
to that (see chapter 6). 
An example of price maps for teff is given in figures 7.3 
and 7.4. It can be seen from these that the zones of 
highest grain prices - southern and central Tigray and 
northern Wollo - match the data already discussed on 
reported crop failures and the origins of the earliest 
famine migrants (see next chapter), whether reported 
subjectively in RRC reports and other documentation, or 
whether identified by satellite imagery. 
If cross-sections are drawn through the price maps 
(figures 7.5 and 7.6), then the extreme differences in 
price for the same variety of grain (in this case teff) 
are apparent. It is important to note that markets only 
20 kms apart, such as Maichew and Korem, or Samre and Adi 
Adi, can exhibit substantial price differentials, with the 
drought/famine zone prices being more than double those at 
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the edge of the zone. The further one moves away from the 
drought/famine zone, the lower are the prices of grain. 
For example, during 1983, at distances of 200-250 kms away 
from the worst-affected areas, where a quintal of teff 
cost as much as 300 birr, the same quantity of grain cost 
80-85 per cent less (see figure 7.5). While we would 
expect some price differential due to transport costs, 
these are unlikely to be so large as to warrant a 100 per 
cent mark-up over a distance of 20 kilometers. Transport 
to remote areas would generally be carried out by pack 
animal accompanied by the trader, and transport costs 
would be made up of the trader's subsistence needs on the 
journey and expenses on fodder and depreciation of 
animals. Admittedly, all of these costs would be 
increased by drought conditions, with the possible 
exception of the cost of pack animals. Unfortunately, we 
do not have data on the costs of transport in the 
traditional sector. 
An interesting case of intra-regional variation in grain 
prices is exhibited by Dela in figure 7.6. Here it 
appears that harvests were much better than in . 
neighbouring areas such as Hentalo and Maichew. This 
situation adds further evidence to the case made earlier 
(in chapter 6) that there is considerable sub-regional and 
inter-household variation in experience of crop failure 
and famine. 
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Price mapping can also be a useful tool for tracing the 
path of famine over time. Figure 7.7 gives cross- 
sectional representations for markets north-west of the 
drought/famine zone over 1979,1983 and 1984. The data 
supports the testimony of the famine migrants who argued 
that the drought was of long-standing in southern Tigray. 
Even in 1979, teff prices were twice as high in Hentalo 
than in Sheraro. This differential grew enormously over 
1983, but in 1984 prices in the traditionally surplus west 
also moved up to famine levelst reacting to poorer crop 
conditions and the pressure of massive outmigration. 
Throughout, a price differential is maintained, although 
presumably if the drought and famine conditions persisted 
it would lessen. This has certainly been the case for 
northern and southern Wollo. As of May 1985, the price of 
a quintal of teff was uniformly high throughout the 
province. Teff was selling for 285 birr per quintal in 
Dessie market (the regional capital in the south); and for 
up to 400 birr per quintal in Korem (northern Wollo). In 
less accessible markets in western Wollo, teff was 
reported to be selling for as much as 1,000 birr per 
quintal when available. However, this was probably a 
notional price, reflecting virtually complete scarcities 
of this preferred grain. 
The available price datar whether expressed serially over 
time or spatially at given times, lead one to hypothesise 
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Table 7.2: Teff prices at meher harvest (Nov. -Dec. ) 
1981-84; Ten markets in Tigray and Wollo 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
Group 1 (north) 
Hentalo 50 200 400 
Maichew 40 - 300 400 
Korem - 95 136 240 
Alamata 52 53 131 237 
Weldiya 58 61 117 237 
Group 2 (south) 
Wegeltena 65 83 83 237 
Tenta 65 73 76 159 
Dessie 76 100 88 216 
Kombolcha 48 83 88 220 
wereilu 60 68 58 144 
All Markets 
mean 57.1 77.0 127.7 243.6 
sod. 10.9 15.2 72.9 88.9 
cove 0.19 0.20 0.57 0.37 
Group 1 
mean 54.9 69.6 176.8 302.8 
sod. 10.9 20.1 75.9 88.7 
cove 0.19 0.29 0.43 0.29 
Group 2 
mean 62.8 81.4 78.6 184.4 
sod. 10.1 11.0 12.5 33.7 
Cove 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.18 
Source: RRC documentation; Hentalo and Maichew own data. 
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that the coefficient of variation (cv) between markets 
will increase during the early stages of famine before 
decreasing again as severe inflation becomes a general 
feature. If we take a cross section of markets from 
southern Tigray in the heart of the famine zone down to 
the southernmost market of Dessie at its edge, it can be 
seen that this in fact is the case. Table 7.2 compares 10 
markets in Wollo and Tigray. It appears that for the set 
of markets as a whole, the cv does rise over 1981-1983, 
from 0.19 in 1981 to 0.57 in 1983, before falling again to 
0.37 in 1984. If we further divide the markets into two 
groups, it can be seen that throughout the period the cv 
is much higher in the northern group, suggesting that 
markets within or close to the original famine zone 
demonstrate the greatest variety of trading conditions. 
It may be the case that as grain becomes more scarce, 
markets begin to take on a more oligopolistic character,, 
at least in those roadside towns where transportation is 
not a serious constraint. 
7.6. Price Behaviour of Inferior Grains during the 
Develor)ment of Famine 
The price data discussed above are for teff, the preferred 
grain. Similar patterns are produced if the prices of 
cheaper, more widely available but 'inferior' grains are 
mapped. In Ethiopia, several other cereals are commonly 
produced which are considered inferior to teff. The most 
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widely available substitute for teff in both highland and 
lowland areas is sorghum. Maize, wheat and millet are 
also grownt but in smaller quantities. Barley is grown at 
the highest altitudes, but is used mostly for brewing 
beer, at least in normal times. 
During times of hardship, poorer consumers should be 
expected to shift from the preferred grain to inferior 
substitutes. Therefore it is important to consider the 
extent to which the price of cereals like sorghum exhibit 
the same general trends as teff, and the extent to which 
they differ. 
Figure 7.8 shows monthly time series data for sorghum in 
Korem, Alamatar Dessie and Gondery the markets for which 
we previously logged teff prices. It can be seen from the 
graphs that. overall, with the exception of Gonder, very 
high sorghum prices did prevail during 1984. In Gonder, 
prices begin to rise markedly only during the early months 
of 1985. The timing of the price hikes in the four 
markets follows exactly the same pattern as that exhibited 
by teff prices in figure 7.2, with price hikes in the two 
northern markets preceding those in the south by some nine 
months or so. -Again, Gonder lags behind Dessie in its 
response to regional crop failures. The only significant 
difference in sorghum price behaviour vis-a-vis teff is 
that the initial price hike in Korem and Alamata markets 
in 1983 is followed by a fall to below 1982 levels at 
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harvest time. However, there is a rapid jump in the post- 
harvest months of January and February, suggesting that 
the temporary influx of sorghum onto the market was 
shortlived. Some varieties of the crop are harvested a 
little earlier than teff, which may explain why the price 
fall in October and November was so sharp. 
According to the recall of the refugees, by 1984 sorghum 
prices at the centre of the Tigray famine zone were little 
different from teff prices. However, according to 
official price data, there usually remains a significant 
price difference between the two crops, even under famine 
conditions, with teff being around 30-40 per cent higher 
than sorghum. Exceptions do occur, for example in April 
1985 in Dessie the price of teff was only 3 per cent 
higher than sorghum. Evidently, constantly changing local 
supply and demand factors influence the relative prices of 
inferior and superior grains, so that it is difficult, 
without extensive local knowledger to predict the likely 
price regime for any given market at any particular time. 
However, if we consider in broad terms the spatial 
analysis of sorghum prices, it quickly becomes apparent 
that the regional price differentials during 1983 and 1984 
follow much the same pattern as teff. In figure 7.9, the 
distribution of sorghum prices at harvest time during 1983 
and 1984 has been mapped. In this case, a MAPICS computer 
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Ficlure 7.9: Sorghum Prices during harvest, 1983 and 1984 
1983 Northern Tigray 
programme has been employed to highlight the price 
differentials by geographical region. It can be seen from 
the figure that the pattern of relative prices is very 
similar to that depicted for teff in figures 7.3 and 7.4. 
During 1983, the zone of highest sorghum prices was 
centred on a belt running from southern Tigray to southern 
Eritrea. By 1984, relatively high grain prices were also 
to be found in all parts of Tigray and Wollo. 
The behaviour of retail prices of grain under famine 
conditions in Wollo has also been investigated by Baulch 
(1985). He found that during the later stages of the 
famine, the prices of inferior grains such as sorghum and 
barley rose at a faster rate than those of the preferred 
staple, teff. This is easily explained by the tendency of 
consumers to switch to inferior grains as the price of the 
preferred staple rapidly climbs out of reach of the 
majority. Baulch also comments on the 'price ripple' 
effect notable from data on famine conditions over 1983- 
84. He argues that while the price ripple hypothesis 
appears to be plausible, with price hikes in southern 
Wollo occuring several months after those in the north and 
in Tigray, it is strange that the pace of change (the 
gradient) is more rapid in the larger southern markets 
(see Dessie in figures 7.2 and 7.81 for example). This 
difference might be explained by market structure 
variables such as the greater concentration of the grain 
trade in the hands of larger private traders who are able 
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to influence the price of grain through speculative 
reaction to perceived future market conditions in towns 
like Dessiel. 
The patterns of price behaviour discussed above probably 
have not been restricted to the most recent famine. In 
1973f an ENI team noted that while the price of grain at 
the roadsides was generally low, prices in the rural 
hinterland were much higher: 
"A quintal of sorghum costs less than $20 in the roadside 
towns while it is retailed for $35-40 in the interior..... 
An important fact to be repeated here is that the rural 
population used to subsist on its own produce and supply 
the urban centres with its surplus. This phenomenon of 
subsisting by buying from the roadside towns is the 
consequence of the reported drought" (ENI 1974 p 53). 
We should also note that while the activities of traders 
ensured that grain was relatively cheap at roadside 
markets during the Wollo famine of 1972-73, the costs and 
difficulties of transporting grain into the rural 
hinterland ensured a substantial price differential. 
Soaring roadside prices in the latter stages of the 1984 
famine reflected trade movement restrictions as well as 
regional scarcities of grain which were far more severe 
than those of 1972-73. 
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7.7 The Effect of Food Aid on Grain Prices 
It is important to consider the effects of food aid on the 
grain market and related economic activity. This is 
because in modern times a large-scale internationally 
organised relief programme has become a normal part of the 
famine process. Typically, a response commensurate with 
the actual size of the problem has been extremely late in 
arriving, some months after the onset of peak levels of 
mass migration (see chapter 9 as to why this was the case 
in 1984). However, once underway, the relief operation 
distributes large quantities of grain over a relatively 
short period, for example, approximately 700,000 tonnes of 
foodstuffs were distributed in Eritrea, Tigray, Wollo and 
Gonder during 1985. Thereforel it seems reasonable to 
, 
expect, that the sharp falls in the price of grain noted in 
late 1985 for the markets depicted in figure 7.2 will be, 
attributed to the impact of food aid distribution as well 
as to the prospect of better harvests. 
The question of the impact of food aid distribution was 
addressed by an FAO team considering Food for Work (FFW) 
schemes in Wollo during 1982. The team concluded that the 
distribution of food aidt some of which was subsequently 
sold by the recipients, had not had any measurable effect 
on the price of locally produced cereals, although there 
was "a suggestion of a .... disincentive" (FAO 1982) in 
relation to the AMC procurement price, which in some cases 
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had fallen in real terms in FFW project areas. Howeveri, 
as Maxwell (1986) has noted, the availability of food aid 
does not appear to have caused the AMC to reduce its 
levels of procurement, as the "quota policy is 
energetically pursued"y even in times or areas of famine 
(ibid p 27). Procurement prices are fixed by central 
government (see chapter 2), seemingly without regard for 
local variations in production costs and market 
conditions, and may therefore be seen as coercive. 
The survey carried out on FFW projects in Wollo by 
Yeraswerk Admassie and Solomon Gebre (1985) also looked 
into the issue of local sales of food aid and their 
possible effects on local markets. The researchers found 
that FFW recipients sold a greater proportion of their own 
farm produce than non-FFW recipients. This would suggest 
at least a marginal effect on local grain prices. However, 
the study was carried out during the period of rapid 
development of famine conditions even in the FFW project 
areas - indeed, FFW was keeping many of the recipients 
from outright starvation. Consequently, massive grain 
price inflation was already taking place, and the 
relatively small quantities of food aid distributed would 
have had little countervailing effect on the shortfalls 
induced by production failures. on the other hand, the 
dramatic fall in grain prices in late 1985 may well have 
been associated strongly with emergency food distribution. 
One USAID representative noted that the "prices appear(ed) 
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to have fallen fastest in areas where food aid 
distribution was largest' (Maxwell op cit p 37). However, 
no econometric studies of this phenomenon have been 
carried out, so it is not yet possible to ascribe any 
particular weight to the impact of food aid distribution 
on grain prices during the relief operation. 
7.8 Summary 
In this chapter, we have considered the pattern of grain 
prices in northern Ethiopia over the period 1979-84. 
Although official data are scarce for some of the most 
important 'heartlands' of famine in Tigray, it does seem 
from the recall data provided by famine refugees, which 
are to some extent corroborated from other sources, that 
those areas which were reported to have been worst 
affected by crop failures were also those experiencing the 
earliest and most severe grain price-inflation over 1979- 
83. However, during 1984, grain price inflation began to 
affect the larger urban markets at the edge of the famine 
zone to an even greater extent, possibly because a few 
large traders dominated the market and reacted sharply to 
a perceived serious regional grain shortage. Grain 
shortages in the famine areas were indeed so severe that 
in many cases grain was virtually unobtainable in remote 
rural markets and some of the highest prices quoted may 
well have been notional. 
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The influx of food aid into the region during 1985 seems 
likely to have had a deflationary effect on grain prices, 
although substantial falls in the price of grain were not 
forthcoming until harvest prospects improved late in the 
year. We may therefore conclude that high grain prices 
are a usual consequence of crop failures, although this 
may not be apparent in larger roadside markets until a 
very late stage in the development of famine. Grain price 
inflation in remote rural markets certainly occurred 
during the famines of 1972-74 and 1983-85f although in the 
former case it seems to have escaped the attention of most 
researchers at the time. It seems reasonable to suggest 
that severe grain price inflation is a normal feature of 
famine in Ethiopia, as elsewhere. 
Note 
1 It is interesting to note here that Ravaillon (1985) 
has investigated traders' behaviour during times of 
food crisis in Bangladesh, and has found that they 
consistently overestimate the effects of harvest 
failures on food availability. Presumably it is in 
their short-term interest to do so, although traders 
must be careful to unload their marked-up stocks 
during the time of presumed shortage, so as not to be 
left with relatively expensive stocks at harvest time, 
when prices may once again fall sharply. 
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Chapter 8: Additional Socio-Economic Effects of Repeated 
Crop Failures 
8.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, we shall examine further components of 
the concatenation process model put forward in chapter 1, 
making use mostly of data obtained from the survey of 
famine migrants. Specifically, we shall consider the 
extent to which sales of livestock and other farm and 
household assets took place, as well as the timing of 
these sales and the prices obtained for the assets. This 
is important in explaining how cash was raised to buy food 
at the prevailing high prices. Further aspects of the 
process which will be investigated include: consumption of 
famine foods; alternative sources of income; patterns of 
labour migration; and the extent to which dependents were 
abandoned with the onset of mass distress migration. 
It should be noted at the outset that often respondents 
were very vague about the months of sale of their animals, 
with the exception of very important beasts like oxen. 
Consequently, the sample sizes are rather small in some 
cases. 
8.2. Asset Sales under Famine Conditions 
It is a generally observed feature of famines that the 
victims are forced gradually to dispose of their assets. 
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It has been postulated that for sales of livestock a 
hierarchy of responses might be distinguished, with 
valuable breeding stock being kept until last, and with 
older animals and male animals being sold off first 
(Swift 1984). The author has suggested in a previous 
paper (Cutler, 1984a) that a distinguishing feature of 
famine in the Ethiopian highlands would be the late sale 
of oxen, after other types of livestock had been disposed 
of, as these animals are essential for farming. overall, 
a much increased volume of livestock sales, coupled with a 
fall in livestock prices, is to be expected in the 
development. of famine. This occurs because the animals 
can be converted into cash, which can be used in turn to 
purchase food. At the same timey the sale of livestock 
relieves the vendor of the increasingly difficult burden 
of maintaining the animals under drought conditions. 
Prior to whole-household migration, distress sales of 
essential household goods and farming equipment are also 
likely to take place. The interviews with the sample 
populations in Sudan made it possible to test these 
hypotheses. We will begin by considering the pattern of 
livestock sales in general. 
8.3. Livestock Sales in General 
An increased volu; ne of sales of all types of livestock - 
whether associated with a dramatic fall in livestock 
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prices or not - is a likely concommitant of famine 
conditions. Indeed, a graph of some data available from 
Korem in Northern Wollo shows a rather dramatic rise in 
both the amount of livestock offered for sale and the 
amount actually sold over the period March 1981 - January 
1983 (Figure 8.1). The peak of sales coincided with 
reports of abnormal migration for labour and followed the 
critical localised rain failures of Kremt 1982. In this 
case the peak of livestock sales is >100 percent above 
that of the previous year and took place some six months 
ahead of distress migration. Another peak of sales 
might be expected just prior to migration. The first 
distress migration of whole households from northwestern 
Wollo and central Tigray took place in the early part of 
1983 and began to gather pace thereafter. 
Similar data from the sample population for Tigray 
(including Sekota in northern Wollo) shows that there is a 
"bunching" of livestock sales between June and September, 
with 70 per cent of sales taking place over this period 
(Figure 8.2). Traditionally, this period is the worst 
time to sell, as it coincides with the highest prices for 
cereals and the lowest demand for meat. The normal peaks 
of livestock sales, when consumer demand jumps, are the 
important festival periods of Easter, New Year and 
Epiphany during April/Mayr September and January 
respectively. This patternt reproduced for two Wollo 
markets during 1980-81 in figure 8.31 is rather different 
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from that generated by pre-famine distress sales, where a 
steadily growing volume of animals is offered for sale as 
household food stocks become depleted and as the condition 
of animals progressively worsens. 
8.4 Oxen Sales 
ownership of oxen among agriculturalists interviewed in 
the refugee sample (the majority of whom were Tigrayans) 
was very widespread, with 68 households out of 82 (83 per 
cent) having their own oxen before the onset of drought. 
The remainder would borrow oxen from neighbours in order 
to plough their land, and in return would give a share of 
the crop or labour time. Although actual ownership of 
oxen was widespread, there was notable inequality in the 
distribution of oxen holdings. Table 8.1 presents the 
data in terms of cumulative percentages which are also 
expressed in terms of a Lorenz curve (Figure 8.4). From 
the table it can be seen that a little over half of all 
oxen (51 per cent) are owned by only 21 per cent of 
households. It is far more common for households to own 
only one to two oxen - 50 out of 82 households (61 per 
cent) are in this position. These findings are supported 
by results from the agricultural survey recently completed 
by the Ministry of Agriculture, which found that on a 
national basis, 32 per cent of farm households owned only 
one working ox (whereas two are needed for ploughing), 
while 38 per cent of households owned no oxen at all 
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Table 8.1: Distribution of Reported Oxen Holdings 
oxen No H/holds % H/holds Cumulative % H/holds 
0 14 17 0 
1 20 24 12 
2 30 37 49 
3 9 11 66 
4 6 7 81 
5 1 1 84 
10 1 1 90 
15 1 1 99 1 
Total 82 99 1 
Note 
1 Error due to rounding 
Source: Interviews with refugee sample 
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(Ministry-of Agriculture 1984). 
It does seem reasonable to suggest that households try to 
hold onto their oxen until after the April-June period 
when the first rains come. With the failure of the rains 
they may then be unable to continue farming and are forced 
to sell oxen only a few months before migrating out of the 
famine zone. Figure 8.5 shows that out of the 35 
respondents who gave the actual date of oxen sales in 
1984,24 (69 per cent) delayed selling until the, Kremt 
rain season through to the pre-harvest period in October. 
No households reported selling oxen just prior to 
departure in November,, although as Table 8.2 (which 
considers the status of all livestock owned by the 
households sampled) shows, a small proportion of oxen were 
abandoned, amounting to 9 per cent of the total sample. 
As we might expect, prices of oxen were generally low 
throughout the famine zone by 1984. Howeverr there 
appears to have been great variation in sale values within 
districts where oxen prices (by month) were reported, and 
even within the same seasons in those districts. Figure 
8.6 presents the data as a series of bar graphs by 
district showing the range of sale values of oxen compared 
with their pre-drought value as estimated by the 
respondent. In general, the actual prices received during 
1984 (particularly during the Kremt season) were much 
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Table 8.2: Households Reporting the Position of Livestock 
Holdings since the Drought 
Type of livestock 
cows 
Goats 
Sheep 
Equines 
Oxen 
Status No of Households 
sold 
died 
eaten 
abandoned 
sold 
died 
eaten 
abandoned 
sold 
died 
eaten 
abandoned 
sold 
died 
eaten 
abandoned 
sold 
died 
eaten 
abandoned 
stolen 
dowry 
39 
17 
10 
14 
32 
3 
6 
0 
18 
1 
2 
2 
16 
3 
0 
2 
58 
6 
1 
6 
1 
1 
Note 
only 5 households out of the total sample of 100 had no 
livestock when the drought began. 
Source: Interviews with refugee sample. 
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lower than those obtaining in previous years. The average 
price received during 1982 and 1983 was 39 per cent of 
pre-drought value; whilst by 1984 the average had fallen 
to 24 per cent. In some cases, interviewees claimed to 
have received as little as 6-7 per cent of pre- 
drought prices for their oxen. This state of affairs 
reflected both a rapid increase in the volume of livestock 
of all types being offered for sale and a general 
deterioration in the quality of animals as pasture and 
browse became ever more scarce. 
However, there are cases where oxen prices may have 
recovered over the short-medium term. For example, in 
Raya and Azeboy one respondent received only 9 per cent of 
the estimated pre-drought value of his oxen in January 
1984, whereas another respondent from the same province 
recalls getting 23 per cent of the pre-drought value for 
his oxen almost a year later. Similarly, in Enderta it 
seems that-oxen prices actually recovered a little by July 
1984 in comparison with 1982-83 levels. Prices were to 
plunge to low famine levels from August onwards, 
reflecting mass distress sales of oxen in poor condition 
resulting in a 'buyers market'. 
This apparent recovery in oxen prices accords with the 
limited amount of data available from Korem in Northern 
Wollo which shows a similar pattern-obtaining over 1982-83 
(Table 8.3). while between October 1982 and October 1983 
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there is a modest rise in the price of teff, and a 
somewhat sharper rise in the price of sorghum, the price 
of oxen falls from a high point in January 1983 to a low 
in July, before recovering again by October of the same 
year. The RRC Early Warning System also reported a 
recovery of oxen prices in south-eastern Gonder during 
1982-83, despite the severe drought (EWPS 1983), while 
during 1974 in Harerghe province,, Seaman, Holt and Rivers 
noted a general increase in livestock prices over a three 
year period of drought (RRC 1974). The reason for this 
price behaviour is that where livestock deaths are very, -- 
widespread, surviving animals can regain some of their 
value, especially where, like oxen, they are essential for 
farming. Sheep and goat prices will also eventually 
recover, and were reported to the author (through ad hoc 
interviews with Wollo famine victims in June 1985) as 
having returned to the pre-famine levels of 1982 by early 
1985. 
In conclusion, it seems that initiallyt there is a general 
decline in oxen prices which can quickly halve the value 
of these livestock, and after two years or so of severe 
drought reduces them further to around a quarter of pre- 
drought levels. Given that peasant farmers still attempt 
to farm, even during drought and famines, there can be 
some recovery of oxen prices to around 40 per cent of pre- 
drought prices reflecting extreme local scarcities. With 
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the complete collapse of options for the vulnerable 
section of the peasantry in the final year of drought 
prior to massive migration, so comes a final collapse of 
livestock prices. Furthermore, some animals are in such 
poor condition that they have to be abandoned as 
unsaleable. 
It is interesting to note that a previous hypothesis 
(Cutler 1984a; Swift 1984) arguing that relatively less 
important animals such as sheep and goats will be sold-off 
first does not seem to be borne out by the data (albeit 
limited) displayed in figure 8.7. The majority of sheep 
and goat sales recorded for 1984 took place during the 
months of June-September, not long before migration. We 
have rather more information on the dates of sale of oxen. 
Fully 40 respondents reported the dates of sale and it 
transpires that among this group it is in fact more common 
for oxen to be sold off before other livestock, or at the 
same time as other livestock sales. only 12 respondents 
reported selling off oxen lastj although a further five 
households left oxen behind either because they were 
unsaleable or were in the care of relatives or neighbours. 
This compares with 18 households which are recorded as 
selling off oxen early on in the sequence of livestock 
sales, with cattle, sheep and goats being kept for a 
longer period. In ten cases, oxen were sold 
simultaneously with other livestock. 
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It may be the case that the individual decision-maker 
weighs the costs of delaying sales of oxen (if prices are 
tending to fall and if the availability of feed has to be 
taken into account) against the costs of renting oxen as 
the drought worsens. For some individuals, holding onto 
oxen until widespread whole-household migration is 
inevitable has considerable costs attached, given that the 
livestock market in the drought zone will have effectively 
collapsed. Many of the cattle left behind by the sample 
population were simply unsaleable. Thus we might make a 
crude distinction between pessimists, who guessed 
correctly that the drought would continue and who managed 
to get rid of their animals at reasonably good prices (of 
around 40-50 per cent of pre-drought levels) and optimists 
who guessed wrongly and kept their potentially most 
valuable animals for so long that they became virtually 
worthless. A third group might be the cautious pessimists 
who sold their most valuable beasts (ie, cattle) early and 
kept hardy goats which would be more likely to survive the 
drought and provide a nucleus for the rebuilding of 
household assets afterwards. 
In order to ascertain whether social class has an effect 
upon the timing of sales of oxen, the dates of sales of 
oxen have been compiled by total vLifpt4V category. Table 
8.4 shows the numbers and years of oxen sales categor-ised 
according to reported yields during the last good year, 
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Table 8.4: Oxen Sales (1981-84) in Comparison with 
Household wealth, Refugee Sample 
Yield(qu) No. households Oxen Sales 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
0-9 6 2 -4 - 3 
10-19 10 1 4 2 5 
20-29 12 2 - 1 5 
30-39 7 - 2 1 11 
40-49 8 - 1 8 
50-59 10 - 9 5 
60-69 0 - - - - 
70-79 1 - - - - 
80-89 3 - - - 7 
90+ 9 - - 6 8 
Source: Interviews with refugee households 
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the latter being defined by the respondent. It can 
immediately be seen from the table that the poorest 
categories of farmers are those most likely to sell oxen 
earliest - sales are recorded as having occured between 
1981 and 1982 in the bottom four categories, while there 
are none recorded for the highest six categories. It 
seems therefore that the middle and rich peasants are most 
likely to hold onto their oxen for as long as possible, 
while the poor peasant is forced to sell early. 
This study was not able to investigate the activities of 
traders buying up the livestock, as access to the famine 
areas was denied by the authorities. However, it seems 
likely that traders would purchase animals in drought and 
famine areas, take them to better-watered areas for 
fattening, and then return at a later date to sell them at 
high post-famine prices. Dessalegn Rahmato (1987) has 
estimated that about a quarter of the livestock sold in 
Ambassel awraja in Wollo during the most recent famine 
were later re-sold in the province. The remainder were 
either slaughtered or exported. Oxen in particular are 
sold at a premium as the agricultural sector begins to 
recover and finds these essential means of production in 
short supply. Traders have been assisted by large-scale 
restocking programmes supported by western agencies. For 
example, during 1985-86, World Vision purchased in excess 
of 1,000 oxen for free distribution to poor peasant 
households in several awrajas of western Wollo. In one 
322 
a) 
Cý 
0) 
0) 
& 
LL- 
mt 
co 
CD 
cl 
E 
Co U) 
(D 
a) 
C» 
:3 
bf. - (D 
C/) 
%o- 
0 
0 
2 
Co 
:3 
0 
r 
CO 
E 
cu U- 
C. ) 
(D 
0 
z 
cl 
a) 
0) 
cz 
0 
0 
5: 
6- 
OL 
a) L 
323 
uj IT co 0i Ir- 
SIUOPUodsoU jo jeqwnN 
Table 8.5: Asset Sales - Household Goods and Farm 
Equipment 
Type of Asset No of Households 
General household goods 4 
Beds 
Food Containers 
Wood from house 
Clothes 2 
House 
Agricultural Equipment 15 
Total 35 
Source: Interviews with refugee sample 
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case, an ox sold by a distressed farmer in 1984 was 
purchased by World Vision from the trader who had bought 
it, and was allocated to a neighbour of the original 
vendor in 1985 (personal communication, July 1986). 
8.5. Sales of Household Goods and Farm EctUipment 
The behavioural model put forward in Chapter 1 suggests 
that farmers will tend to wait until they are incapable of 
feeding themselves and their dependents and are about to 
migrate before selling off farm equipment and household 
assets. As can be seen from Figure 8.8, this is generally 
the case for the Tigrayan refugee sample. of the reported 
sales, 94 per cent took place between July and November- 
December 1984, the latter being the months in which most 
of the migrants left their homes. Table 8.5 lists the 
kinds of assets sold by the sample population. 
Agricultural equipment includes ploughs, yokes, and simple 
tools such as grinding equipment. Beds and food 
containers were sold in local markets, and these often 
fetched better prices than farm equipment* The latter was 
often sold at ludicrously low prices, for example one 
farmer reported selling his oxen yoke for 0.75 birr, as 
compared with a normal price of around 100 birr, while 
another sold his plough for 25 cents. By contrast, sales 
of beds, food containers and other relatively valuable 
items of household equipment commonly raised between 10 
and 20 birr (US$ 5-10). This is probably the case because 
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those households which can afford to buy goods already 
have farming equipment, but can always use extra food 
containers, better beds, etc, while traders can get good 
resale prices for household goods in the towns and more 
prosperous villages. Again, detailed information on the 
activities of traders during the famine is lacking. 
8.6 Access to Credit 
Among the refugee sample, borrowing for consumption 
purposes was very common, with 59 households managing to 
take loans as a means of survival, while the remainder 
attempted to get credit but failed. Some 70 per cent of 
the loans obtained were interest free, while the remainder 
paid interest ranging from 10 per cent per month (where 
calculated monthly) or from 60-80 per cent per year (where 
calculated annually). In one extreme case a man was 
supposed to pay 300 per cent interest pa to the church on 
a loan of 60 birr. Yet the same individual received six 
cups of grain from a relative and 20 birr from a friend, 
both interest free. In fact, family and friends made up 81 
per cent of creditors, with the church, and the rebel 
organisations, including 'peoples' associations', making 
up the remainder. The church generally did charge 
interest, while the rebel organisations are only recorded 
as having done so in one Out of six cases. Most loans 
were in small amounts, and in cash, although 13 households 
also received loans of grainy ranging from a few tins of 
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Table 8.6 Household Wealth and Access to Credit Compared 
Yield (qu) No. h/holds Credit terms Average amount 
no. M cash/i. r. kind/i. r. 
_ 
0-9 20 1. 13 (54) 44 1.7qu (2) 
2. 2 (8) 29 32% 
3. 8 (33) 
4. 1 (4) 
10-19 21 1. 6 (29) 32 0.5 qu (1) 
2. 3 (14) 29 118% 
3. 11 (52) 
4. 1 (5) 
20-29 9 1. 8 (40) 24 
2. 3 (15) 49 27% 
3. 9 (45) 
30-39 9 1. 5 (62.5) 50 0.5 qu (2) 
2. 2 (25) 45 152.5% 
, 3. 1 (12. '5 ) 
40-49 9 1. 2 (22) 40 2.0 qu (1) 
2. 2 (22) 120 60% n. s. 25% 
3. 5 (56) 
50-59 11 1. 8 (67) 52 
2. 1 (8) 300 60% 
3. 3 (25) 
60-69 2 1. 2 (100) 165 
70-79 1 1. 2.0 qu 
80-89 6 1. 3 (50) 20 0.4 qu (2) 
2. 1 (17) 100 10% 
3. 2 (33) 
90+ 14 1. 3 (25) 112 
2. 6 (50) 122 33% 2.0 qu (1) 
3. 2 (17) 
4. 1 (8) 
Notes 
1. = no. receiving free credit 3. = no. not receiving 
credit 2. = no. paying interest on loans 4. = terms of 
loans not specified. Nos. in brackets in last column 
refer to no. of loans in kind. 
Source: interviews with refugee sample. 
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inferior grain to four quintals of teff. What is perhaps 
most interesting about the loans is that in no case were 
they ever repaid, either partially or in full, before 
migrating. Many respondents argued that they fully 
intended to repay, but had been in no condition to do so. 
However, if they survived (with the creditors) the debtors 
all intended to repay at some future date. 
Table 8.6. analyses credit terms by social class, using 
ten categories based on size of yields of respondents 
holdings before the drought (as estimated by the 
respondent) as means of classification. It can be seen 
that interest-free loans were common to all categories, 
although the richest group records the lowest incidence of 
interest-free borrowing, at 25 per cent of recorded loans. 
Conversely, the richest decile took out the largest number 
of interest-bearing loans. The average size of loans rose 
with social class, with the richer half of respondents 
recording average loan sizes of 100 birr or more. The 
average size of loan among the poorer groups (the bottom 4 
deciles) did not exceed 50 birr. 
The incidence of famine victims not receiving credit , 
varies from 12.5 per cent to 56 per cent of respondents in 
each decile. The highest incidence rates are in the 
bottom half of deciles, notably the second, third and 
fifth. Fewer people were refused credit in the top two 
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deciles, as might be expected. Those with the greatest 
amount of collateral will be the most creditworthy. 
Given the high incidence of interest-free credit during 
the famine, and given the unlikelihood of either interest- 
free or interest-bearing loans being repaid in the short 
to medium term, it would seem that the Ethiopian peasantry 
is remarkably open-handed in times of famine. The 
availability of credit, in the majority of cases from 
family and friends of the famine victims, presumably 
increased the vulnerability of the creditors, some of whom 
would not be long in following the debtors out of the 
famine zone. Indeed, it seems likely that a web of petty 
credit/debt relationships sustains otherwise destitute 
households through those desperate last few months before 
the final harvest failure drives out large numbers of 
victims. Thus, households can be debtors and creditors at 
one and the same time. When one household has some small 
fortune - perhaps a labour migrant manages to remit 
income, or a distribution of food relief is made - then it 
will be under considerable social pressure to redistribute 
some of that income to relatives and neighbours. 
Certainly this was the case among Wollo peasants 
interviewed by Charles Stewart during the filming of 
0 Harvest of Hunger' in April 1984. Stewart observed that 
the ration. was generally considered insufficient, not 
because of its calorie content per se, but because of the 
need for repayment and redistribution of the food aid 
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(personal communication). 
8.7 Emr)lovment and Self-Emi)lovment 
According to the experience of Wollo peasants during the 
last famine (ENI 1974; Wood 1976), and as part of the 
behavioural model under discussion here, a major response 
to crop losses should be a rapid rise in the supply of 
labour flowing to traditionally prosperous parts of the 
region, particularly in the west, where seasonal 
employment is available. Well-established migration 
routes will evidence sudden increases in the numbers of 
peasant farmers seeking work. This phenomenon was 
observable in Northern Ethiopia during 1983-84 and was 
indeed noted by various agencies engaged in survey and 
relief work. The famine refugees interviewed for the 
purposes of this study were also questioned about their 
history of wage-labour and self-employment. 
The earliest mention of exceptional labour migration 
during the development of the present famine is contained 
in a field report written by ion Bennett, on behalf of the 
rebel relief organisation, the Relief society of Tigray 
(REST). He noted that: 
"... until December last year (1982), most of those 
displaced to the west of Tigray were family heads, usually 
male, travelling to the more fertile regions around 
Sheraro and Wolkait in search'of temporary work. They 
330 
would then be in a position to buy grain and (bring) it 
back to their families in the drought-stricken areas. The 
hardest work available paid an average of only 2.5 birr 
per day when the market price for sorghum was 50 birr per 
100 kg. Such work, even where available, could only be 
temporary and by January this year (1983) few 
possibilities were open to those seeking employment" 
(Bennett 1983a p 11). 
Judith Appleton, a nutritionist working with Save the 
Children Fund, also reported from the other side of the 
famine zone that famine migrants from northwestern Wollo 
had arrived destitute in Korem having failed to find 
sufficient work: 
"The farmers I got a chance to talk to in Korem had come 
from around Sekota, the district capital ... This stream 
of people looking for food had to go further afield than 
usual when the rains failed there and the autumn harvest 
was small. Some first traipsed west all the'way over to 
Gonder, where there was still casual agricultural work to 
be found in some places as late as November, before 
hurrying back to Wollo when distribution started there. " 
(SCF Field Report, April 1983) 
By the end of 1983, large numbers of small peasant farmers 
and other able-bodied workers were moving out of the 
drought zone into Sudan in search of paid employment in 
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the large commercial farms harvesting sorghum in, the 
Eastern Region of Sudan. Most of these labour migrants 
expected to return to their families, bringing cash or 
food if they were successful in obtaining work, and then 
moving out of the famine zone with their families (if 
necessary) at a later date. Wright (1983) reported that 
larger numbers of labour migrants then usual were moving 
further west in search of work because the labour market 
in food surplus areas of western Tigray had become 
saturated. This saturation was caused partly by the rise 
in numbers of migrants seeking work and partly because of 
the reduction of ot+VPwF in food surplus regions as the 
drought deepened and as military action disrupted 
agricultural activities. An additional factor forcing the 
concentration of migration was the danger of conscription 
or of physical abuse where traditional migration routes 
brought the would-be labourers into zones controlled by 
the Ethiopian authorities. There also seems to have bebn 
a "bottling up" of labour migrants in Western Tigray 
caused by the difficulties of the passage to Sudan which 
was plagued by banditry and physical barriers such as the 
Tekeze ('terrible') river. 
Howeverf quite a number of labour migrants did manage to 
get to Sudan. John Seaman, Of SCF, questioned some of 
them in November 1983 in an effort to estimate the degree 
of deprivation in Tigray and the likelihood of further 
famine migration. While some of the men said that they 
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Table 8.7: Occupations Pursued by Famine victims Prior to 
migration 
Occupation No. % of total sample 
Agricultural Labourer 19 22 
Agricult ral labourer 
migrant 9 10 
Woodcutter/trader 9 10 
Trader 3 14 16 
Builder 67 
Porter 11 
Weaver 22 
Launderer 11 
Beggar 22 
No work found 25 28 
Total 88 99 
4 
Notes 
1. Includes such activities as ploughing, weeding, 
harvesting, watering, and milling. 
2. Includes household members other than respondent. 
3. Traded commodities included grain and other 
foodstuffs, livestock and salt. 
4. Error due to rounding. 
5. Nine respondents recorded two or more occupations. 
Source: Interviews with sample refugee households. 
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were "going home to die", many clearly intended to seek 
help from the "authorities", whether rebel or government 
(Dr John Seaman, personal communication). A team of Oxfam 
researchers were later to meet returning migrants as the 
team left the drought zone (English et al op cit). 2 
The 100 household heads interviewed in Sudan were 
questioned about their employment history. The results 
are presented in Table 8.7, from which it can be seen that 
agricultural labour on farms which still yielded produce 
in the locality and migration for agricultural labour made 
up the largest category of employment, with 32 per cent of 
the total households reporting seeking work in these 
activities. Agricultural work wholly or partly employed 
44 per cent of those who actually found work. This 
finding supports our notion of the extreme variability of 
rainfall even in an area considered ýdrought affected', 
and the different production conditions experienced at 
different elevations, as was discussed in chapter 5. 
Another large category was made up of the self-employed, 
working as woodcutters and wood traders (14 per cent of 
those in work) or as traders of other goods such as grain, 
livestock and salt (22 per cent). The remaining tasks 
carried out included building and portering (which often 
meant working far from home), and weaving. A large 
category of households, making up 28 per cent of those 
reportedly seeking work, consisted of those who looked for 
work but could not find it. Begging was also reported by 
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two households, but was probably more widespread. 
It may seem somewhat surprising that more long-distance 
labour migration was not reported. Part of the reason for 
the relatively low incidence of this phenomenon was 
undoubtedly due to the risks of travelling through war 
zones and areas where banditry is endemic. Added to this 
would be news of harvest failures in the main grain 
producing areas of Eastern Sudan, with consequent 
depressed wage-earning opportunities. Another factor 
discouraging labour migration is the possibility of self- 
employment through trading. When combined with sale of 
assets, households could subsist for several months after 
running out of home-grown food supplies before being 
forced into terminal migration. 
Wages did not seem to have fallen a great deal in money 
terms, as one might expect during a famine. wages were 
generally at very low levels of 2-3 Pirr per day which in 
normal times would buy about lkg of the cheaper 
foodgrains. However, as there had been considerable grain 
price inflation over the last 2-3 years of drought, the 
amount of food this daily wage could buy had been reduced 
to around 330 grams at the centre of the famine zone. This 
would yield around 1,150 kcall which is less than the 
energy expended in labouring. By way of comparison, a 
normal famine relief ration of 500 grammes per day should 
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yield about 1650 kcals. 
Labour migrants to the Sudan may not have fared quite so 
well in their ability to keep money wages at pre-famine 
levels. A team filming the crisis in the Sudan reported 
that wages at least one commercial farm had been forced 
down to a quarter of normal levels (personal 
communication, Desmond Lapsley, BBC, January 1985). This 
was made possible by the pressure of both Sudanese and 
Ethiopian labourers competing for work. It may well be 
the case that Tigrayan wages were sticky downwards because 
of some degree of enforcement of wage levels by the rebel 
authorities. Certainly REST was able to organise 
employment for some 100,000 famine migrants as basket- 
weavers at a wage of 2-3 birr per day during most of 1983- 
84 (English et al, op cit). 
8.8 Famine Foods 
A total of 60 households stated that they had resorted to 
the consumption of famine foods in order to supplement 
their diets. The most commonly-cited plant foods consumed 
were hamli (Brassica Carinata or Ethiopian cabbage) and 
kulkul (Opuntia Ficus-Indica or prickly pear). Another 
vegetable also called kulkul in Tigrinya is the trumpet 
gourd (Lagnenaria Siceria). other famine foods which have 
been tentatively identified include shembebata 
(Borassus Aethiopicum or fan palm); kanshera 
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(Ziziphus Spina-Christi or Christ's thorn); and k'unti 
(Solanum Americanum or black nightshade). Several 
interviewees recalled consuming the fruit from trees, 
called akat or gabaa, which is the fruit of the crab apple 
tree (Dovyalis Abyssinica). Unidentified varieties of 
grasses (musa) were widely consumed, while the local names 
of several other plant varieties were recordedr although 
not identified. These include: assema, gudibele, hansu, 
kurient, kurka, monquodtf mushumo, seraka and tatayi. 
Several respondents recalled eating birds and wild 
animals, including 'monkeys', which were probably the 
gelada baboons native to the Ethiopian highlands. one 
respondent complained of pest attacks decimating his 
source of wild plant foods. 
Not all of the above foods would be considered inferior, 
some 'famine foods' would be eaten as delicacies in normal 
times. However, the majority of them, especially kulkul 
would be eaten only in adversity. It may also be the case 
that the consumption of certain foods is considered 
shameful, which may explain why 40 percent of the sample's 
respondents failed to report that they had resorted to 
foods not normally eaten. 
8.9 Migration of Household Heads in Search of Food Aid 
It was argued earlier that with the establishment of the 
RRC and of parallel rebel organisations (REST and ERA), it 
337 
might be expected that whole household migration would be 
preceded by a wave of migration of household heads to RRC 
branch offices and to small roaýside towns which act as 
distribution centres when food is available. The RRC and 
the rebel authorities were, in fact, somewhat successful 
in managing to deliver some food to household heads on a 
0 take home' basis. By the middle of 1984, the RRC claimed 
to have registered more than a million 'beneficiaries' of 
free food rations while REST were directly feeding an 
estimated 100,000 people out of a displaced population of 
400,000. However, these rations were usually inadequate, 
in that they would have to be shared among beneficiaries 
not strictly included as part of the 'household' and in 
some cases loans would have to be repaid in kind to 
creditors by the aid recipients. Even if the RRC had 
distributed Ethiopia's entire food aid receipts for 1983 
as free food aid among the five million people designated 
as famine-affected on a completely equitable basis, this 
would have resulted in a ration of only a little over 3kg 
of grain per person per month being distributed, instead 
of the 15kg minimum 'famine ration'. On the basis of a 
fairly conservative estimate of needs, Ethiopia would have 
required one million tonnes of food aid for 1983 instead 
of the 200,000 mt she received. In its March 1984 appeal 
to the donors, the RRC concluded that: 
"Ethiopia is facing a potential disaster of considerable 
magnitude in which, this year, around one fifth of the 
country's population will need assistance in some form or 
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another. If those affected do not receive relief 
assistance, the consequences will be frightening. 0 (RRC 
1984 p 25). 
In fact, a critical gap in supplies to the RRC was allowed 
to develop, as we shall see in the next chapter. Relief 
food shipments, always erratic, fell, desperately short in 
July and September-October. With the collapse of the 
0 entitlement' of registered household heads for a food 
ration, however insufficient, it was clear that outright 
famine on a large scale-would result within a few weeks 
(Cutler and Stephenson 1984). By mid 1984 famine 
conditions, whereby mass starvation deaths were being 
prevented only by peasant resourcefulness and limited 
state action, had given way to outright famine, which was 
eventually filmed by a BBC TV crew in dramatic shots of 
tens of thousands of people converging as a last resort on 
virtually empty food distribution centres. This type of 
migration can be conceptually distinguished from labour 
migration or migration for 'take home' rations. The 
terminal wave of migration of distressed peasants marks a 
final stage of famine and is characterised by the break up 
of families. 
8.10 Terminal Distress Migration 
While for any group of villages or districts we might find 
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it useful to use a simple macro-model of migration 
patterns, eg, labour migration followed by the return of 
household heads, then a move down to roadside food aid 
distribution centres, and finally 'whole household' 
migration down to towns and roadsides; these waves of 
migration do tend to overlap somewhat as different agro- 
climatic zones and socio-economic groups suffer famine 
conditions at different times. Thus, a certain amount of 
whole household migration was already taking place over 
1983 from the centre of the drought zone in Tigray and 
northwestern Wollo. This movement was in three main 
directions: southeast from Sekota down to Korem; southwest 
from Sekota to Ibnat; and westwards from central and 
eastern Tigray into Shire and Wolkait (see figure 8.9). 
Nothwithstanding the fact that the majority of victims 
were claimed as belonging to territory controlled by the 
TPLF, substantial numbers did move into government 
controlled areas for aid. At the height of its 1983 
feeding operations (in April), Ibnat camp in southern 
Gonder had 4,500 inhabitants; while Korem claimed about 
12,000 people, mostly mothers and children (the men were 
avoiding conscription), during the same month. Meanwhile, 
the TPLF estimated that 350-400,000 people had been forced 
to move westwards out of Sekotal Tembien, Endertal Raya 
and Azebo, Hulet Awlalo, Axum and Adwa to the more fertile 
and rain-favoured western provinces in an orderly 
migration forced mainly by drought but exacerbated by war 
(see figure 8.9). 
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It is important to note that while whole families were 
forced out of their home areas in 1983 as well as 1984, 
many intended to return. The proof of this is in the 
reverse flow of household heads and other able-bodied 
household members to their farms to plant during the early 
Kremt season. REST estimate that 56,000 people, 70 per 
cent of them male household heads, did this during 1984, 
(English et al op cit) while Ibnat camp reported a 
dramatic fall in camp numbers from 4,500 to 1,500 by June 
1983 as people went home to plant. Similarly, according 
to UNHCR an estimated 45,000 farmers left the Sudanese 
camps for their homes between March and May 1985. It is a 
rational strategy to leave the very old, the very young, 
and the sick in the care of humanitarian organisations 
while the able-bodied continue to seek work and even, as 
we have seen, seasonally migrate to their farms. 
Nevertheless, the continuing and spreading drought coupled 
with a collapse of employment opportunities and of the 
provision of food relief by the authorities in both 
government and rebel-controlled areas meant that by 1984 
this precarious option was no longer viable. The final 
and greatest waves of terminal migration were to take both 
the earlier uprooted population and many of those who had 
so far survived the drought reasonably intact on long 
journeys to famine camps. There was an explosion of 
population out of the famine zone which began to gain pace 
in August-October 1984 and which reached epidemic 
proportions during the harvest and post-harvest season 
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from around November 1984 through to March 1985. The 
exodus continued throughout 1985, with well over 300,000 
people travelling to Sudan, and an unspecified but equally 
large number finding their way to other parts of Ethiopia 
(see chapters 6 and 9). 
It is important to note that when famine conditions do 
break down into outright famine, the flow of victims to 
the roadsides, towns and camps can dramatically increase 
over a relatively short period. For example, the numbers 
crossing the Sudanese border rose from around 300 per day 
in September-October 1984 to 3,000 per day by the end of 
November. Flows of refugees over the border were 
stabilizing at around 3-4,000 per day by January 1985, but 
the exodus showed no signs of abating. However, there was 
again some reverse migration of able-bodied farmers back 
into the famine zone with the onset of Kremt rains in 
another attempt to get a crop from the denuded highlands. 
Unfortunately, the availability of plough oxen, seed and 
tools severely restricted the numbers which could return. 
Indeed, it was reported that in some parts of Tigray that 
many farmers had already abandoned the plough and had 
reverted to hoe cultivation by Kremt 1983 (Wright ibid). 
Thus there was a ratchet effect on production technology, 
with less efficient farming techniques being resorted to 
by impoverished farmers (Chambers, 1983). 
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8.11 Terminal Migration and Mortality: Experience of 
Famine Victims in Sudan 
The refugee sample was questioned about their. household 
size and composition, deaths of household members and 
relatives over the past year, and about the abandonment of 
dependents in the famine zone. Figure 8.10 presents a 
simple age pyramid describing the sample populations. The 
majority of migrants were in nuclear family groups - 65 
out of 100 households fell into this category. The men 
were concentrated in the 40-50 age groups, while the women 
were in the 30-40 year groups. This discrepancy reflected 
the traditional age gap between males and females on 
marriage. The preponderance of nuclear families in these 
age groups shows that it is the farming families at the 
middle stage of familial development who are most likely 
to migrate during famines in highland Ethiopia. 
Young men in their twenties were not well-represented in 
the sample. They were more likely to be found, in a sub- 
category of single male households, and there were nine of 
these, of all ages. only one of this group stated that he 
was married -a 35 year-old who abandoned his wife and two 
children at Korem. A further 5 households consist of 
single men who had left their families in search of work 
and food. Three men were widowers in their 50s and 60s. 
Single men tended to attach themselves to other family 
groups for company. 
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Female-headed households made up the second-largest 
category (after nuclear households)l with 13 women being 
in this position. Only two were entirely alone, the 
remainder were with their offspring. The majority of 
these women were in their 40s and 50s, with only two being 
in their 20s and 30s. A further two women were in their 
60s. Five women reported being widows - usually of some 
years standing. The remainder had been abandoned by their 
husbands, although one woman was confident that her spouse 
would find his way to Sudan and meet with her shortly. 
Male heads of household with children but no wives were 
also represented, with 12 men being in this position. 
Nearly all were in their 50s and 60s, with only one in his 
90s and only two in their thirties. Two men admitted to 
having abandoned their wives, in both cases leaving 
daughters behind also. However, all of these men had some 
children to look after. The largest households were both 
headed by 50 year old men. one had 3 daughters and 4 sons 
to look after, while another had 5 sons depending upon 
him. 
Table 8.8 gives details of dependents abandoned and deaths 
within the year preceding the interviews. A number of 
points arise from the data. Firstly, the ratio of 
surviving females to surviving males in the camps 
(immediately following migration) is 767: 1000. The 
overall death rate both before and after migration is 
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Table 8.8: Households Reporting Deaths and Dependents 
Abandoned at Migration 
Abandonment 
Relationship No h/holds with with with 
children spouse parent 
Father 10 1 4 
Mother 11 2 4 
Son 12 10 
Daughter 10 7 
Husband 3 
Wife 18 15 
Note 
A total of 46 households reported abandoning dependents: 
25 males and 39 females were abandoned in all. 
Deaths 
Relationshi 
Father (in-Law) 
Mother (in-Law) 
Husband 
Wife 
Son 
Daughter 
Brother 
Sister 
Uncle 
Nephew 
Note 
Starvation Disease War 
2 
83 
3 
2 
5 
A total of 37 deaths (in year of migration) were 
reported; 23 males and 14 females. The cause of death 
was not clear in some cases, and has not in every case 
been recorded here. 
Source: interviews with refugee sample. 
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quite low, at 70 per 1000t and females appear to have a 
better chance of survival than males, with reported deaths 
being in the ratio 609 females to 1000 males. The 
discrepency in the female/male ratio in the camps is to 
some extent explained by the abandonment of more female 
dependents than males, with the ratio being 1560 females 
for every 1000 males. The second largest category of 
abandoned dependents is that of wives with children, with 
old people most likely to be abandoned. 
If we include abandoned dependents and deaths in the 
calculation of the overall female/male ratio, then the 
ratio is improved slightly but is still well below that 
which might be expected. Instead of a sex ratio of 1020 
females to 1000 males (recorded during the drought in 1983 
in Wollo province; Ministry of Agriculture 1984), the sex 
ratio overall is 822 females per 1000 males. Thus it is 
tempting to conclude that a degree of under-reporting of 
females has taken place. However, the findings that 
females are less likely to die of hungerr ceterus paribus, 
but are more likely to be abandoned with children 
burdening them (and th erefore more likely to die of hunger 
in the long run) is supported by the literature (eg, see 
Rivers 1982; Ali 1984). 
It is also notable that there are disproportionately few 
under-five year olds, amounting to only 12 per cent of 
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those reported to be alive in the camps. In normal times 
it might be expected that about 20 percent of the 
population would be under five (Ministry of Agriculture 
ibid table 2). It may be that that the drought has taken 
its toll on fertility, as well as increasing mortality. A 
drop in fertility occurs during the development of famine 
conditions partly because the incidence of miscarriages 
rises, and partly because starving people lose their 
libido. Wright reported that starving women in Tigray 
were failing to conceive during 1983 (ibid). 
Children will also suffer disproportionately from hunger 
and disease in the camps and are more vulnerable to post- 
migration mortality. However, it should be noted that 
people do not wait until they are very weak before moving 
out of a famine zone - the relatively low death rate of 70 
per 1000 overall at the time of the survey is an indicator 
of this, fact. By way of comparison, it might be noted 
that the death rate at the height of the 1974 famine in 
Wollo was estimated at 190 per 1000 (ENI 1974, table D5, p 
20). Unfortunately, famine survey teams often expect to 
find dramatic levels of poor nutritional status in famine 
zones and are*confused to find that this may not be the 
case, although 'normal' levels of endemic undernutrition 
prevail (MSF 1984). It is at the edge of the famine zone 
that one is likely to find the most widespread 
malnutrition among migrant populations, particularly some 
weeks after migration when there is inadequate provision 
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of food, water, medicine and shelter, as has been the case 
both in Sudan and Ethiopia, owing to the failure of the 
governments of these states and the international 
humanitarian organisations to respond quickly enough to 
mass migration (see chapters 9 and 10). This is an 
important point given that the regular monitoring of 
nutrition status of children is widely advocated as a 
means of assessing risk of famine. It is likely that the 
children weighed and measured at the centre of a famine 
zone will be the children of the better-off families, 
unless there is some attempt at differentiation on the 
basis of social class and history of on-farm production 
failure is made. 
8.12 Summary and Conclusion 
It can be seen from the above observations that the 
components of famine behaviour commonly described in the 
literature are also features of the household response to 
famine during the Ethiopian crisis of 1982-84. Asset 
sales were common, with most livestock being sold during 
the stressful kremt seasont when grain prices are 
traditionally at their highest. The most valuable 
livestock sold were oxen. It seems that poorer households 
are more likely to sell-off oxen at an early stage, 
I 
whereas richer households can hold onto their oxen for a 
longer period. Those who sell some years before 
migration receive a better price for their animals. 
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Indeed,, the widespread deaths of oxen at a relatively 
early stage in the famine process may explain the 
temporary recovery of oxen prices in 1983, which was 
reported from several sources. Towards the end of the 
victims' sojourn in their home country, they resorted to 
last-minute sales of household goods and farm equipment. 
The resilience shown by the famine victims to repeated and 
severe crop failures was long-lasting, with victims 
surveyed commonly reporting 4-5 years of rain failures 
before the date of migration. Apart from asset sales, 
means of survival included widespread consumption of 
famine foods, wage labour and self-employment, and access 
to credit from relatives, neighbours and formal 
organisations such as farmers' associations and the 
church. It seems likely that in these ways great numbers 
of impoverished peasants were able to survive the famine 
without migrating. Those who moved to Sudan, although 
numerous, were a distinct minority who were forced to 
migrate through fear of death by starvation. They avoided 
feeding centres under the control of the Ethiopian 
government for fear of conscription or forced 
resettlement, or because the victims simply did not 
believe that they would be fed in the camps controlled by 
the Dergue. At least as many victims as migrated to Sudan 
were displaced inside Ethiopia, although a relatively 
small proportion of Tigrayans sought sanctuary in the 
government-held towns. Yet it should be remembered that 
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well over half of the population survived the famine 
intact, while a minority must have prospered, especially 
the traders buying up assets sold at distress prices, and 
the big farmers able to employ cheap labour. 
Unfortunately, lack of access to the actual famine zones 
at the time of the study has ensured that this analysis 
has necessarily concentrated on the losers rather than the 
gainers. 
The losers who had been forced to seek sanctuary in the 
burgeoning famine camps during 1984 found themselves 
trapped in sink-holes of starvation and disease. Although 
human losses before migration had been kept low, at less 
than half the famine levels recorded in the previous 
decade, the almost complete lack of preparation and 
inability of the international agencies to respond quickly 
to a foreseeable event ensured that death rates rocketed 
in the months immediately following the migration. 
Eventually, the Sudanese camps were to experience the 
highest death rates ever recorded in a refugee emergency, ' 
whilst similar scenes were to be found across the border 
in Ethiopia. The reasons for this state of affairs are 
considered in the next two chapters. 
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Notes 
1A seasonal pattern of livestock sales seems clear from 
the lowland market of Bati, which is one of the 
biggest in the region. However, the seasonal pattern 
may have been breaking down in Eliwoha during 1981, a 
highland market which shows a sharp increase in sales 
from may-September, during the kremt rain season. 
2 These reports were taken as clear evidence by SCF, 
Oxfam and other observers that outright famine was 
imminent, and that forward relief planning was an 
urgent necessity. 
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Chapter 9: The Response to the Famine prior to October 1984 
Introduction 
Before describing the institutional response to the 
famine, it is important to recall the methodological 
framework devised in chapter 1, so that the events 
described may also be explained. The key arguments are as 
follows: 
(i) Food is a strategic resource, especially during 
famines. Hence, governments and donors will 
allocate food in accordance with their overall 
political aims. These aims may be advanced during 
the famine as the social crisis provides political 
opportunities. The response to famine is 
therefore primarily politically-conditioned. 
The nature and extent of the institutional 
response to famine depends principally upon the 
relations of the inter-governmental organisations 
(IGOs) with donors and with the recipient 
government. The IGOs can respond only if the 
government requests help and if the donors provide 
sufficient resources. In cases of doubt, the IGOs 
will not take risks, and will avoid 
responsibility. 
The non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are 
dependent upon donor governments, the general 
354 
public and IGOs for resources. However, they are 
more likely to take risks than the IGOs in 
attempting to publicise famine because this can 
lead to a considerable increase of flows of 
resources into their organisations. Lacking a 
firm financial base, NGOs are highly insecure and 
must regularly compete with other NGOs for 
resources. This is not generally the case with 
IGOs whose budgets from funding governments tend 
to be fixed over the medium term, although budgets 
can suffer over a longer period if the IGOs 
activities are not to the liking of their major 
supporters. 
Given these basic conditions, we must now consider what is 
likely to happen if the government of a famine-affected 
country fails to respond sufficiently. Such a government 
would value other political objectives - such as 
maintaining its power through feeding the urban 
population, fighting civil wars, building new social 
institutions etc. - above those of feeding starving 
sections of the peasantry. 
The response of the donors to this situation would depend 
upon their own political objectives. There are two basic 
scenarios here: 
(a) the donors are allied to the government, and are 
concerned to prevent its downfall. Under these 
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circumstances, the donors will seek to persuade the 
government to act to control the famine where there 
is a perceived threat to the government's 
stability. Thus the USA unilaterally distributed 
food to the population of the potentially 
rebellious province of Darfur in Sudan in 1983-84, 
but not to the Ethiopian refugees or the passively- 
starving peasants in the less politically-volatile 
provinces. ' 
the donors are not allied to the government, and 
have an interest in seeing it fall or change its 
political and economic orientation. Under these 
circumstances, famine control becomes an issue only 
when the problem becomes highly visible, in the 
form of mass migration of famine victims. This 
event will in turn only be responded to by donors 
on a reactive basis if it is sufficiently 
publicised by the media in the donor countries and 
becomes a humanitarian political issue. This state 
of affairs describes the situation during the 
recent famine in Ethiopia. 
The role of the media in the latter case is extremely 
important. Only the exposure of the famine to the 
pressure of humanitarian political lobbying can change the 
degree of the international response. However, media 
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pressure may still fail to change the nature of the 
response, leading to a concentration upon long-term 
development programmes rather than short-term relief 
projects. In any case, the degree of response will 
dwindle as the news event passes into history. 
The analysis of response given in the next two chapters is 
periodised precisely because the upsurge in humanitarian 
political lobbying, which forced the donors to respond to 
the problem in a manner commensurate with its size, did 
not occur until October 1984. Before that date, there had 
been quite a lot of reporting of the famine in the quality 
press, but not very much in the popular press. The famine 
had not yet attracted the concerted attention of the TV 
and radio media because it was not yet deemed by news 
editors to be spectacularly bad enough to warrant prime- 
time exposure. Only during the latter half of 1984 were 
the scenes of starvation considered sufficiently dreadful 
(and therefore newsworthy) to warrant such exposure. Even 
so, the timing of the broadcasting of these scenes 
depended to a great extent on the whims of news editors. 
The famine could have gone largely unobserved by the West 
had it not been for competition between rival television 
networks in the UK (Harrison and Palmer 1986). 
The role of the IGOs over the period leading up to the 
mass media coverage of the Ethiopian famine deserves 
closer examination. Throughout, the IGO's response to 
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mass migration was reactive and therefore much less 
effective than it might have otherwise been in terms of 
its impact on excess mortality. This state of affairs 
arose because of both the nature of the overall political 
climate and of IGO institutional rationality and 
procedures. Knowing that Western donors were highly 
likely not to want to pre-empt mass migration, they 
awaited its effects before making detailed appeals. The 
IGOs then avoided responsibility for implementation as far 
as possible by passing it on to NGOs and branches of the 
Ethiopian government. If the media demanded to know what 
had already been done to combat the famine the IGOs could 
point to actions taken and provide lists of commodities 
and cash supplied to the implementors. It should be noted 
that the IGOs were in general poorly informed about 
conditions in the rural areas. Their staff were for the 
most part confined to the capital cities, chained to their 
mandates and organisational procedures, and were unable to 
take political risks, which were likely to prove fruitless 
and would probably act to the detriment of their careers. 
IGO staff also had little experience of famine, and found 
it difficult to recognise its symptoms or understand its 
probable development path. 
Meanwhile, the response of the NGOs depended very much 
upon the scope of their operations in the country at the 
time and the degree Of POlitical security they 
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consequently enjoyed. NGOs operating in a famine area 
will usually attempt to publicise rural distress, and will 
mitigate it according to their own perspectives - for 
example childcare charities will concentrate on feeding 
children, and development charities will involve 
themselves in works projects. NGOs do not generally 
promote a broad perspective, and will be unwilling to 
share information and resources with rivals. 
Consequently, they suffer from tunnel vision, 
concentrating on their own professional fields and 
geographical areas of operation. Thus NGO's can be taken 
by surprise by the eventual scale and sudden onset of mass 
migration. This was largely the case in Ethiopia in late 
1984. 
It should be noted at the outset that many of the events 
occuring over the two periods remain obscure, both in 
terms of hard facts and in terms of underlying motives of 
the various actors involved. Motives often have to be 
inferred through a comparison between official statements 
of intent and actual behaviour-. This study has to some 
extent benefited from interviews carried out with some of 
the important actors involved in the famine relief 
operation at key periods during its development, which has 
assisted in the process of untangling fact from fiction, 
for many of the agencies and actors involved have been 
editing history since the public disclosure of the extent 
of the famine (examples will be given in this chapter). 
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9.2. The Attitudes of Donors to Information about 
the Famine 
As has been apparent from our analysis of the recent 
history of famine in Ethiopia, hardly a year has gone by 
since the revolution when actual or threatened starvation 
was not reported by the RRC's early warning system. Table 
9.1 lists the RRC's estimates of the numbers of people 
facing "food shortages" over the period 1981-1984. The 
numbers given are very large, ranging from almost 3 
million to more than 6 million over the period. However, 
the RRC does not attempt to define what is meant by its 
use of the term "food shortages". 
Despite the fact that these estimates are compiled 
directly from field reports of peasant associations; the 
bureaucrats of the donor agencies rarely believe them. 
This is partly because the numbers are so large, and 
partly because the figures given are so precise. 
Nevertheless, historically, the donors have rarely taken 
the trouble to understand how the figures are arrived at; 
and equally the RRC has not (until recently) attempted to 
explain their origin. In August 1984, this situation was 
to some extent rectified through a workshop sponsored by 
UNICEF and attended both by producers and users of 
information (RRC 1984a). Unfortunately, this exercise 
coincided with the outbreak of uncontrolled famine in 
Ethiopia, so it was rather too late to affect planned food 
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Table 9.1: No of People (000) Facing Food Shortages due 
to Meher Crop Failures, 1981-84 
Administrative 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Region 
Arssi 220 220 60 2.5 
Bale 109 59 35 52.9 
Gamu Goffa 108 250 - 79.9 
Gojjam 198 65 20 35.2 
Gonder 202 50 424.6 376.5 
Harerghe 777 327 285 419.1 
Illubabor 6 - - 33.1 
Keffa 26 20 - 1.6 
Shewa 533 471 195 407.1 
Sidamo 333 - 145 695.4 
Tigray 600 . 
350 l"000 11331.9 
Wellega 96.6 46.6 - - 
wollo 592.4 572.4 1,200.2 11790.8 
Eritrea 713 400 534.8 872 
Total 4,, 514 2,831 31899.6 6,098 
Source: RRC documentation 
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aid shipments. 
Part of the reason for the neglect of the RRC to define 
precisely its terms and to account for its figures is 
undoubtedly because it wishes to maximise potential 
claims. At the same time, the representatives of-the 
potential donor governments are unwilling to admit these 
claims, given their own political and institutional 
interests, at least before famine itself becomes a 
political issue. Hence, the RRC reports have 
traditionally been the subject of extreme donor cynicism. 
Here are a selection of comments culled from 
representatives of bulk food donor agencies during March 
1984, by which time large scale famine was virtually 
assured and the RRC was in the process of making a 'last 
ditch' appeal: 
"They come up with a figure which nobody believes" (EEC 
of f icial) . 
"Every year-I have been here for the last four to five 
years they have said that several million people were 
facing food shortages. If this was true at least a 
million would have died by now" (WFP official). 
"If we see the figures we tend to divide by ten - maybe 
that is a very cynical attitude. If there is a bad year, 
we might add ten per cent (to food aid imports)" (EEC 
of f icial) . 
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"There's a kind of 'wait and see' attitude, there are many 
other places which are being declared emergencies .... the 
RRC asks to be taken on faith. It says it will put on a 
show and it puts on a flop" (Canadian official speaking 
about a tour of the famine-affected regions). 
we shall examine in detail the record of the official 
donor agencies shortly. At this point it will be 
sufficient to take note of the generally negative attitude 
of representatives of important donor agencies in Addis 
Ababa. 
The RRC appeal of March 1984 was one of a string of 
regular appeals for aid. However, it was both 
quantitively and qualitatively different from those 
preceding it. The report stated starkly that: 
"Ethiopia is facing a potential disaster of considerable 
magnitude in which, this year, around one-fifth of the 
country's population will need assistance in some form or 
another. If those affected do not receive relief 
assistance, the consequences will be frightening" (RRC 
1984b p 25). 
The report was launched at a meeting with aid donors, held 
on March 30th. Gill (1985), who has written a detailed 
account of the response to the famine, is scathing about 
donor attitudes at this time: 
wThe RRC holds regular 'donor' meetings, several a year in 
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the recent past, and some donor representatives have tried 
to persuade me that there was nothing out of the ordinary 
about the 30 March meeting. There were in fact several 
unusual aspects to the presentation that day as the RRC 
struggled to bring international attention to bear on the 
developing tragedy. First they showed the donors a film, 
a video compilation stiched together in part from western 
television coverage of famine conditions, with an RRC 
commentary stuck on top. The question-and-answer session 
after the main presentation was particularly lengthy as 
donors queried the level of government food stocks in the 
country and the capacit"y of the-ports to handle large 
quantities of aid" (ibid pp 28-29). 
Moreover, the tone of the report was different from 
previous efforts. Gill considers that a note of 
desperation had crept in whereas previous reports had 
tended to understate the impact of developing famine 
conditions. 
It must be remembered that this RRC appeal came in the 
wake of numerous other warnings from a variety of 
interested parties. These warnings are summarised in 
table 9.2, and it can be seen that they emanated from the 
UN system, research foundations, and from non-governmental 
organisations. In some cases, representatives of 
bilateral donor agencies also made reports to their head 
offices warning of faminep but this was admitted publicly 
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Table 9.2: 'Main Features of Warnings of and Responses to 
the Forthcoming Famine 
March 1981 Ethiopia warns of serious crop failures in 
the north. UN Coordinating Committee for 
Relief and Rehabilitation prepares a 
report (with RRC) detailing assistance 
needs. 
early 1982 The Organisation of African Unity warns 
that more than 100 million Africans would 
be affected by severe food shortages 
continuing into 1983. 
April The RRC details assistance requirements 
for more than 5.5 million people and 
states that "drought and the effects of 
war .... have together made the food 
supply most critical. " 
July The NMSA warns of drought following a one- 
month delay in the onset of kremt rains in 
the north. 
December The RRC publishes a second 'assistance 
requirements' report asking for aid for 
4.8 million people. SCF begins warning 
donor agencies of the likelihood of 
famine, including an influx to Sudan, and 
-sets up a supplementary feeding centre at Korem in northern Wollo. 
January 1983 First alert from the FAO Global 
Information and Early warning System on 
the African Food Situation for 1983-84. 
February Oxfam begins feeding operations at Ibnat. 
March The RRC requests relief for 3.9 million 
people. 
April SCF team kidnapped by TPLF guerrillas at 
Korem. 
October FAO convenes a special meeting of 
representatives of donor countries and 
drought-affected countries to discuss the 
food crisis. CRS requests a further 
16,000 mt. food from USAID. 
November The International Wheat Council warns of 
the deteriorating situation in the 
Sahelian countries, including Ethiopia, 
during its 99th session. 
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Table 9.2 (cont. ) 
December The UN Economic Commission for Africa 
states that 150 million Africans will 
"face hunger and malnutrition in 1984" 
January 1984 The USA announces $90 m. additional aid 
for Africa. The International Disaster 
Institute/London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine begin warning agencies 
of worsening famine conditions and 
publishes supporting evidence. 
February FAO convenes joint session with UN 
ambassadors to inform them of crop 
conditions, food supplies and relief 
efforts in famine-affected African 
countries. FAO/WFP mission sent to 
Ethiopia to assess needs. 
March RRC launches extraordinary appeal for food 
for more than 6 million people, 
accompanied by a film to help convince 
donors of the seriousness of the 
situation. The World Bank issues a strong 
warning that Africa is facing a "food 
catastrophe" and that Ethiopia, Chad, 
Mozambique and Burkina Faso have only four 
month's food left in stock. 
may The US government approves only 8,000 mt 
of emergency food for CRS. 
June The London Economic Summit states that 
Western leaders are "greatly concerned" 
about African drought and are "pledged to 
maintain and wherever possible increase" 
aid to Africa. Church Drought Action in 
Africa issues a famine warning for 
Ethiopia. Oxfam, warns of famine in 
Tigray. The FAO/WFP needs assessment 
report is published, recommending only 
125,000 mt of emergency food aid for 
Ethiopia. FAO delays clearance of WFP 
emergency shipment of 30,000 mt. 
July 0 Harvest of Hungero shown on British 
Independent Television. Joint NGO appeal 
launched. UNDRO circulates 5 telexes on 
the deteriorating situation in Ethiopia 
between May and July. 
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Table 9.2 (cont) 
August The RRC publishes an update on relief 
needs and the general situation, stating 
that "we have no grain in our stocks as of 
the middle of July". WFP calculates the 
Ethiopian food deficit at only 50,000 mt. 
September CRDA demands "immediate and extraordiary 
action" of western donors. Oxfam 
announces a 10,000 mt grain shipment to 
shame Western governments into action. 
WFP figures state that Ethiopian food aid 
received or in the pipeline exceeds 
requirements. UNDRO states that crop 
growing conditions in the northern famine 
areas are "almost satisfactory". 
October Deaths in Korem camp reach 100 a day. The 
situation there is filmed by Samir Amin 
and presented by Michael Buerk as a 
"famine of biblical proportions". Film 
extracts get prime-time coverage worldwide 
over the coming weeks, stimulating an 
international political furore. 
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only later. Indeed, once the famine had begun, almost 
everybody claimed to have warned of its development, and 
many could point to internal memoranda or external appeals 
which supported these claims. This point is underlined by 
a survey of NGOs carried out in Addis Ababa in May 1986. 
The report notes that: 
"seven out of seventeen agencies interviewed claim to have 
known about a major famine before the end of 1983 .... Of 
the others, three said they knew a major famine was coming 
by February 1984, one said April 1984, one May,, one 
September, one August and two October" (Confidential 
draft, undated). 
The UN early warning system, based at the FAO headquarters 
in Rome has also been defensive about its record, pointing 
out that it had been warning of food crises in as many as 
22 African countries as early as October 1983. 
It is important to recognise that the Ethiopian famine was 
a creeping disaster. As such, it attracted a relief 
response as early as December 1982, which grew steadily 
over 1983 and early 1984, before undergoing a quantum leap 
in size of operations following the October television 
footage. Therefore, almost all agencies with a presence 
in Ethiopia could argue that they had responded to the 
crisis before it became known to the mass media and thence 
to the general public in the West. Furthermorer the 
crisis had already attracted considerable attention from 
the media. Regular press coverage since early 1983, 
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particularly in the 'quality' newspapers of western Europe 
and North America had been supplemented with a certain 
amount of television footage in early-mid 1984. Charles 
Stewarts' short film 'Harvest of Hunger' had already 
raised some V million for Ethiopian famine relief when it 
was broadcast on British Independent Television in June 
1984. However, the misery depicted in the film was 
quantitively and qualitatively different from that 
displayed in October. By then, the relief system had 
almost completely failed to cope with the onslought of 
massive distress migration to relief camps. Consequently, 
the harrowing films and photographs of famine victims 
attracted a much more emotional and financially generous 
response from Western viewers. 
In order to understand how this situation arose, it is 
useful to consider the actions of the responding 
institutions separately. These are grouped as follows: 
(i) the Ethiopian government; (ii) major governmental 
donors; (iii) the United Nations agencies and (iv) the 
non-governmental organisations. 
9.3 The Response of the Ethiopian Government to the Famine 
We have seen that the RRC was instrumental in issuing 
regular warnings and updates on the developing famine. It 
was also involved directly in the distribution of relief. 
It is unusual for a poor country such as Ethiopia to 
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invest in a permanently established body for relief 
distribution, and it is still more unusual for such a body 
to attract wide praise for its relative honesty and 
efficiency. The ex-director of Oxfam, Michael Harris, has 
stated that the RRC is: 
Na bureaucratic organisation, often slow to operate and 
its systems are immensely hierarchical. Its reporting 
procedures are irregular and often non-existent. It is, 
however, infinitely better than corresponding 
organisations in many other countries (Harris 1985 p 17). 
Even administrators of countries unsympathetic to Ethiopia 
are impressed with the RRC. Gill reports that "through 
clenched teeth, the (US) State Department acknowledged 
that aid donors considered the RRC to be a relatively 
well-organised and well-run organisation" (op cit p 37). 
It may well be that the discipline based on fear instilled 
by the Dergue following the threat to its rule during 
1977-78 (see chapter 2) has considerably modified the 
traditionally corrupt practises of the Ethiopian 
bureaucracy. Nevertheless, in 1983-84 the RRC was rendered 
virtually incapable of carrying out its mandate through 
lack of support from both donors and government. This is 
an example of sectoralisation leading to bureaucratic 
inertia, in line with Shaffer's arguments which were 
discussed in chapter 1. If we further accept B. Harriss' 
(1985) argument that famine ultimately represents a 
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failure of the State to provide for the subsistence needs 
of its citizens, then Ethiopia is a fine example of state 
indifference to mass starvation, despite the apparent 
priority given to famine control manifested in the 
establishment of the RRC. As we have seen from chapter 3, 
the State has traditionally been indifferent to mass 
starvation among the rural population, who represent 
little threat to the urban power base. However, when the 
urban poor are threatened, steps are taken to provide 
subsistence for this potentially riotous population. 
Lack of state support for famine control was evident in a 
number of ways. To begin with, the government did not 
make commercial purchases of food, either for consumption 
by townspeople or for famine victims. This behaviour 
contrasts with that of the governments of neighbouring 
Kenya, and impoverished Bangladesh, both of which made 
substantial purchases to ward off famine in 1984, despite 
being priority recipients of food aid from the West. The 
lack of commercial purchases by government helped to 
convince donors that the threat of famine was exaggerated. 
At the same time, the regime busied itself with preparing 
for the celebrations of the 10th anniversary of the 
revolution, held in September 1984. The cost of these has 
been variously estimated at (conservatively) at least $50m 
(Korn 1986), although most estimates appear to vary 
between $200-$500m (M. Harris op cit). In addition to the 
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cost of materials for the celebrations, the government 
diverted large numbers of state employees to prepare for 
the celebrations. Even RRC staff were not exempted from 
"various parading and banner-waving exercises" (Cutler and 
Stephenson 1984 p 29). Meanwhile, donor agency staff were 
denied access to the famine areas, whether for needs 
assessment purposes or to support existing relief 
operations, because the government was particularly 
concerned that foreigners should not be captured by the 
various guerilla movements and used as propaganda material 
during the coming celebrations. 2 
When ships carrying relief goods did arrive, they were not 
always given priority over arms shipments and commercial 
imports, including shiploads of materials for the 
celebrations. Indeed, port handling charges were raised, 
and are currently among the highest in the world, being 
ten times higher than in neighbouring Sudan, and "which 
soon overtook coffee sales as, Ethiopia's main source of 
foreign exchange" (The Times, 30-10-86). Meanwhile, the 
military campaigns continued, with major, if largely 
unsuccesful, operations in Tigray and Eritrea throughout 
1983 and 1984. 
The most compelling evidence for the government's lack of 
concern over famine victims was the way in which 
rehabilitation operations were eventually conducted. 
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Resettlement of northerners was the preferred strategy, 
and this was often forcibly undertaken. There is evidence 
to suggest that deliberate witholding of food aid took 
place to encourage resettlement, and that provincial 
allocations of relief food under the control of the 
government were not made on the grounds of need. As the 
resettlement programme took place after October 1984, 
these data shall be presented and discussed in the next 
chapter. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that 
the famine presented an opportunity for the government to 
pursue its major political objectives. As such the famine 
assisted the war effort and presented an opportunity for 
large scale experimentation with other overt methods of 
social control, such as resettlement and villagisation. 
9.4 The Response of the Wor Governmental Donors 
The most generous and influential of donors during 
disasters in African countries is usually the USA. 
Generallyr the USA aims to provide up to half of the 
emergency needs of any country, and assumes that other 
donors will make up the reminder. Once the Ethiopian 
famine became public knowledger the US authorities 
provided one-third of the, 1.3 m tonnes of food shipped 
during 1985. However, before the media exposure of the 
famine, the USA had been extremely niggardly in its 
response. Its attitude had a direct bearing on the 
development of the famine, and in several instances went 
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against the advice of its own embassy and specialist 
headquarters staff. 
As Ethiopia, is considered hostile to US interests, it 
is not eligible for development aid, including Title 1 and 
111 food aid allocations which are made for concessionary 
sale or for use on development projects under the 
provisions of Public Law 480. However, title 11 aid can 
be given for humanitarian purposes. Under the 
circumstances of dealing with a hostile country, the US 
prefers to channel aid through private US charities, such 
as the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) or the Committee for 
American Relief Everywhere (CARE). The former 
organisation had an established presence in Ethiopia, and 
during 1982 was working in Mekele, the government-held 
capital of Tigray in the heart of the famine zone. 
Alarmed by the influx of famine migrants into the 
provincial capital during the latter half of 1982, CRS 
decided to appeal in December for a small amount of food - 
838 tonnes - for its Mekele feeding programme. The agency 
stated that it would pay all transport and distribution 
costs. It took five mont. hs for this tiny donation to be 
approved. Later, in October 1983, CRS again appealed for 
a much larger amount, 16,000 tonnes of food needed to 
undertake a large expansion of feeding programmes in 
response to growing needs. This time, a seven month delay 
resulted in only half of the request (8,000 mt) being 
4p 
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approved, and there were further delays between approval 
and shipment. Given that CRS was an experienced agency 
staffed with US nationals it seems quite clear that the 
delays were a result of an extreme reluctance on behalf of 
the US government to assist even the displaced famine 
victims of a hostile regime. 
Further evidence of US footdragging is provided by the 
reaction of the State Department to an urgent cable sent 
from the US embassy in Addis Ababa on 4th April 1984. The 
cable stated that "a very serious situation could develop 
in Ethiopia this year and we will be remiss if we are not 
adequately informed and prepared" (USGAO 1985 p 4). In 
response to the cable, a USAID mission was dispatched to 
conduct a survey. on May llth the mission concluded that 
the situation should be monitored closely but that "no 
additional food (should) be offered to the Ethiopian 
government" on the grounds that it could not be 
distributed (ibid). There can be no clearer statement of 
the US government's intentions at that time. 
It should be noted here that a very useful 'escape hatch' 
habitually employed by agency officials who were either 
unwilling or under instructions not to respond to the 
growing crisis was to claim that insufficient information 
existed upon which to base a decision. Certainly the 
Ethiopian government did not give sufficient "supporting 
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data to substantiate and verify food shortage claims and 
appeals for international food aid" (jbid p 6). on the 
other hand, few officials bothered to seek supporting 
evidence, or to canvas the opinions of relief workers with 
knowledge of the affected areas. No individual or agency 
had begun to routinely collect and summarise the available 
information, so each actor had only a partial view of the 
situation. 
The difficulties of making a case for extra emergency aid 
for Ethiopia were not confined to the US embassy. The EEC 
is another very large donor with a permanent staff in 
Addis Ababa. A senior EEC official there has remarked on 
the difference between the atmosphere of post-October 1984 
in comparison with the previous period: wYou had this 
feeling of immense public support in Europe. And the 
spirit here was incredible. Everyone was positive about 
doing things. Before, you would never really talk about 
the problem itself; it was always a question of how to 
present the problem. There was simply nothing that could 
not be done at that time. Now, of course, we A re back in 
the old routine" (quoted in Gill op cit p 79, emphasis 
added). 
Before the media blitz, enemies of the Dergue in Europe 
were calling for a halt to shipments of emergency food, 
just as they were in the United States. These enemies, 
included right-wing anti-communists in both national 
376 
parliaments and in the European parliament, who were 
concerned for both ideological and strategic 
reasons to undermine Ethiopia's alliance with the Soviet 
Union. They were joined by left-wing politicians and 
lobbyists who supported the liberation movements in 
Ethiopia, particularly in Eritrea and Tigray. These 
pressure groups considered that by denying food to the 
regime they would assist in putting pressure on its 
foreign exchange reserves, forcing the Ethiopian 
government to make commercial purchases in order to 
support its key interest groups, and thereby reducing the 
flow of funds available for arms purchases. The leftist 
supporters of the liberation fronts meanwhile hoped that 
food denied to the Dergue would instead be granted to the 
rebels. In order to marshall support for these 
strategies, politicians on the right joined those on the 
left in condemning the regime and in seeking evidence of 
misuse of food aid. Reports of food being diverted to the 
army were frequent, with journalists being shown physical 
and photographic evidence of food aid captured by the 
rebels from army camps in the north. Meanwhile, 
allegations concerning the exchange of EEC food aid for 
arms made in the Sunday Times in March 1983 caused a major 
row, particularly in the European parliament. These 
allegations were subsequently strongly denied by the EEC 
office in Addis Ababar which launched an investigation at 
the behest of the European Commission. 
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Footdragging by the EEC was not confined to political 
machinations. The ordinary processes of identifying 
needs, making pledges, and releasing relief materials take 
an inordinately long time under EEC procedures, compared 
with donations from others such as WFP, the USA, and 
Canada. With twelve States represented, incorporating 
every shade of opinion from far left to far right, the 
pledging process can take months. The byzantine 
procurement procedures of the bureaucracy add further 
delays. The European Court of Auditors found that the 
record of food aid deliveries in 1983-84 was actually 
worse than that of 1982. Auditors calculated that "less 
than half the grain allocated in 1983 as food aid was 
delivered in the course of the year, with only a third of 
the milk powder and about a quarter of the butter oil. 
The Court of Auditors found that in the case of cereal the 
time lag between decision and delivery was up to fourteen 
months, and in the case of butter oil up to nineteen 
months" (Gill ibid p 70). 
In the Ethiopian case, the 1983 allocations for all 
purposes (relief and development) were sanctioned only in 
July, ensuring that most of the deliveries were made in 
the following year. The 1984 deliveries were sanctioned a 
little earlier, in May. Of the 116,000 mt 'delivered or 
pledged' between January and September 1984 (before the 
media blitz), more than half (62,000 mt) was left over 
from the previous year. Moreover, only a fraction (16 per 
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cent) was for free relief distribution. 
The EEC delegation appears to have been less aware of the 
potential famine than the US embassy. In early 1984, 
Brussels was informed that "no immediate shortage is 
expected" (ibid p 71). However, when the RRC appealed in 
May 1984 for 115,000 mt grain; 15,000 mt milk powder; and 
2,500 mt butter oil as the EEC's contribution to famine 
relief, the Commission agreed to provide 18,000 mt grain; 
1,400 mt milk powder; and 500 mt butter oil. In all, this 
amounted to 15 per cent of the foodstuffs requested. 
Clearly, the arguments advanced by the anti-Ethiopian 
lobbies were sufficient to attract widespread support, 
although a certain amount of food was nevertheless 
advanced to satisfy those arguing for aid on humanitarian 
grounds. one notable concession was made - the EEC agreed 
to earmark the grain for emergency relief rather than to 
stipulate that it should be used for food-for-work, which 
was the normal practice with EEC donations to Ethiopia. 
Later, the EEC attempted to deny that it had substantially 
ignored the famine. In the house magazine, the 'EEC 
Courier' of March-April 1985, under the subheading: "the 
community reacts instantly and well", the Commission had 
this to say about their response to the famine: 
"The Community? of course, did not wait for the media to 
cover the situation before it sat up and took notice ..... 
It was in fact in April 1984, six months before the first 
379 
television pictures, that the EEC brought in its first 
emergency plan" (of 210,000 tonnes of food aid and ECU 83 
million). The report goes on to list in detail the 
amounts of food allocated to the 14 African countries 
covered by the plan. Ethýiopja is not on the list. 
The allocation of food aid according to political choice 
by the donors between countries suffering different 
degrees of distress is of course in accordance with the 
arguments advanced at the beginning of this thesis. This 
is underlined by the fact that Ethiopia was by far the 
worst-affected of the famine-affected countries - its 
nearest rival being Sudan, with less than half of the 
number facing starvation according to UN estimates. 
Allocations to favoured countries reflected economic links 
and strategic alliances, rather than relative need. The 
francophone West African countries particularly benefited 
from their existing links with France and other EEC 
countries. 
The scarcity of food pledges from traditional sources 
meant that the smaller donors were increasingly called 
upon to make up the shortfalls. Among the most generous 
were the Canadians. Following the RRC's appeal of March 
1984, the Canadians made a substantial donation of 20,000 
mt grain through the World Food Programme, a United 
Nations agency. Little appears to have been recorded 
about the precise circumstances of the donations made or 
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of the attitudes of Canadian officials to the Ethiopian 
government. However, an assessment mission was despatched 
from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 
in August 1984. In an urgent telex to the head office, 
the mission concluded that the situation was urgent and 
that further donations should be made. 
Several other countries donated food for relief purposes 
in early 1984. These included Australia (1,000 metric 
tonnes of wheat); Belgium (4,000 mt wheat); China (1,000 
mt maize); Denmark (4,500 mt wheat); Finland (500 mt 
wheat); West Germany (5,000 mt wheat and wheat flour); 
Norway (4,500 mt sorghum); Switzerland (2,200 mt 
wheatflour); and the USSR (10,000 mt rice). It is 
apparent that none of the contributions were very large. 
The RRC March appeal had been for 450,000 mt food, half of 
that which the RRC believed to be really necessary. Five 
months later, the appeal had generated pledges only of 
87,000 mt grain and 8,000 mt other foodstuffs -a little 
over 20 per cent of that requestedi and only 10 per cent 
of the calculated actual needs. It was clear that the 
nations with the most surplus food to dispose of were 
unwilling to come to Ethiopia's aid. The RRC would have 
to look to other sources of support. Logically, the 
relevant United Nations agencies might have been expected 
to fill the gap and to put diplomatic pressure on the 
donors to relieve the famine. Unfortunately, the UN 
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failed spectacularly to carry out this task. This failure 
will be analysed in the next section. 
9.5. The Response of the United Nations Agencies 
There are sixteen agencies within the United Nations 
system, but we are concerned here to analyse the 
activities of only five of them, all of which are mandated 
in various ways to assist governments in relief 
operations. The most important is the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), which is the lead UN agency 
in any country and which is mandated to coordinate the 
activities of the others in an emergency. of lesser 
importance politically, but controlling greater material 
resources for famine control (especially food aid) are the 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and its 
subordinate, the world Food Programme (WFP). FAO is 
responsible for collating and disseminating information 
concerning likely food deficits worldwide; while WFP is 
responsible for transporting and distributing foodstuffs 
donated by countries within the UN network. There is a 
great deal of tension between FAO and WFP over their 
respective roles, with FAO seeking to maintain control 
over WFP's activities, and WFP seeking autonomy. 
The agency which is supposed to coordinate and disseminate 
all necessary information relating to the planning and 
execution of disaster relief is the United Nations 
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Disaster Relief office (UNDRO), which is based in Geneva. 
UNDRO is a relatively new organisation, with a very small 
budget, few staff, and no financial control over the 
activities of other agencies during disasters. 
Consequently it confines itself mainly to advising 
potential donors of appeals made for disaster relief by 
the host government. 
The final agency to be considered as having a role in 
famine relief within the UN system is UNICEF. Originally 
set up as the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund 
following the Second World War, UNICEF has since moved 
away from a pure concentration on emergency relief for 
children to more general support for family health and 
development programmes. UNICEF has a tradition of 
innovative thinking and decentralised management 
structures and is therefore capable ofr&cting quite 
quickly to disasters. UNICEF's institutional flexibility 
is partly a result of its diversified financial base - it 
enjoys charitable status and has a large network of 
private voluntary fundraisers. It is also partly a result 
of the outlook'of its director, James Grant. ' 
The sources of agency funding are extremely important to 
an analysis of famine response by the UN agencies. All 
(even UNICEF) depend for the bulk of their funds upon 
Western governments, in particular the United States. 
-This country provides nearly half of the UNDP budget, and 
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around a quarter of those of FAO and WFP. The Eastern 
bloc countries provide little in the way of resources for 
the UN organisations, and are thus not able to influence 
them as effectively as the Western paymasters. In 
general, the agencies will put the interests of the donors 
above those of the recipient, while paying lip service to 
the opposite idea. In cases where this does not happen, 
as with UNESCO for example, financial sanctions are 
eventually employed by the donors in an effort to realign 
agency policy. 
An analysis of the response of the UN agencies to famine 
should begin with the role of the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO), which is charged with the task of 
compiling information on potential food emergencies at its 
Rome headquarters. To do this FAO relies upon reports 
submitted from its offices in each country. The FAO 
representatives in turn rely mostly on governmental 
sources of information. These are often rather limited, 
and if FAO is requested to approve a shipment of food aid 
through its sister organisation, the World Food Programme 
(WFP), then a joint mission will be despatched to carry 
out a survey of crop con, ditions and overall prospects for 
domestic consumption. one such mission was sent in 
February 1984 to verify Ethiopian requests for food aid. 
The misleading analysis and conclusions of the report did 
much to undermine other attempts to highlight the 
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seriousness of the situation. 
It will be recalled that the RRC had estimated emergency 
food needs at 900,000 mt, but in an honest appraisal of 
its transportation capacity had cut the appeal to 450,000 
mt. The FAO/WFP mission calculated that the relief 
requirement was 685,000 mt, and that if this full amount 
were to be received, some $49 m. would be required to pay 
for its distribution. However, the report focused 
specifically on the drought-affected north, and concluded 
that: 
"considering the present and potential logistical capacity 
for the transport and distribution of relief goods (mainly 
food aid) as well as the accessibility of the affected 
areas, the mission concluded that 125,000 tonnes can be 
distributed from the ports to the drought-affected areas 
and distributed internally between April and December 1984 
to supply the drought-affected people of the northern 
regions. No estimate was made of logistic capacity in the 
south" (FAO 1984 p 2). 
In order to facilitate the shipment of these goods, the 
mission had prepared a plan which envisaged a modest 
expansion of capacity from a distribution rate in the 
north of 6,000 mt to 14,000 mt. The mission calculated 
that $12 m. would be required to pay for this expansion. 
While not stating outright that Ethiopia did not require 
900,000 tonnes of emergency relief, or even the 450,000 
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tonnes she was claiming; the FAO/WFP joint mission was 
effectively stating that the requirement was only 125,000 
tonnes, and that the only problem areas were in the north. 
The RRCs original needs assessment had been cut by 86 per 
cent. This impression was heightened by the leisurely 
manner in which the report was published - some three 
months after the mission had returned from Ethiopia - and 
by the failure of the FAO to convene the usual donors 
meeting to discuss the report. 
The report did not go uncriticised within the UN system. 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Resident 
Representative, Dr. Kenneth King, publicly lambasted the 
findings of the report as "an exercise in cynicism" on the 
Harvest of Hunger' documentary released by Central 
Television in the UK in July 1984. He obliquely referred 
to the strategic alliance between the USSR and Ethiopia as 
a possible cause of the underestimation of famine. Later, 
King was himself reprimanded by his superiors because "the 
donors did not like it" (Gill op cit p 45). While one 
might admire King for his public statement, his private 
actions do not invite praise. As head of UNDP, the 
Resident Representative is also in charge of the UN 
Disaster Relief office (UNDRO) and is empowered to 
coordinate the activities of all UN agencies in an 
emergency. Although UN 
agencies such as UNICEF and WFP were already engaged in 
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famine relief, their efforts were limited, uncoordinated, 
and underfunded. There was a clear case for an emergency 
committee to be set up, at the latest by April 1984, in 
order to pool informationt streamline emergency relief 
operations, and to act as a pressure group on the major 
donors. King was requested to set up such a committee, 
but this initiative faild to find its way onto his 
A 
agenda. This may well have been the case because King was 
unwilling to appear critical of the Ethiopian government, 
which preferred to have resources channelled through its 
own organisations (see Kent 1986). 
At this juncture, in Michael Harris' words, "one might be 
forgiven for asking where was UNDRO? " (OP cit p 34). 
UNDRO was set up ostensibly to "mobilise, direct and 
coordinate the relief activities of the UN system and to 
coordinate the assistance with that given by other inter- 
governmental and non-governmental organisations" (quoted 
in Gill op cit p 112). UNDRO is a relatively new 
organisation within the UN system and, as Gill has pointed 
out, it was therefore in a weak starting position when 
attempting to compete for resources. By the time of the 
Ethiopian famine, UNDRO had already been effectively 
marginalised by other UN agencies defending and expanding 
their territory. As a consequence, the agency was greatly 
understaffed, with a total international complement of 
only 50 professional'ýstaffr although there was a permanent 
UNDRO representative in Addis Ababa. 
387 
The UNDRO representative did attempt to coordinate appeals 
to donors, these being based mostly on official 
information. However, UNDRO's information was presented 
uncritically, and lacked analytical weight. Consequently, 
it could easily be dismissed by the donors who were in any 
case unwilling to provide aid to the Ethiopian government. 
Occasionally, UNDRO's information was wrong, as when it 
was reported that growing conditions in the north were 
"satisfactory" in late 1984 (New Scientist, 7th November, 
1984). Nevertheless, the UNDRO representative could have 
played a valuable role as compiler and analyst of key 
information coming from a variety of sources relevant to 
the growing crisis which could have been used as a 
counterweight to the misguided reports emanating from FAO 
and the politically powerful food aid donors. 
Unfortunately, this exercise was not carried out, 
primarily because it was not part of the terms of 
reference of the UNDRO mission, which to a great extent is 
bound to accept information from the host government. In 
this respect, UNDRO resembles FAO, which also relies 
mostly upon official information from member governments 
of the United Nations Organisation. 
Among the other UN agencies operating in Ethiopia, UNICEF 
was already reacting to the spread of famine, particularly 
in the areas in which it was already working on projects. 
i 
In some cases, UNICEF demonstrated an innovative approach 
to famine relief. Early in 1984, the agency set up a 
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small "cash for work" programme in two peasant 
associations in Gonder. This was a useful intervention 
given that the PAs affected by crop failures there were 
close to areas of surplus production where food could be 
bought at reasonable prices. one of the main benefits of 
the programme was that it enabled some farming households 
to retain their capital, and even in some cases to 
purchase oxen and other means of production. However, the 
programme was not easy to administer, in that it was 
difficult to account for the large amounts of cash being 
distributed, and some of the poorer members of the PAs 
were not paid for work done on road-building projects. 
This situation arose because such was the scale of demand 
that three times as many workers were employed by the PA 
committees on the projects than had at first been planned. 
UNICEF staff meanwhile insisted that full wages be paid 
only to a third of the number employed, in ieeping with 
the original plan, so the remainder were disenfranchised 
(personal communication, Charles Stewart, Central 
Television, August 1984). 
This experience is worth mentioning because it could be 
argued that the distribution of cash during a famine is a 
more appropriate response than the distribution of free 
food. The experience of the UNICEF project suggests that 
such initiatives would not be quite as straightforward as 
they may at first appear. Furthermore, contrary to a 
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demand-centred view of famine, cash pumped into areas 
suffering absolute shortages of food (such as central 
Tigray and Northern Wollo) would simply have contributed 
to inflation, as more money chased a dwindling supply of 
grain. Sen's notion that food can be bought at normal 
prices during a famine (such as that described in his 
analytical version of the Wollo famine of 1973) applies 
only if there is an adjacent food source for sale at low 
prices. 
Staff of UNICEF also kept themselves appraised of the 
spread of famine; dispatching personnel to report on 
newly-affected areas, particularly in the south. In doing 
so the agency was following the tradition established in 
1974, when it exposed the famine under Heile Selassie. 
UNICEF also provided the funding vital for the operation 
of the RRC early warning system, following its abandonment 
by western donors in 1977. As a result, UNICEF would be 
expected to take a special interest in the reports. 
The record of the World Food Programme during the build-up 
to the famine is less impressive. while operating the 
largest food-for-work programme in Africa, as well as 
providing small amounts of emergency food aid, WFP acted 
as the major information source on the status of food aid 
pledges and shipments., Although providing an 
comprehensive service in this regard, the WFP head office 
in Rome appeared to be incapable of distinguishing between 
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food aid for emergencies and that for regular 
developmental activities. This may have been a deliberate 
attempt to show that the agency was responding 
sufficiently to the appeals made by the Ethiopian 
government. As late as September 1984, WFP Rome was 
reporting that total food aid delivered and scheduled for 
Ethiopia between January and December 1984 was 338,945 
tonnes: well in excess of its reported "FAO-estimated 
total food aid requirement" of 300,000 tonnes. Donors 
receiving such information might well have been forgiven 
for believing that there was not a food crisis in 
Ethiopia. Furthermore, WFP shipments of food used as 
wages for workers on the Wollo food-for-work projects 
failed to arrive just as the famine there neared its peak 
in the middle of 1984. Peasants who had previously 
congratulated themselves on being fortunate enough to have 
such a lifeline as food-for-work in the middle of a famine 
zone starved as they waited in vain for their back-pay 
(Yeraswork and Solomon 1985). 
Delays in WFP shipments were not long compared with those 
of donors such as the EEC - an average delivery time of 
six months from request as compared with 17 months in the 
latter case. Shipments could, however, be held up as a 
result of the "state of guerilla warfare" (Gill OP cit 
p 126) existing between FAO and WFP. This situation has 
developed because WFP wishes to break away from its parent 
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organisation, thereby gaining financial control over the 
monies allocated to it and complete physical control over 
food donated to the UN system. Certainly the decision- 
making process would be more straightforward if it were to 
do so. Currently, all shipment orders have to be 
countersigned by FAO officials at the highest level. 
Normally this is done within one or two days, and the 
established upper limit is ten days. However, an urgent 
request for 30,000 mt of emergency food aid submitted by 
the Ethiopian government to WFP on 26th May was not 
cleared by FAO until 27th June, a month after its receipt 
from WFP. The delay was part of a continuous process of 
agency wrangling, but it is unusual to find that requests 
for emergency food aid are treated in this fashion. 
9.6 The Role of the Non-Governmental Organisations 
Before the October 1984 television coverage, there were 
about two dozen NGOs working in Ethiopia. Among the most 
influential, whether in terms of size or in terms of their 
involvement in relief operations in major famine areas 
were Catholic Relief Services (Tigray), Oxfam (Gonder and 
Southern Shoa), Save the Children Fund (Wollo)t the 
Lutheran World Federation (Wollo)y World Vision (Gonder 
and Gemu Goffa), Concern (Gonder)t Redd Barna (Gemu Goffa) 
and the Ethiopian Church of Mekane Yesus (countrywide). 
With its confirmed evangelical approach, the latter is 
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viewed with suspicion by a regime preaching allegiance to 
Marxism-Leninism. Consequentlyr the Church of Mekane 
Yesus has suffered the imprisonment of its head cleric and 
the periodic harassment of its mission staff. Despite 
these difficulties, the Church manages to continue its 
relief operations. The Ethiopian Red Cross (ERC) was not 
overtly opposed to the policies of the government and was 
consequently in much better odour with the regime. Hence 
it was able, with little governmental interference, to 
pursue relief operations in Wollo. 
The NGO operations were for the most part on a very small 
scale, involving supplementary feeding of mothers and 
children at established relief sites around Mekele, Korem, 
Ibnat and Zeway Hamusit. For many NGOs, relief operations 
were merely an adjunct to developmental activities (which 
would not involve free hand-outs of food), although some, 
such as Concern and Oxfam, attempted to link development 
projects to relief work, such as through roadbuilding 
projects in Gonder, which exchanged relief food for work 
on the part of the recipients. As the established NGOs 
had made substantial investments of timer effort and cash 
in their various long-term projects, they were well aware 
of the sensitivity of the Ethiopian government and were 
unwilling to prejudice their position through overt 
criticism of the way relief operations were being handled. 
As we would expect from our previous discussion of 
voluntary agency behaviour (see chapter 1), NGOs were also 
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quite competitive and were often privately critical of 
each others' activities, particularly in the relief field, 
where most were relative newcomers. 
The NGOs were loosely grouped together under an 
organisation known as the Christian Relief and Development 
Association (CRDA). This body meets monthly to consider 
relief and development needs in the various regions and 
helps to coordinate the various activities. Although CRDA 
is potentially an excellent source of information on the 
rural situation, it is not ready to exploit its 
comparative advantage. Minutes of the meetings are edited 
to exclude any controversial references, and are then sent 
round to the various donors. The latter occasionally send 
junior personnel to attend. However, the minutes contain 
little or no analysis of the situations described, or 
projections of future needs. Prior to September 1984, at 
these meetings there was little or no discussion of 
strategy, beyond the level of general appeals to 'fill the 
gaps'. There was similarly no discussion of projected 
needs beyond the current month's activities. There was no 
move to bring pressure to bear on the donors, or to make 
some joint statement in support of the RRC (Cutler and 
Stephenson 1984). only in September did the CRDA 
belatedly pen an open appeal to the donors, apparently 
doing so at the insistence of one individual with 
sufficient experience of famine and with the necessary 
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force of character (Gill ibid). The timing of the appeal 
is also significant - it came immediately after the 
celebrations of the 10th anniversary of the revolution had 
been completed - and it was hoped by the CRDA that the 
attention of the Ethiopian government would be refocused 
away from festivity and towards famine relief. 
Such a low-key response to the famine by the NGOs was a 
product of the fact that they were as a group fearful of 
alienating both the Ethiopian government and their, 
constituent donors. The NGOs were the weakest of foreign 
organisations working in Ethiopia, in terms of size, 
resources and political clout; yet paradoxically they were 
the best informed about the developing famine. They were 
unable to put this knowledge to effective use both because 
they failed to fully analyse and effectively present to 
the donors and the media the facts of the famine and, 
partly as a result of this failure, because they were 
unable to change the politi. cal conditions of aid 
allocation. In particular, no one agency took on the 
task UNDRO had effectively failed to do - which was to 
collate, analyse and disseminate the available 
information. The NGOs were unwilling to do this partly 
because they were busy with their individual projects and 
partly because it was considered politically dangerous. 
The CRDA secretariat was probably the best able, yet the 
least likely candidate for such a task, being most 
concerned as the collective representative of the NGOs to 
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maintain good relations with both donors and the 
government. This entailed avoiding the responsibility for 
disseminating potentially controversial information. 
9.7 Other Institutional Factors Contributing to the 
Failure of Resoonse 
There are, of course, other institutional dimensions to 
the problem of anticipating famine. In the first place, 
all agencies are prone to a 'firefighting mentalityf, when 
short-term responses to the crisis take precedence over 
long-term planning. It is very difficult for agency staff 
to sit back and plan ahead under such circumstances 
which is precisely why a higher, more politically secure 
body was necessary. In the second place, it is genuinely 
difficult to predict with confidence a famine, especially 
where travel is restricted and where much of the available 
evidence pertaining to the worst-affected areas tends to 
be anecdotal and subjective rather than measurable and 
objective. Nevertheless, by mid-1984, there was 
compelling evidence that the supply of food to the various 
relief systems was about to break down completely. An 
analysis of the kind presented in chapters 6 and 7 would 
have led inexorably to the conclusion that famine 
conditions were widespread. 
A final piece of evidence - the supply side of the 
equation - was available in Addis Ababa in mid-1984p had 
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Table 9.3: Projected Receipts of Relief Food in Ethiopia, 
July-October 1984 
Month 
Ju ly 
August 
Source 
WFP 
USAID 
Finland 
Recipient Amount 
RRC 12,320 
CRS 5,667 
LWF/RRC 700 
Total 18,687 
RRC/LWF/CRS 30,000 
RRC 4,400 
RRC 8,696 
Total 43,096 
CRS 5FOOO 
RRC 22,692 
Total 27,692 
UNICEF 4,000 
CRS 2,181 
Total 6,181 
Def icit 
- 41,, 313 
Canada 
Australia 
WFP 
September USAID 
WFP 
October Belgium 
USAID 
- 16,904 
- 32,, 308 
- 53l819 
Note 
Needs calculated in March 1984 by RRC at 60FOOO tonnes per 
month. 
Source: Food Commodity Shipping Bulletin No. 41 World 
Food Programme, Addis Ababa. 
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the agencies cared to use it. Table 9.3 details the 
projected receipts of emergency food aid over June - 
December 1984. Even under the conservative assumptions of 
need put forward at the time (60,000 mt per month instead 
of the 100,000 mt per month eventually adopted; Cutler and 
Stephenson 1984), a massive shortfall was imminent. 
In the event, no agency or group of agencies, whether 
bilaterall multilateral, UN or NGO took responsibility for 
compiling, analysing and disseminating available items of 
key information which could have given a more objective 
picture than that provided solely by government sources. 
We have seen that needs estimates, particularly those 
based on official sources, were the subject of deliberate 
donor cynicism. Nevertheless, it seems likely that a 
sustained campaign by the United Nations 'family' and the 
NGOS in Ethiopia would have resulted in a more media 
interest at an earlier stage of the crisis and therefore 
could have produced a more timely and coordinated approach 
to famine control. Given the political strategy of the 
donor governments, it is clear from the attitudes of the 
bulk food donors that (in the absence of a change in 
, 
their politics), only massive publicity could force them 
to respond in a manner commensurate with the problem. 
This, as the world knows, eventually transpired. 
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Notes 
Meanwhile, the Nimieri regime continued to pretend that 
the country was economically self-sufficient. This 
attitude was perhaps partly a result of national pride, 
and partly of a desire to continue to attract foreign 
investment funds for agricultural and industrial 
development, particularly from the Arab world. 
2 Two teams of foreign relief workers and Ethiopian 
nationals had already been captured in 1983 - one at 
Korem in April and another in Lalibela in June. In 
each case the rebels took their captives on a 'tour' of 
the famine-affected areas under their nominal control 
before releasing them with maximum publicity. 
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Chapter 10: Relief Operations after October 1984 
10.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, we shall consider how the nature of the 
response to the Ethiopian famine changed after the BBC 
television coverage at Korem was shown worldwide. Public 
indignation at the scenes of mass starvation was so strong 
in the Western countries commanding the largest food 
surpluses and foreign aid budgets that the famine became a 
priority political issue and Western governments were 
forced to be seen to be taking it seriously. At the same 
time, they took action reluctantly. Some donors, such as 
the United Kingdom, made little fresh money available to 
deal with the crisis, and simply switched funds to uses in 
Ethiopia from existing aid budgets. others, such as the 
USA and the EEC, had huge reserves of foodstuffs and were 
forced by public opinion to commit considerable material 
resources to famine relief. However, these were as far as 
possible channelled through non-governmental 
organisations. Such behaviour proved to be a tremendous 
economic and political opportunity for the NGOs, leading 
to a rapid expansion of their operations which in 
many cases severely strained their administrative 
resources. 
The NGO activities in Ethiopia served two purposes of the 
donors: keeping resources Out of the direct control of the 
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government, and serving to avoid responsibility on behalf 
of the donors themselves for implementation. The IGO 
sector, notably the UN agencies, attempted to exert 
control over the resource flows by setting up a special 
office, but only managed to give the appearance of doing 
so, acting as a clearing house for information and as a 
press office, yet failing to truly control the process of 
resource allocation. In other respects the IGOs behaved 
like NGOs, fiercely competing for resources and related 
prestige. 
Meanwhile, the government was to use famine relief as an 
opportunity to pursue its own policy goalst although it 
received overt support for these only from its eastern 
bloc allies such as the USSR and East Germany. These 
policy goals included the collectivisation of agriculture 
through resettlement of displaced peasants, and the 
allocation of government-held food stocks to priority 
regions and population groups within those regions which 
were not necessarily those most affected by the famine. 
These contentions follow logically from the theoretical 
framework outlined in chapter 1 and summarised in the 
previous chapter, and the evidence for them shall now be 
examined. 
The BBC film, first released on 23rd October 1984, was 
exceptionally well-filmed and well presented, receiving 
professional acclaim from the film industry itself 
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(Harrison and Palmer 1986). It was subsequently to be 
released by 425 broadcasting organisations worldwide, 
attracting an audience of almost 500 million people. The 
response was immediate. The Ethiopian famine was suddenly 
a priority subject on the political agendas of the 
democracies of North America, Western Europe, Asia and 
Australasia. ordinary members of the public acted with 
unprecedented generosity - in some cases selling their 
homes or donating substantial personal savings to the 
famine appeals. The cash receipts of NGOs rocketed as 
people jammed their switchboards offering money and help. 
British relief agencies alone raised E50 million in the 
four months following the broadcast, adding to the E10 
million already raised from the summer appeals. In the 
case of the two largest British NGOS, the famine appeal 
more than doubled their normal annual budgets. Unlike the 
response to previous famines, this was not shortlived. 
Initiatives such as the Band Aid and "USA for Africa" 
records, and the Live Aid international concert kept the 
famine a newsworthy event close to public consciousness 
for months afterwardsi. 
No doubt the timing of the BBC coverage was fortuitous. 
October is in the autumn, a season when television viewers 
in the northern hemisphere return to their television sets 
after the summer drop in viewing figures. News of the 
famine broke at a time when Europe and North America were 
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facing serious problems of surplus food disposal, and this 
topic had been high on the political agenda. The contrast 
was stark. Europe's grain mountain alone was some 16 
million tonnes, while worldwide it was close to 300 
million tonnes. Ethiopia required about one million 
tonnes to contain the famine - six per cent of the 
European stockpile whose procurement and storage costs 
threatened to break the budget of the Common Agricultural 
2 Policy 
The famine became such a politically sensitive issue that 
politicians and aid agencies were immediately forced onto 
the defensive. They-reacted in several predictable ways 
to the threat of being exposed as uncaring or incompetent. 
Firstly, they presented facts and figures designed to show 
that their response to the famine had already been 
substantial, although regrettably constrained by budgetary 
considerations. Secondly, they attempted to gain extra 
resources, as well as power and prestige for their 
organisations. Thirdly, they set up new organisational 
fora to deal with the extra resources and to give the 
impression of concentrated activity prioritising the 
famine. These ranged from the 'task forces' commonly 
encountered in virtually every aid bureaucracy to the 
special operational department set up in Addis Ababa by 
the United Nations. This classic bureacratic escape route 
was a publicly visible institution although it had limited 
influence on the actual distribution of famine relief. 
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Its record shall be considered below. 
10.2 The United Nations Emergency Office for Ethiopia 
(UNEOE) 
The office was created in November 1984, immediately 
following the wave of international publicity. The speed 
of its inception was remarkable by UN standards, 
reflecting the exceptional degree of public pressure being 
exerted on the organisation. The office was headed by a 
Finn, Kurt Jansson, an able famine relief administrator 
with experience of the Kampuchea relief operation which 
began in 1980. The political background to this 
complicated operation was in many respects similar to that 
in Ethiopia, involving warring alternative socialist 
governments and inherent superpower conflict (Shawcross 
1984). As a Finn, Jansson's nationality was acceptable to 
both East and West. He also had a diplomat's 
understanding of the political limits of his mandate, and 
would bring pressure to bear where there was "room for 
manoever", while minimising conflicts over areas of 
contention, such as resettlement. 
Jansson was given a suite of offices in the UN/OAU 
headquarters building in Addis Ababa, and a small staff 
affiliated to the various UN agencies (including WFP, WHO, 
UNICEF and UNDRO), sponsored by donor governments eager to 
gain credit for being at the centre of action over the 
I 
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famine. The UNEOE office's task was ostensibly to 
coordinate the activities of the various actors involved 
in relieving the famine and to monitor the distribution of 
aid. This task was considered important for western 
donors who demanded accountability of the RRC and NGOs 
involved. They needed to know, or at least give a 
credible appearance of knowing, that the aid donated under 
the aegis of an unfriendly government would get to the 
famine victims requiring it. Accordingly, aid monitors 
were stationed in several famine-affected provinces to 
follow-up shipments forwarded from the ports. 
Although Jansson was given the title of Assistant- 
Secretary General, and was therefore a very senior 
appointee directly under the authority of Perez de 
Cuellar, the. UN Secretary General, other UN agencies were 
immediately sensitive to the potential threat to their 
territory. Chief among them was UNDP, whose director, a 
US citizen named Bradford Morse, engineered the 
establishment of yet another new office, the UN office for 
Emergency Operations in Africa (UNOEOA), some six weeks 
after the establishment of UNEOE. The normal process of 
consultation with the heads of the various UN agencies 
about the establishment of UNEOE had not taken place, and 
Morse was apparently furious with Perez de Cueller and 
with Jansson (Gill 1985; Jansson et al, 1987). The 
establishment of UNOEOA may well have been a move by de 
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Cuellar to placate Morse. Jansson's office was to report 
to UNOEOA, as was a sister organisation (UNEOS) later set 
up in Sudan. Thus UNDP managed to re-establish its role 
as lead agency in the UN organisation. This was also the 
role it had formerly abrogated in Addis Ababa. 
There followed blazing arguments between UNEOE and UNEOEA 
over operational precedence (Gill op cit p 121; Jansson, 
. 
ýbid p 17). The latter eventually emerged principally as 
a focus for information on the current state of relief 
operations in 17 African countries in which relief 
operations were being mounted, while Jansson's office 
managed information about the day-to-day relief operation 
in Ethiopia. Both offices provided worthwhile information 
to donor governments, a function sorely lacking during the 
previous phase of relief operations. Nevertheless, 
battles for operational control among the various UN 
organisations remained a feature of the entire operation. 
Gill observes that: "the establishment of new UN offices 
in response to the famine did nothing to reduce the 
brawling between agencies. If anything, it increased 
it.... " (ibid p 132). Agencies were competing for funds, 
seeking to expand their activities and influence wherever 
possible. 
In the eventr UNEOE actually did very little. Some of the 
nine food monitors responsible for the provinces in which 
relief operations were taking place were very active, and 
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accumulated much useful information, while others hardly 
bestirred themselves in keeping an adequate account of aid 
flows in their operational areas. This was not a problem 
for UNEOE, which knowing it could not greatly influence 
the allocation of aid by the donors and the Ethiopian 
government - both having political goals which were 
implemented through their respective national agencies, 
such as CARE, CRS, the RRC etc. Consequently, UNEOE was 
more concerned with the appearance of monitoring and 
evaluation than its substance. As the relief operation 
progressed, it became apparent that resource flows were 
being manipulated to suit the political objectives of the 
Ethiopian governmentr such as the preferential feeding the 
militia in Eritrea, or the diversion of supplies to 
resettlement. Information collected by some food monitors 
began clearly to demonstrate these priorities (see section 
10.4). However, this information was not released to the 
donors. 
In other circumstances, such as the burning of Ibnat 
relief camp and the expulsion of its inmates in April 
1985, Jansson was forced to make representations to 
Chairman Mengistu, as reports had already found their way 
into the foreign press. By contrast, subsequent press 
reports concerning the misallocation of food aid were 
denied by UNEOE, despite being based on figures collected 
by its own monitors. Jansson had a good understanding of 
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what potential leverage existed, and would exert this only 
where results were likely or where pressure from the 
donors forced him to do so. UNEOE's main function was to 
act as a "screening device" (Kent 1986), giving the 
appearance of competent action in response to famine but 
not compromising its actual position in Addis Ababa by 
unduly antagonising the host government. However, the 
need to satisfy both donor and host government interests 
put UNEOE in a difficult position, although occasionally 
there may have been an inadvertent harmony of interests 
between the two opposing forces. For example, it would 
have been as embarassing for the donors who had entrusted 
resources to the Ethiopian government as it was for the 
government itself to have aid misallocation exposed. 
10.3. The Scope and General conditions of the Relief 
Operation 
The dramatic expansion of relief operations is evident 
from RRC figures published in October 1985, a year after 
the 'discovery' of the famine. Whereas before this date 
only 87,000 tonnes of food aid had been received or 
pledged for relief, between llth December 1984 and 25th 
August 1985, fully 895,300 tonnes of grain and 
supplementary foods had been received, with a further 
342,100 tonnes pledged (RRC 1985 p 5). These donations, 
amounting to more than 1.2 million tonnesr had exceeded by 
almost three times the RRC's original request of March 
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1984. They nevertheless represented what informed 
observors now reckoned to be the real level of need of the 
country's starving peasantry, at more than 100,000 tonnes 
per month. of course,, had, the original assessments made 
by OSRO and USAID been correct, Ethiopia's infrastructure 
would have been hopelessly overburdened. In fact, 
deliveries from the ports often exceeded 3,000 mt per day, 
and this did not include commercial and arms imports. 
This level of offtake was substantially above the 1,000 mt 
per day commonly accepted as the upper limit for all 
imports during the early months of 1984. The increased 
level of offtake partly reflected the fact that donors had 
responded to transport needs as well as to food needs. 
The UK government had provided equipment to improve port 
handling capacity. The RRC fleet had been strengthened 
with vehicles, spare parts and technical equipment 
provided by the donors. Several NGOs had introduced their 
own trucking operations. Nevertheless, there were 
occasionally serious blockages at the ports, especially 
when essential imports (such as fuel and arms) or 
essential exports (such as cotton and coffee) were given 
priority. When these occurred, food had to be stockpiled 
at the dockside. on one occasion, some 10,000 mt was 
destroyed on the dockside at Assab when unexpected heavy 
rains fell on uncovered grain stocks. 
The difficulties of transporting relief goods to the 
famine-affected provinces of the interior gave rise to a 
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much publicised international airlift. This was supported 
by the UK, West Germany, Poland and the USSR. Western 
Hercules aircraft were used to shuttle food from Assab and 
Addis Ababa to the interior, while Soviet Antonovs were 
used largely to shuttle peasants, not all of whom were 
famine victims, from the northern provinces to the 
resettlement sites of the southwest. Helicopters were 
also used for marking dropping zones in remote parts of 
the interior. Although aircraft payloads were small, and 
the operations some ten times more expensive than 
conventional road transport, their use for dropping food 
aid was justifiable at this late stage in the famine, when 
speed was essential to save lives. Road access to many 
parts of Tigray and northern Wollo was in any case 
severely restricted through the threat of guerilla 
warfare. 
An early initiative was made to negotiate a safe passage 
agreement in the disputed war zones. This was spearheaded 
by the radical UK NGO, War on Want, and attracted the 
patronage of such international figures as Willy Brandt, 
the ex-Chancellor of west Germany; Pierre Trudeau, ex- 
Canadian Prime Minister; and the former premiers of 
Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands and Senegal. Kurt 
Jansson also presented proposals to Mengistu which had 
been drawn up in collaboration with the international 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). mengistu refused to 
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countenance an arrangement with TPLF and EPLF forces, 
presumably on the grounds that this would endorse their 
claims to control substantial areas of Ethiopian 
territory. The President of the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU), Julius Nyerere, similarly refused to act as 
mediator, presumably being unwilling to establish a 
precedent in a continent characterised by boundaries which 
pay little heed to ethnic divisions. Meanwhile, the 
warfare continued, with the Dergue mounting major military 
campaigns in Tigray and Eritrea during 1985. Sekota in 
northern Wollo was captured by government forces in May, 
only to be relinquished 18 months later. Lalibela fell 
several times to the TPLF during the year; and the 
government lost several towns in Eritrea before managing 
to recapture them in bloody counterattacks. 
10.4. Food Distribution and Resettlement 
Food, particularly during a famine, is a strategic 
resource. It has been argued throughout this analysis 
that food will be distributed as far as possible to the 
advantage of those controlling it. In this case, there is 
constant tension between the Dergue, which through its 
organ (the RRC) attempts to attract resources on an 
unconditional basis; and the predominantly western donors, 
who impose conditions or demand accountability. Hence 
information about food stocks and other aspects of famine 
relief, such as the status of vehicles, spare parts, 
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numbers of people affected by famine (especially those in 
camps) and camp death rates become strategic data. The 
government encourages secrecy in these matters - for 
example CSO estimates of national food production are 
classified information; while NGOs are fearful of 
expulsion if they were to divulge information on death 
rates and disease outbreaks in famine camps (Myles Harris 
1986). As a result, it is extremely difficult for 
outsiders to gain access to data on overall food 
distribution. However, thanks to the activities of the 
UNEOE food monitors, a certain amount of data is 
available, although it is not formally published. 
Table 10.1 lists the flows of RRC-controlled food aid 
going to the various famine-affected regions between April 
and August 1985. Although figures for food distribution 
by NGOs are not available (despite making up more than 
half of the total) it seems probable from the data that 
the RRC does not make allocations strictly on the grounds 
of need. According to the table, Wollo heads the list of 
famine-affected regions with 32 per cent of the total 
affected population; followed by the southern regions 
(served by the RRC store at Nazereth) with 30 per cent; 
Tigray (18 per cent); Eritrea (11 per cent) and remaining 
areas of the west and centre (9 per cent). However, in 
terms of food distribution, the southern regions 
(Nazereth) got the largest share, at 36.5 per cent; 
followed by Wollo (24 per cent); Eritrea (21.5 per cent); 
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and 'elsewhere' (11.9 per cent). Tigray got a mere 5.6 
per cent of RRC wheat, despite having nearly a fifth of 
the famine-affected population. Furthermore, unpublished 
reports compiled by the UNEOE food monitor in Eritrea 
consistently noted that stores in Asmara were kept full, 
and that ration sizes were commonly 50 kg per person, and 
sometimes were as high as 70 kg. Many of the recipients 
were members of the militia. The size of the rations in 
Eritrea should be compared with those in Wollo, which 
rarely exceeded 10 kg. 
It seems reasonable to suppose therefore that the 
distribution of RRC food is decided by "a higher 
authority" (Mitchell 1986). Food is not allocated on a 
regional basis on the grounds of need. The manner in 
which the food is distributed also shows that the 
relative severity of famine in each region is not 
uppermost in the minds of the food controllers. The 
latter are in fact the "higher authority", most probably 
the special committee set up by Mengistu in October 1984 
to mobilize resources to fight the drought, which is made 
up principally of senior members of the highest executive 
body in the land, the Central Planning Supreme Council 
(CPSC). On the basis of the priorities set by the 
committee and the CPSC, the RRC would draw up a 
distribution plan. This usually applied to food 
deliveries scheduled some three months ahead. Obviously,, 
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the situation in each province could change markedly over 
this period, so would have plans have to be adjusted 
accordingly. However, the RRC could use the status of the 
distribution plan as justification for despatching food to 
areas where it was not a priority requirement. 0 Mistakeso 
would also occur, such as when 7,500 mt of grain 
specifically earmarked for Wollo was consistently delayed 
at Assab port, and was then sent to the central store at 
Nazareth, where it languished for several months. 
Mitchell argues that: "from these and other similar 
episodes one is forced to hypothesise that the 
distribution plan was used as an excuse to mask orders 
from a higher authority. If this was the case it would 
appear that the regional destination of RRC grain was not 
under the control of the RRC" (ibid p 30). 
Perhaps the most convincing evidence of manipulation of 
RRC objectives by a higher authority is that relating to 
the distribution of food during the resettlement drives. 
Resettlement was a policy justified by the government as a 
logical response to the degradation of the environment in 
the northern provinces. Poor peasant volunteers would be 
moved from the camps to new state-organised farming areas 
in the well-watered western provinces, notably in Gojjam, 
Keffa, Wellega and Illubabor. Each household would 
receive basic accomodation and tools, and would have 
access to 1,000 m2 of land for their own cultivation. The 
reminder of cultivation would be carried out on a communal 
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basis (Clarke 1986). 
Broadly speaking, during 1984-85 resettlement took place 
over two main periods. The bulk of the state-organised 
mass migration took place between November 1984 and May 
1985, with 169,000 people being settled from Wollo alone. 
During the rainy season there was a lull, possibly because 
of the enhanced transport difficulties experienced during 
the unusually heavy kremt rains. The resettlement drive 
resumed from October 1985 onwards, and by January 1986 
some 600,000 peasant farmers and their families had been 
resettled (Jansson et al, op cit p 64). 
Mitchell has compiled data which show substantial 
variations in the number of people being assisted by the 
RRC in Wollo over 1985-86 (see figure 10.1). Following a 
steady increase in foodgrains distributed over January - 
May 1985, there is a sudden fall (90 per cent below the 
previous month) in the'assistance rate for June. From 
July to September there_. is, a resumption of somewhat 
erratic, although much higher, levels of food distribution, 
followed by a fall tol-extremely low levels from October 
onwards. 
Mitchell observes that during the first phase of the 
resettlement drive, people volunteering for resettlement 
were given priority for food distribution. 
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Figure 10.1: RRC and NGO general ration distribution 
(number of assisted persons); Jan. - Dec. 1985 
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Unsurprisingly, many starving people volunteered for 
resettlement. Some, particularly the old, sick, and 
adolescents were not deemed fit for recruitment and were 
left to beg at distribution points (Cutler and Mitchell, 
1985). The second phase of the resettlement drive took 
place at a time when general ration distribution was well 
established by both the RRC and NGOs operating in the 
famine areas. As a result, local administrators were 
unable to fulfil their quotas of 'volunteers' and so the 
take home' food supplies had to be cut off to induce 
people to come down to distribution points. There, they 
were often forcibly rounded up. Mitchell notes that 
during this phase "coercive tactics were the rule rather 
than the exception" (op cit p 42). The NGOs were not 
exempt from participating in these tactics, as several 
were ordered by local RRC officials to discontinue food 
distribution during the campaign. There were even cases 
of NGO trucks being forcibly commandeered for the 
transportation of migrants. Such instances, together with 
the general tenor of the whole campaign, contributed to 
straining the working relationship between the RRC and the 
NGOs. 
These reports are confirmed by the testimony of peasants 
who have since fled the resettlement sites, and indicate 
that people from Wollo were not the only forced deportees. 
The Swiss journalist Niggli (1985) interviewed more than 
50 peasants from Wollo and Tigray who fled into Sudan to 
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escape resettlement. He found that in general, the Wollo 
peasants had been lured through the promise of food aid 
into the hands of the militia and then transported for 
resettlement. The Tigrayans, on the other hand, often 
came from villages outside the control of government and 
were captured either in those villages or in the towns 
under the control of government. Niggli points out that 
the average age of the settlers from the two regions was 
very different - 22 years for Wollo settlers and 42 years 
for Tigrayans - suggesting both that the Tigrayans ensured 
that only older people were put at risk of capture in the 
towns; and that the Wollo population was more trusting, 
having already received food aid from the government. 
Clay and Holcomb (1985) also interviewed escapees, and 
carried out a thorough analysis of the data collected by 
Niggli. They note that while Wollo respondents could for 
the most. part justifiably be classified as famine victims, 
Tigray respondents "strongly asserted that they had been 
captured for resettlement when involved in economic 
activities - working in their fields, threshing grain, 
selling produce, trading livestock or having their cattle 
vaccinated" (ibid p 85). This suggests that the majority 
of Tigrayan famine victims had already migrated out of the 
area, the bulk of them travelling to TFLF-controlled zones 
in the west or through to Sudan. It also shows that 
economic activity persists for a substantial section of 
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the population even during the height of famine, and in 
the worst-affected areas. 
The forced resettlement of peasants was well-known among 
relief workers. In most cases, NGOs were unwilling to 
publicise their knowledge for fear of being evicted from 
Ethiopia. However, one agency, Medecins sans Frontieres 
(MSF), was so incensed by the enforced migration of famine 
victims in the areas of Wollo in which it was working that 
it published a paper entitled "Mass Deportations in 
Ethiopia" and demanded an independent enquiry into the 
conditions of resettlement. As a result, MSF was expelled 
from the country. 
Some agencies support resettlement as a 'fait accompli' 
and offer humanitarian assistance. These include UNICEF, 
the Irish agency 'Concern', the German agency"Menschen 
fur Menschen' and a French agency 'Secours Populaires 
Francais'. others are unwilling to support resettlement, 
but are likely to do so in future as human misery in the 
resettlement sites increases. Some observers strongly 
argue in favour of resettlement as the only long-term 
solution to famine, for example, Hancock (1985) castigates 
the West's refusal to support resettlement as a "spiteful 
and misdirected error" (ibid p 110). However, his 
argument ignores the costs of resettlement, which are high 
at an estimated 1,400 - 5,000 birr per person. Taking the 
lowest cost estimate, this would mean that the cost of 
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resettling the 1.5 million people targetted by government 
would be 2.1 billion birr, which can be contrasted with 
the entire Ethiopian budget (for 1982) of 2.9 billion 
birr. It may well be the case that lesser amounts 
invested in rehabilitating agricultural land in the famine 
zones would be more cost-effective as well as a more 
humane alternative to a migration which appears to be 
largely forced. 
10.5. The Role of Non-Governmental Agencies in Famine 
Relief 
We have seen that after appearing unconvinced of the 
imminence of the famine, the major bilateral and 
multilateral agencies were forced to make substantial 
donations to Ethiopian famine relief in the wake of 
massive publicity. Although the United Nations agencies 
received some of the benefits of this forced generosity, 
much of it went through the operational media of the NGOs. 
Donors such as the USA, Britain and France preferred to 
channel aid through NGOs organised by their own nationals 
rather than through the RRC. In this way, some degree of 
accountability could be ensured - the aid would be used 
strictly for famine relief and not to suit other purposes 
of the Ethiopian government. 
The number of NGOs operating in Ethiopia expanded rapidly 
over 1984-85. During 1983F less than twenty foreign NGOs 
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were active in relief operations there. By late 1985, 
there were more than sixty. The NGOs handled 60 per cent 
of the food aid coming into Ethiopia, and in addition ran 
most of the intensive feeding centres, although often they 
would do so in partnership with staff of the RRC and 
Ministry of Health. As RRC ration distributions fell over 
1985, the NGOs increased their efforts. Figure 10.1 shows 
this quite clearly, with the number of 'beneficiaries' 
supplied by NGOs in Wollo rising to over a million by 
October 1985. Unfortunately, figures on actual amounts of 
food distributed are not available. 
Although the NGOs managed to communicate with each other 
through CRDA and informally in the field, their degrees of 
experience of relief operations varied widely. This was 
reflected in the varying degrees of success each enjoyed 
in setting up camps and in bringing down death rates. 
Although there was an unspoken understanding that the most 
undernourished children should get priority for relief 
feeding, NGOs had widely different cut-off points for 
deciding who was or was not malnourished. We should note 
here that the priority feeding of children during famines 
is a value judgement inflicted on the victims by the 
controllers of food. Logically, one should preserve the 
adults first, as they are the providers and are capable of 
reproducing the household unit. In the words of one 
relief worker, feeding children without feeding adults 
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results in a situation where one is "making orphans' 
(personal communicationt August 1984). At the height of 
famine, mothers allowed into the feeding centres with 
their children would surreptitiously snatch food from 
their children. Sometimes, children would be deliberately 
kept undernourished in order to qualify for rations. 
Mitchell (1986) reports cases of undernourished children 
being rotated among several families in order to increase 
their chances of getting a ration; and of parents 
consuming raw rations of supplementary food which was 
supposed to be taken home and reconstituted with water 
before being fed to the children. In an extreme 
situation, none of this behaviour is surprising. What is 
surprising is that NGOs should expect famine victims to 
treat their children with indulgence when they themselves 
are starving. 
of course, many staff of NGOs realised that the 
supplementary feeding of children in the absence of 
general ration distribution was difficult to enforce. 
This may be one of the reasons why they were so eager to 
take on a logistical role in the faminer hoping to 
contribute to general ration distribution despite being 
ill-equipped to do so in terms of skilled personnel and 
experience. There was also prestige attached to being 
seen to be in an expanding relief role. The NGOs began to 
import trucks, which were used to transport relief 
materials in relatively secure areas such as Wollo. 
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However, the complexities of trucking operations require 
more than well-meaning amateurs, bolstered with the odd 
professional. As Mitchell has noted: 
"High calibre staff were not readily available. It was 
noticeable, particularly in the early stages, that many 
relief workers lacked either technical competence, or 
experience, or both. Currently there still appears to be 
an image pinned to NGO staff as well-meaning but 
inexperienced volunteers doing their best under very 
difficult circumstances. On the basis of my observations 
in Wollo, this perspective is not without some 
foundation ...... (op cit p 58). 
With the dramatic expansion of their operations, and 
through venturing into new technical fields, many NGOs 
became overstretched and were unable to offer sufficient 
support to their field teams. This was particularly the 
case during the early stages of the operation. It is also 
an entirely normal feature of relief operations in sub- 
Saharan Africa given the present 'state of the art' of 
relief systems, which are characterised by a lack of 
skilled personnel, inappropriate policies, and poorly 
defined standard operating procedures (see, for example, 
IDS 1986). 
A variety of factors ensured that the NGO personnel in the 
camps operated under extreme and uncertain conditions. 
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Communications were hindered by their physical isolation 
and by restrictions on travel enforced by the Ethiopian 
authorities. Staff based in Addis Ababa could be cut-off 
from their field teams for days at a time. The constant 
tussle over the RRC distribution plan as opposed to 
rapidly changing needs in the rural hinterland ensured 
that supplies to the camps were erratic. These problems 
were compounded by the usual hold-ups with vehicle 
breakdowns and accidents, while spare parts would often be 
held up at the ports. Living and working conditions for 
relief workers were often extremely poor. Many camps were 
set up at, or just after mass starvation reached its peak. 
Consequently, large numbers of people had crowded into 
roadside centres in the hope of finding food. one of the 
worst was Bati, in eastern Wollo. Myles Harris describes 
conditions there in early 1985: 
"The entire floor of the valley had been covered in a mass 
of grey, ragged shapes which, indistinguishable at a 
distance from the mud-grey sand, became a sea of skeletons 
draped in grey sacking, hideous caricatures so bereft of 
flesh they seemed mere collections of triangles shrouded 
in cloth"... (Harris op cit p 192). 
As usual during famines, these concentrations of people 
facilitated the spread of infectious diseases such as 
shigellosis, typhoid, typhus, bacilliary dysentry, 
hepatitis, cerebro-spinal meningitis, malaria and cholera. 
The latter was officially refered to as 'infectious 
425 
diarrhoeal disease'. The authorities were unwilling to 
admit to having cholera in the country, as this affects 
agricultural exports. The disease appears to have broken 
out near Assaita in Wollo in November 1984, as a result-of 
Afar tribespeople drinking infected river water. It 
quickly spread throughout the province, so that by April 
every camp had experienced outbreaks. Cholera also 
reached the Sudanese camp populations by June, probably 
after having been transported across the border by 
Tigrayan famine migrants. The degree of success enjoyed 
by the NGOs in dealing with cholera outbreaks depended to 
a great extent upon their experience and consequent 
adequacy of preparations. Mitchell notes that "in 
general, outbreaks were reasonably well-contained; in 
Bulbullo camp for example, although approximately 50 
people were stricken, no deaths resulted. However, partly 
due to larger outbreaks, lack of experience and lack of 
preparation, camps at Lalibela and Kundi for example, 
experienced intense chaos and high death rates" (op cit p 
12). Further disease outbreaks included pneumonia and 
associated hypothermia, respiratory tract infections and 
relapsing fever where typhus was prevalent. All of these 
diseases contributed substantially to mortality amongst a 
population severely weakened by starvation. Mitchell's 
conservative estimate of deaths in Wollo is that between 
August 1984 and August 1985 "at least 40,000 people died 
in the camps and shelters" (op cit p 14). Seaman 
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(personal communication) estimates roadside deaths in 
Wollo over 1984-85 at a minimum of 50,000. To these 
estimates may be added REST's calculation that deaths in 
Tigray reached a peak of 1,500 a day in early 1985 (REST 
1985 p 4). 
Gradually, conditions in the camps improved as general 
ration distribution was undertaken and as survivors began 
to return to their homes. Figure 10.2 illustrates the 
progress made in Bati, where mortality rates fell from a 
peak of 8.7 per cent in November 1984 to 0.4 per cent by 
October 1985. Conditions had improved sufficiently for 
many NGOs substantially to reduce their feeding operations 
by the end of 1985, with the numbers of displaced people 
in the camps falling from 800,000 in March 1985 to 15,000 
in December (Jansson et al op cit p 64). In some camps, 
such as Korem, agencies were faced with the problem of 
rehabilitating families which had become institutionalised 
as a result of the feeding programmes and medical care. 
However, other groups such as the Afar were more than 
willing to return to their home areas. This was also true 
of Tigrayan farmers who returned in large numbers from 
Sudanese refugee camps in April 1985 to attempt farming 
once again. This latter group had been the victim of one 
of the most badly organised and reactive relief operations 
of the famine, which paradoxically had also been one of 
the most foreseeable. It is worth considering this case 
in detail as an example of agency inertia even under 
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political conditions apparently favourable to a relief 
operation. 
10.6. Aqencv Relief Operations on the Sudanese Border 
Sudan has been host to numerous refugee influxes from the 
various countries surrounding it. By the end of 1984, 
some 500,000 Ethiopians, 250,000 Ugandans, 120,000 
Chadeans and 5,000 Zaireans had sought asylum in the 
country. Although these refugees had arrived in large 
numbers over the past two decades or so, never before had 
actual inflows exceeded 30,000 or so over a short period 
of time. However, between October 1984 and March 1985 
almost 300r000 Ethiopians were to cross the Sudanese 
border in an unprecedented mass migration. Available 
resources were pitifully few to cope with the demand, and 
as a result levels of starvation, disease epidemics and 
mortality on the border were among the highest of the 
entire famine. 
As with the famine migration inside Ethiopia, this influx 
had long been predicted. Following the-influx of 
approximately 100,000 labourers over the harvest season of 
1983-84, there was a smaller migration of around, 30,000 
distressed men, women and children in the months up to 
March 1984. This migration had been expected (by agencies 
such as SCF and UNHCR) to be larger, and to gain momentum 
over the kremt season of June-September. Insteadr 
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although people continued to cross the border in steadily 
increasing numbers, the exponential leap in refugee 
arrivals was to occur much later, between November and 
December 1984. In early November, the rate of inflow was 
approximately 300 people a day. This jumped to around 
1,, 500 a day by the end of the month, and to 3,000 a day by 
late December. The flow was not steady,, but occurred in 
fits and starts. For example, during one day in December, 
as many as 16,000 refugees crossed the border. 
The exodus was partly organised by the Eritrean and 
Tigrayan Relief Organisations (ERA and REST). Eritreans 
had been fleeing the latest Ethiopian offensive; while 
Tigrayans were largely fleeing famine, being unwilling to 
throw themselves at the mercy of the Dergue, for fear of 
conscription or resettlement. Consequently, REST had 
already warned relief agencies of the imminent influx of 
up to 300,000 refugees. Although their'estimate was 
remarkably accurate, REST gave very little lead time. 
only two months or so elapsed before their prediction 
began to become alarmingly true. 
The major responsibility for providing relief for refugees 
in Sudan lies with the government's Commission of Refugees 
(COR). This in turn to a great extent is funded by the 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The 
latter organisation itself relies on bilateral and 
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multilateral donors for the bulk of its resources. Among 
these, the world Food Programme is notable in that it 
often undertakes to supply UNHCR with food. 
The Resident Representative of UNHCR, aware of the March 
1984 influx and of famine conditions on the Ethiopian 
plateau, prudently ordered 75,000 extra rations to arrive 
in February 1985. He also asked UNHCR headquarters in 
Geneva for the resources to set up two extra camps to 
assist with the growing flood of Ethiopian and Chadean 
migrants. The Geneva office responded by reducing his 
existing staff by two (Pearson 1986). 
A further complicating factor was the imminence of an 
almost complete harvest failure on the established refugee 
settlements, which were supposed to be moving towards 
self-sufficiency. WFP had in fact already fielded a team 
in November to assess ration requirements for the settled 
refugees over the coming year. The WFP team recommended 
half rations for some 56,000 refugees, but completely 
ignored the developing crisis caused by the new arrivals. 
This seems to have occurred partly because had the team 
paid heed to this emergency it would have meant exceeding 
the terms of reference for the mission; and partly because 
the WFP office in Khartoum, headed by a rather 
inexperienced individual, refused at this stage to 
acknowledge the potential scope of the crisis. When UNHCR 
belatedly recognised the needs of the newcomers, WFP 
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insisted on sending yet another needs assessment mission. 
This team was despatched to Sudan in January 1985, by 
which time well over 100,000 new arrivals had established 
themselves in makeshift camps. 
The major bilateral food donor in Sudan is USAID. This 
agency initially refused to become involved in feeding the 
eastern refugees, arguing that this was the job of the 
United Nations and the EEC (personal communication). 
USAID preferred to concentrate its efforts on propping up 
the shaky Nimi eri regime by feeding the urban poor in the 
restive province of Darfur, which was adjacent to Chad and 
Libya. In doing so, the USA was initially shipping 82,000 
tonnes of sorghum from Port Sudan to Khartoum, where much 
of the grain was to languish owing to internal 
transportation constraints. The route taken by the grain 
lorries passed the 30,000 starving Beja nomads who 
clustered along the highway outside Port Sudan (Cutler 
1986) and also passed close to the Ethiopian camps. 
Although conditions in western Sudan were very poor 
indeed, with mass migration already taking place, they 
were nothing like as bad as those actually being 
experienced by the Beja, Tigrayans and Eritreans. 
Later, the USA was to express a committment to funding an 
initiative to push food aid into Tigray via Sudan. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which was 
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heavily involved in supplying food to the Tigrayans,, was 
approached by USAID with the offer of 210 trucks to assist 
their operations. In February 1985, US Vice President 
George Bush visited the famine camps on the border, and 
further aid was promised. Like the trucks, this 
humanitarian assistance was not forthcoming. The EEC 
unofficially allowed some aid to be diverted, using an 
elaborate system to boost NGO operations elsewhere so that 
they could divert resources to the border. Howevery 
substantial delays arose from these transactions, so that 
as emergency aid the EEC contribution was slight (Gill 
op cit). Meanwhile, UNHCR mounted a last minute airlift, 
which cost $1.3 million to transport a meagre 320 tonnes 
of foodstuffs. Belatedly, USAID diverted a small portion 
of their supplies, while the ICRC diverted food earmarked 
for the cross-border operation into-the camps. As Pearson 
notes, "none of these sources were anywhere near enough 
and appalling scenes of starvation were witnessed on news 
programmes around the world as the media swooped to cover 
the story" (op cit p 29). The Refugee Policy Group 
emphasises this point by stating that: "overall, according 
to specialists from the Centre for Disease Control in the 
US, the east Sudan refugee situation during these months, 
(from December 1984 to April 1985) recorded the highest 
sustained death rates of any situation they had ever 
recorded" (RPG, undated, appendix 6, p 20)., The death 
toll over this period has been estimated from the same 
source at 10-15,000. 
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As usual, following the news coverage the NGOs scrambled 
to step up their response to the crisis, with predictable 
results. Teams were 'parachuted' into camps with 
virtually no back-up facilities. The strain on ill- 
prepared NGO country offices was extreme, and coincided 
with the expansion of relief operations elsewhere in 
Sudan. For example, the League of Red Cross Societies 
(LRCS) expanded their expatriate staff in Sudan from one 
in November 1984 to 300 within a year. Coordination 
within individual agencies under such conditions was 
extremely difficult, while coordination between agencies 
was virtually impossible. At the peak of the emergency, 
information on such basic variables as food stocks was 
lacking, and many agencies operated without reference to 
others. Pearson notes that "the jealousy with which 
UNHCR guarded the refugee camps from other UN agencies and 
even USAID led the US government to issue a series of 
complaints about UNHCR's conduct" (op cit p 30). The 
Sudanese Commission for Refugees (COR) was also highly 
secretive, and given to transfering large numbers of 
refugees from one camp to another without warning the NGOs 
assisting in those camps. Food supplies under the control 
of COR were highly erratic, and there were allegations of 
maldistribution by COR staff seeking to benefit from the 
inflow of foreign resources. 
Despite the considerable disadvantages of disorganisation 
and distance, the foreign agencies operating on the border 
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eventually brought the situation under control. Although 
cholera was to break out in May, news of outbreaks in 
Ethiopia had alerted several agencies to the risk, and in 
many cases staff were already prepared to tackle the 
outbreaks. Supplies of drugs and intravenous kits were 
also airfreighted to the scenes of the outbreaks. As a 
result of preparation, death rates from cholera were kept 
low, at under 2 percent of reported cases. As in 
Ethiopia, the Sudanese government refused to acknowledge 
the existence of the disease. 
10.7. Conclusion 
We can see from the above account that relief operations 
in Ethiopia and Sudan exhibited many similarities, despite 
the rather different political conditions obtaining in 
each country. In both cases the extent of the crisis was 
underestimated during the critical early stages. The 
political priorities of the USA, and to a lesser extent 
other western donors ensured that food aid was available 
in quantity only where it was considered politically 
expedient. Initially, this meant that western Sudan was 
protected. Later, when Ethiopia was being wooed (once the 
West had been forced systematically to respond to the 
famine) it became politically expedient to withdraw 
promises of support to the rebels. The Beja were of no 
strategic interest and were allowed to starve for nine 
months before NGO pressure and media publicity forced a 
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response from the food donors. 
Although the USA was largely disinterested in preventing 
famine on the border, despite carefully monitoring refugee 
flows by satellite and other means, it remained for the 
United Nations system to fail spectacularly to prepare for 
a foreseeable event. In this case, despite the attempts 
of UNHCR staff in Sudan to plan ahead, and despite belated 
requests from WFP for emergency aid, head office suspicion 
of the assessments of their own field staff ensured that 
there would be delays while missions were dispatched to 
view conditions for themselves. It is notable that head 
offices do not seem to believe information emanating from 
their own organisations, not to mention outside sources. 
They are of course subject to rather different political 
pressures, being closer to the donor agencies providing 
the resources requested. 
The NGOs are often first on the scene, but become quickly 
overwhelmed. Their ventures into territory of which they 
have little experience, notably the mass transportation of 
food, are costly and potentially damaging to their image, 
despite being undertaken partly in order to expand the 
agencies' influence and territory. A shortage of 
competent and well-paid staff, together with the 
inevitably long delays and shortages of fuel, spare parts 
etc. ensure that trucking operations are plagued with 
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difficulties. Several NGOs found that by the time they 
had ironed out these problems their truck fleets had 
become largely redundant, as the emergency was effectively 
over. However, NGOs may be reluctant to admit that their 
expensive investments are no longer needed, particularly 
given the need to justify them to the general public and 
government of the home country who have donated most of 
the funds. In the Sudanese case, the mass distribution of 
free food was continued on a scale damaging to the economy 
through its depressant effect on local markets for grain 
and for labour (Pearson op cit; Osborne et al 1986). NGOs 
are better organisers of their 'traditional' activities, 
such as relief camp management, although paradoxically 
their efforts are rendered rather fruitle. ss in the absence 
of general ration distribution. 
Where general ration distribution is in the hands of 
government, it will be used to suit the current aims of 
the State. It seems fairly clear, although some would 
testify otherwise, that the preferred strategy of the 
Ethiopian government is resettlement rather than 
rehabilitation of famine-affected populations from the 
north. In the south, villagisation seems to be the 
preferred goal, although as yet this process is in its 
early stages. However, it is planned to be extended over 
the whole country. To this endr the government 
continually insists that it is competent to distribute 
relief, and demands that all resources be channelled 
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through its official organs, notably the RRC. The latter 
is not as autonomous as may at first appear, and is 
generally subject to the orders of a 'higher authority'. 
As a result, bilateral food donors quietly divert as great 
a proportion of relief resources through 'their' 
organisations (NGOs staffed with donor country nationals) 
as possible. The longer the relief operation, the greater 
the proportion going to the non-governmental sector. 
Despite all of these difficulties, constraints and 
political manoueverings, the famine was eventually 
contained. The very late response ensured that there was 
great loss of life, although until a systematic study is 
carried out we will not be able to make proper estimates 
of the death toll. One could say with certainty, however, 
that the total will easily exceed the 200,000 thought to 
have died in the Wollo famine of 1973-74. It is further 
conceivable that the death toll would exceed half a 
million, if excess mortality over the period 1982-86 were 
to be taken into account, and this is Jansson Is personal 
estimate (op cit p 74). Meanwhile, the United Nations 
Emergency Operations office for Africa has gone on record 
as stating that more than a million people died in the 
famine. 
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Notes 
1 It is interesting to speculate as to why pop stars 
such as Bob Geldof and his supporters are so keen to 
get involved in fund-raising for famine relief 
activities. Pop musicians do have a history of fund 
raising through musical events, but Band Aid, Live Aid 
and the USA for Africa initiatives were the biggest- 
ever manifestations of musicians' endeavours on behalf 
of charity. They were very successful because the 
celebrities involved were able to attract huge 
audiences who would then respond to direct appeals for 
money. The television and radio media 
enthusiastically participated to promote their own 
interests as well as to make a genuine contribution to 
famine relief. 
Pop stars tend to be anti-establiphment figures with 
unconventional views. They are the products of a 
liberal western generation of the sixties, seventies 
and eighties which is often scornful of contemporary 
political behaviour and which views governments as 
having failed in many socio-economic fields. Events 
such as the Live Aid concert are opportunities to make 
statements about such failuresr but do not require the 
burdens of office. They tend not to recognise that 
the failure to respond to the Ethiopian famine may be 
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interpreted as successful foreign policy by a 
Conservative government. 
2 The Common Agricultural policy (CAP) exists to support 
EEC farmers against world-wide competition which would 
put a great many smaller farmers out of business if 
market forces were allowed their head. As a result, 
large surpluses are produced which can find no market 
unless sold at prices well below their cost of 
procurement, if not production. These surpluses are 
kept in storage in the hope that they will eventually 
find buyers at prices which will recoup their costs. 
This state of affairs has lead to discussion about 
whether the surpluses might be mobilised to 'feed the 
hungry". During famines, the use of food stocks for 
direct relief is obviously important and useful. 
However, the use of food aid for longer-term 
programmes is fraught with difficulties which have 
been widely discussed in the literature (e. g. Stevens 
1979; Jackson and Eade 1982). 
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Chapter 11 Summary and Conclusion 
11.1 Introduction 
In this thesis it has been argued that famine is a 
concatenation process caused by a severe shock to the 
economy which in turn leads to a series of socio-economic 
adjustments by the affected population. If the economic 
shock is sufficiently pronounced and prolonged, then the 
socio-economic adjustments fail for vulnerable sections of 
the population. Unless the State intervenes to prevent 
mass migration and mass starvation, famine ensues. 
In northern Ethiopia, severe shocks to the economy, in the 
form of rain failures, pest attacks and warfare frequently 
disrupt agricultural production, and sometimes lead to 
famine in an economy and society which is overwhelmingly 
dependent upon agriculture for its subsistence. These 
production failures in turn represent a failure of 
Ethiopian society to adapt sufficiently to changing 
demographic and climatological conditions. The underlying 
causes of famine are therefore multiple, involving social, 
economic, demographic and. technical factors. 
The failure of Ethiopian society to adapt sufficiently to 
changing agricultural production conditions has been 
explained historically. Excess extraction of surplus from 
the peasantry was, undertaken by a ruling class which 
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largely failed to reinvest its wealth in agriculture and 
industry. Therefore, the forces of production - both the 
infrastructure and capital requirements, and the technical 
means employed - tended to stagnate. This system remained 
largely unchanged until very recently. In 1974 the feudal 
order was overthrown and a transformation of the social 
structure took place. Yet the change did not reduce the 
risk of famine - it seems to have increased. 
By way of a conclusion then, it is useful to reconsider 
the factors causing the development of famine in Northern 
Ethiopia as belonging to three interlinked categories. 
The first category is concerned with the historical roots 
of famine, which can be discussed in terms of the overall 
political and social context both before and after the 
1974 revolution. The second category concerns the shocks 
to the economy, and the socio-economic responses to them, 
which precipitate famine. An example is provided by the 
1983-85 famine, which is our major case study. The third 
category concerns the response of the State to famine, and 
is again illustrated by experience from 1983 onwards. 
11.2 The Historical Roots of Famine 
It was shown in chapter 3 that famine is no stranger to 
northern Ethiopia, its incidence having been recorded as 
long ago as the 9th century. If anything, the incidence 
of recorded famine has actually increased over the latter 
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half of the 20th centuryr with hardly a year going by 
without an outbreak of famine somewhere in the north. 
Traditionally less-affected parts of the country, 
particularly in the south and west, are also increasingly 
coming under pressure. 
The roots of this high incidence of famine have been 
traced (in chapter 4) to the essentially feudal social 
system which reigned in Ethiopia for more than a 
millenium. Under the peculiar Ethiopian form of agrarian 
structure, many different types of land tenure could 
coexist. Essentially, however, the system was 
characterised by a ruling class of feudal lords and their 
intermediaries taxing the great majority of the produce of 
the poor peasantry. The latter became disinclined to 
labour to better their position, knowing that the bulk of 
the fruits of their effort would be removed by their 
superiors. Meanwhile, the peasantry itself remained 
highly conservative, jealously guarding its rights to 
cultivate land, even though these involved thorough 
exploitation. 
The church occupied much the same position as the 
landlords, owning large tracts of land'and further 
demanding a portion of every peasant's produce. At the 
same time, the church exhorted the masse s to fast 
frequently and to observe days upon which labouring was 
proscribed. 
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As a consequence of several factors, including: primitive 
production techniques and little development of 
alternatives; the lack of reinvestment of surplus in 
agricultural infrastructure; the depressant effects of the 
dictates of the church on peasant productivity; and the 
demands of army provisioning on peasant produce, the 
agricultural system became ever less resistant to periodic 
production failures through rain failures, pest attacks 
and warfare. Unless work and food was available in 
adjacent districts, or unless the local elite had the 
resources and the compassion to distribute food to the 
starving, famine would often ensue. 
The slow process of modernisation of the State, begun 
under Emperor Menelik II in the late 19th century, 
following the first steps towards unifying Ethiopia under 
his predecessor, Emperor Tewodoros, did little to alter 
the underlying structures of feudal society. Although 
roads and railways were constructed, and modern banking, 
postal and administrative services introduced, the feudal 
power structure remained intact. Under Heile Selassie, a 
parliament was set up, and a modest amount of capitalist 
development of industry and agriculture took place. Yet 
this form of modernisation was funded partly in the 
traditional manner, with surpluses extracted from the 
peasantry. Foreign investors also found a ready welcome 
in Ethiopia, but confined their efforts mostly to export 
crop production, in a few areas. Capitalist development of 
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agriculture was not widespread geographically, but where 
it took place poor peasants and pastoralists became 
swiftly marginalised and more vulnerable to famine as they 
were denied access to land which they had traditionally 
cultivated or used for grazing. This was particularly the 
case in the Awash valley. At the same time, the large 
plantations which had been developed offered extra 
seasonal employment to poor highland peasants, thereby 
reducing their vulnerability to famine. Consequently# 
capitalist development of agriculture had both beneficial 
and adverse effects on the impact of famine on the 
peasantry. 
Heile Selassie's government was eventually overthrown in a 
creeping coup which lasted some six months. The 160-man 
military committee which took power was reduced by two- 
thirds as a result of internecine warfare over the next 
few years. Bloody faction-fighting and an invasion by 
Somalia ensured that stability did not return to urban 
areas until the end of the decade. Meanwhile, large 
tracts of the rural north, particularly in Eritrea and 
Tigray, remain contested by rebel forces which have 
themselves undergone a similar process of internecine 
warfare. Now the situation has stabilised, with both 
government and the rebel opposition internally cohesive, 
but with neither side gaining any lasting advantage over 
the other. 
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Consequently, warfare is endemic to northern Ethiopia. Its 
direct effects on agricultural production are limited, but 
its effects on trade are serious. It has become extremely 
difficult for traders to move large quantities of grain 
from one part of the country to another. These 
difficulties are compounded by government restrictions on 
trade, which are rigorously enforced in the formal sector. 
er The government of Ethiopia (and its rebel adversies), is 
now embarked upon a development path modelled on Marxist- 
Leninism. The particular interpretation of Marxist- 
Leninism chosen by the Ethiopian government closely 
resembles that developed by Stalin. Neo-Stalinist 
techniques, including force exerted through a strongly- 
centralised and rigidly hierarchical political structure, 
are currently being used to coerce a recalcitrant 
peasantry into adopting collectivised forms of 
agriculture. Although land reforms aimed at removing the 
priviliges of the feudal ruling class and establishing 
security of, tenure on peasants' landholdings initially 
proved popular with the majority of the rural populacer 
before long rural taxation levels had crept back to, or 
even had exceeded those of the pre-revolutionary period. 
Consequently, there remains a substantial degree of 
political alienation of the rural masses from the urban 
elite. 
Although both the official and rebel governments are 
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making attempts at agricultural rehabilitation and 
development through afforestation programmes, terracing 
etc., there is little prospect - given the enormity of the 
task and the poverty of material resources with which to 
tackle it - of a rapid transformation of the forces of 
production. As a result, the peasantry remains vulnerable 
to crop failures. The recent extent of these, and the 
coping mechanisms employed by the peasantry in attempting 
to adapt to them, are summarised in the next section. 
11.3 Crop Production Failures and Peasant Responses 
The official agricultural statistics analysed in chapter 5 
have produced some puzzling anomalies. Although, given 
the persistence of famine in various parts of Ethiopia 
over the last quarter century one might expect per caput 
agricultural production figures to register a downward 
trend, they have in fact shown a slight upward increase 
over the period 1960-84. At the same time, yields appear 
to have increased and land area under cultivation appears 
to have decreased, instead of the opposite trends one 
would perhaps have expected. While these trends conceal 
considerable inter-regional differences; and while there 
is also a great deal of fluctuation in the record of 
production over time; a case could be made for food 
availability as a whole having had little bearing on the 
incidence of famine. Even allowing for population growthr 
agricultural growth rates appear to have been sufficient 
to ensure an adequate diet for all, were. the food 
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distributed equally. However, local production losses are 
often very severe, although affecting national production 
figures less dramatically. This would appear to bear out 
Sen's general thesis that famines often take place in the 
presence of an adequate food availability "balance sheet". 
Nevertheless, in chapter 5 it is demonstrated that recent 
famines have taken place when food availability per caput 
was historically at very low levels, as during 1977 and 
1984, for example. 
The production failures of the early-mid 1980s do seem to 
have been exceptionally severe. It has been shown in 
chapter 6 that rain failures, including poorly distributed 
rainfall, hailstorms and floods, as well as meteorological 
drought caused sustained crop failures across large tracts 
of the north from 1980-81 until late 1984. As a 
consequence, as we have seen in chapter 7, the price of 
grain rose rapidly, demonstrating a geographical "price 
ripple" effect as crop failures spread and as more and 
more peasants were forced onto the market to purchase 
food. During the early stages of famine, high grain 
prices of both preferred and inferior grains were a 
feature only of central Tigray and, northern Wollo. By 
late 1984, massive grain price inflation was evident right 
across the north, and had affected urban markets as well 
as remote rural locations. only a combination of good 
harvests and the influx of large quantities of food aid 
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could bring grain prices back down to approach pre-famine 
levels, in late 1985 and early 1986. 
Peasant responses to crop failures included a number of 
strategies aimed at generating extra cash with which to 
purchase dwindling local supplies of food. Among these 
strategies were labour migration to better-favoured areas, 
sale of livestock, and borrowing. Many victims were 
forced to consume unpalatable famine foods, having 
exhausted their meagre resources through asset sales. The 
latter led to a collapse of prices of livestock and 
household goods being offered for sale. Prices of goods 
10-20 per cent 
10ý 
the norm were commonplace during the 
final stages of famine, and some assets were simply 
unsaleable in glutted markets. 
Although most peasants suffered losses, there were 
differences in the ability of richer and poorer peasants 
to withstand the effects of crop failures. We have seen 
from chapter 8 that richer peasants tended to sell oxen 
later in the famine process, and had greater access to 
credit. Meanwhile, traders who were able to purchase 
assets at distress prices could then re-sell them in more 
prosperous regions, or even in their area of origin after 
the famine was over. This was particularly the case with 
livestock, with beasts such as oxen selling for as much as 
ten times their famine prices a year later, during the 
period of agricultural rehabilitation. 
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The above strategies were to become exhausted for hundreds 
of thousands of poor peasants, and even for some 
previously wealthy households. Mass distress migration of 
destitutes to famine camps began as early as December 
1982, but snowballed only from mid-1984 onwards, as most 
of Wollo and Tigray suffered catastrophic crop failures. 
By the close of 1984, some one million people had been 
displaced, and an unknown number had starved to death. 
More deaths were to arise in the overcrowded and 
undersupplied camps during 1985. This was a direct result 
of the failure of both the Ethiopian government and the 
international famine relief agencies to prepare for a 
foreseeable event. The reasons for this failure are 
summarised in the next section. 
11.4 Response to the Famine 
It has been argued in chapter 1, and reiterated in chapter 
9, that ultimately famine control is the responsibility of 
the State, and that feeding rural people has never been a 
priority of the Ethiopian government, whether before or 
after the revolution. Nevertheless, the present 
government gave an outward appearance of concern, having 
set up a "Relief and Rehabilitation Commission" to plan 
and implement famine relief. This body was not, however, 
given sufficient resources to carry out. its task. The 
regime prefered to spend scarce foreign exchangey which 
could have been used for the importation of relief food, 
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on warfare and on celebrating the tenth anniversary of the 
revolution, held by an unfortunate coincidence during the 
height of famine in September 1984. only when the 
celebrations were over, and the foreign media alerted to 
the mass starvation in the north, did the regime take 
serious steps to contain the famine. It did so partly in 
response to international opinion, and partly in an effort 
to monopolise as much of the incoming resources as 
possible, which it could then redirect towards its own 
ends. These were to include forced or coerced 
resettlement, in line with its neo-Stalinist approach to 
peasant agriculture, and the support of key groups loyal 
to the regime, such as townspeople in Addis Ababa, and 
militia in Eritrea. The evidence for this behaviour has 
been reviewed in chapter 10, showing that food aid under 
the control of government was not directed to the various 
regions of Ethiopia on the grounds of need. Furthermore, 
food aid was witheld from famine-affected populations 
during 1985 in an attempt to induce starving peasants to 
"volunteer" for resettlement. 
Meanwhile, the international humanitarian organisations 
had their own political agendas which dictated their 
response to the famine. Governments controlling the 
lion's share of the available surplus food aid were 
unwilling to support a Marxist government allied to the 
USSR, unless strategic concessions were to be made. 
Inter-governmental agencies were fearful of upsetting 
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I 
their patrons, and hesitated to publicise legitimate fears 
of famine in an unpopular country. Charities suffered 
from tunnel vision, being unaware of the spread of famine 
except in the tiny project areas in which they worked, and 
lacking the courage and cohesion to challenge the power of 
governments. 
It has been argued that media coverage of the famine in 
October 1984 was the critical factor creating a response 
commensurate with the size of the famine. The reasons why 
this occured are considered below, in the context of a 
general model of response to famine, which may be used to 
clarify the arguments presented in chapters 9 and 10. The 
model is illustrated in table 11.1. 
The response to famine on 441z-fvrt' of the international 
controllers of food surpluses available for relief 
purposes is conditioned by their perceptions of risk. If 
individual decision-makers feel that it is risky to their 
organisations, and hence to their careers, to seek pre- 
emptive famine relief-for a country unpopular with the 
Western donors,, then they, will avoid responsibility for 
doing so, and will not act. Various "escape hatches" can 
be, used to avoidýresponsibility, including claiming that 
the organisation's mandate does not cover this particular 
situation; or that head office has already been informed 
and is already dealing with the problem; or that the 
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Table 11.1 Donor Agency Decision-Making under Different 
Conditions of Risk 
A. Risky 
overall political situation unfavourable to 
government requesting aid. 
High degree of career risks for individuals 
making decisions in favour of famine control, 
which are in any case likely to be blocked 
or severely curtailed at a higher level. 
Unwillingness of agency officials to perceive a famine 
and avoidance of responsibility through recourse to 
"escape hatchesm including: 
mandate of organisation 
(ii) standard operating procedures 
(iii) centralisation of responsibility 
Reactive famine management - perception of a problem only 
when mass migration occurs to camps and other centres. 
B. Non-risky 
Institutional response seen by top agency decision-makers 
as politically imperative. 
Appearance of concerted responsible action through the 
establishment of committees ("task forces") to plant 
monitor and coordinate relief programmes. These also serve 
to gain control over extra resources being made available 
by government and the general public. 
Offloading of actual responsibility 
onto other organisations or branch 
organisation. 
for implementation 
offices of the parent 
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Table 11.1 (cont. ) 
Forward planning begins, but is undermined by forces 
causing reactive management, including: 
host government's political goals 
(ii) problems of forecasting agricultural conditions 
(iii) rivalry among implementing agencies 
Perceptual problems in ending famine relief operation, as 
this now involves political risk. oversupply of aid, 
especially foodstuffs, distorts and damages local 
economies in some cases. 
Establishment of a permanent relief operation leads to the 
institutionalisation of aid and a paradigm shift in 
methodologies for targetting aid. Currently this includes 
the adoption of socio-economic indicators as well as 
anthropometry. 
Gradual dismantling of relief operat. ions as the public 
furore dies down and the agencies run out of money. 
Return to normal agency activities and operating 
conditions. Political-risk grows again as the famine 
passes into history. 
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government of the famine-affected country has not declared 
an emergency. Other escape routes can be created to suit 
the situation. Only when there is unambiguous needr as 
when famine victims are force to migrate and starve 
publicly, will these agency decision-makers respond. The 
response is necessarily reactive, and therefore late, 
leading unavoidably to deaths among the displaced victims. 
When the famine becomes public, and when it is seen to be 
sufficiently widespread and horrific in its effects, it is 
likely to become a serious object of scrutiny by the 
Western news media. If this scrutiny is sufficiently 
well-presented, as was the Amin-Burke television coverage 
of Korem in October 1984, then it will engender a 
sympathetic international public response to the plight of 
the victims. The famine now becomes a political issue, 
and one which must be immediately addressed by the Western 
governments and the agencies sponsored by them. The risk 
profile is reversed, and it becomes risky for agencies not 
to react, or at least be seen to be reacting. 
The underlying distaste for the unpopular regime remains 
with Western governments, being forced by public opinion 
to go against their perceived strategic interests. Hence 
the need for dramatic displays of action - task forces are 
set up, new offices arise, airlifts and food shipments 
take place. Development aid is not to be forthcoming, 
however, as this is long-term, expensive, and potentially 
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useful to the recipient nation. Ethiopia is, after all, a 
subject of an official embargo on development aid in the 
USA, traditionally the largest provider of famine relief 
and development aid. 
The NGOs, meanwhile, have benefited enormously from the 
famine. Their prestige has risen and their coffers are 
filled with the results of public generosity. Vying for 
resources, they rush to involve themselves in famine 
relief, competing with their peers for the favours of 
donors. The latter are more than willing to subcontract 
their aid to the NGOS, solving onerous logistical problems 
and satisfying the need to avoid responsibility for 
implementation at a stroke. 
The NGOs rapidly build up infrastructures and see 
opportunities for development projects, turning to their 
constituents and the donors for support. Unfortunately, 
the famine is now fading from public consciousness with 
the return of good harvests, and the political impetus 
behind the aid programme is dwindling. The risk profile 
is changing back to its original state, although for a 
while IGOs and donors are sensitive to a resurgence of 
famine, being unwilling to be publicly embarrassed once 
I again by a foreseeable event. There is a degree of 
nervousness among relief agencies over the following few 
seasonsr and they tend to overdramatise relatively minor 
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harvest failures. In countries popular with the donors? 
such as Sudan, too much aid may be delivered, causing 
disruption to indigenous markets for food and labour. 
However, eventually the relief operation runs down, and 
the-famine is largely forgotten. 
11.5 Future Prospects for Famine Control in Ethiopia 
It seems cle'ar from the arguments and evidence advanced in 
this thesis that there is little prospect of an end to 
famine in Ethiopia in the foreseeable future - let us 
say over the next two to three decades. The underlying 
causes of famine have not changed, and neither will the 
international response to famine change unless there is a 
strategic re-alignment between Ethiopia and the West. 
There are not currently many signs of this occurring, 
although the volatility of politics in the Horn of Africa 
makes prediction difficult. 
Any positive steps that are to-be taken must come from the 
government of Ethiopia or its sponsors. A pre-condition 
for famine control and agricultural development in the 
north is peace, and again there seems to be little 
prospect of negotiations occurring without the 
intervention of the superpowers - the USA and the USSR. 
Currently, there are no signs of such an undertaking, 
although recent progress on arms control might produce a 
degree of optimism which was not called for during the 
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great famine of the 1980s. 
If there is not to be peace, and given that the northern 
wars have reached a position of stalemate, there might be 
grounds for considering that the policies of the 
government would be able to deal with famine in those 
areas where it does hold sway. These policies include 
controls on trade; infrastructural development through 
organising labour; and resettlement and villagisation, 
which promote collectivised forms of agriculture. The 
actual and potential results of such policies are 
considered below. 
The government has shown few signs of wishing to abandon 
controls on inter-regional trade. These were instrumental 
in assisting the spread of famine. Traders in the formal 
sector could not respond to market signals in the famine 
areas, neither was there much surplus grain available 
internally by 1984. The informal sector did respond, as 
we have seen in chapter 8, with peasants themselves 
turning to trading in an effort to secure a livelihood. 
However, the difficulties of transporting grain by pack 
animal in war zones ensured that large quantities could 
not be moved. The government prefers to transport grain 
under its own auspices, to feed people according to its 
own priorities. 
Infrastructural development through mobilising labour in 
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the Peasant Associations does hold promise, in that it is 
a genuine attempt at dealing with pressing problems of 
soil erosion and declining soil fertility, principally 
through terracing, afforestation and water control. Such 
initiatives are also enthusiastically pursued in areas 
under the control of the rebels, and in both cases the 
results have been impressive. However, there has been no 
substantial breakthrough in the promotion of more 
intensive methods of agriculture - no "green revolution" 
such as has occurred in parts of Asia and Latin America. 
This is. unlikely unless substantial sums are committed to 
agricultural research and extension. Furthermore, it is 
precisely those areas which are most vulnerable to famine 
which are least likely to benefit from agricultural 
research and investment. The government, like others 
elsewhere, prefers to target available resources at the 
zones which are likely to be most productive. This is 
also the recommended strategy of the World Bank and other 
large western IGOs. The NGOs can be persuaded to invest 
in marginal zones, and are already doing so, but lack the 
resources to make much of an impact. 
Resettlement has been justified as a necessary, if 
regrettable measure, even when forced. Commentators 
subscribing to this view (e. g. Timberlake 1985; Hancock 
1985) believe that the ecological degradation of the 
northern highlands is so advanced that only mass 
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depopulation can give the land time to recover. Howevery 
this view ignores several important factors. In the first 
place, with population growth at an estimated rate of 
close to 3 per cent per annum, the highland population 
remaining behind will rapidly expand to take the place of 
the migrants. Secondly, little is known of the ecology of 
the lowland areas to which the majority of the settlers 
are being taken, although it is usually the case that 
lowland soils are generally less hardy and less fertile 
than those in the highlands. With deforestation they are 
likely to quickly become leached. A situation could 
rapidly develop where the resettlement sites become 
overpopulated in relation to the available resource base. 
This problem would be compounded by the lack of producer 
incentives inherent in state-organised cooperative 
farming, which has a poor record of productivity. 
The latter situation has in turn arisen partly because 
production on resettlement schemes is organised 
communally, and is likely to be resisted by peasants who 
see it as reducing income incentives for individuals, 
while going against highland traditions; and partly 
because the produce is sold to the AMC at fixed prices, 
which are typically lower than those obtaining on the free 
market. 
A third factor which does not seem to have been properly 
considered by the proponents of resettlement is the cost. 
Although cost-benefit studies have not been carried out, 
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it seems reasonable to suggest that investment in soil 
conservation and improved cultivation practices in the 
eroded highlands would be more cost-effective even than 
well-organised resettlement. Certainly the Institute of 
Development Research at Addis Ababa University has 
discovered that such schemes as the Wollo agricultural 
rehabilitation programme, which involves terracing and 
tree-planting, paid for on a food-for-work basis, are 
acceptable to the peasantry and do not appear to damage 
the local grain trade (Yeraswerk and Solomon 1985). This 
experience contrasts with the failure of even well-planned 
and well-supported agricultural settlements studied by the 
Institute to reach self sufficiency after a decade or 
so (IDR 1986). 
It is doubtful, therefore, that resettlement is really 
seen by the Ethiopian government as an optimum economic 
solution, although there may be a lingering fascination 
with the potential achievements of 'scientific socialism'. 
Its motivation is primarily political and institutional. 
The State may recognise that communal farming will reduce 
the available agricultural surplus, but this is of lesser 
concern than the need for the State to control the 
available surplus and the farmers producing it. Thus a 
Stalinist agricultural strategy is being introduced, both 
through resettlement and its corollary, villagisation. 
Apart from the attraction of control over agricultural 
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surpluses and the development process, this strategy 
offers the added benefit of the movement of peoples to 
fragment ethnic discontents and to weaken the support base 
of the various liberation fronts. The enforced movement 
of people will facilitate social and economic control, 
especially if carried out in an incremental fashion. 
However, the enforced migration of northern highlanders to 
the southern lowlands recalls the great imperial expansion 
under Menelik II, and is likely to result in a stiffening 
of resistance among the slowly awakening Oromo. with 
almost half of the population of the modern Ethiopian 
empire, the Oromo are potentially potent enemies of the 
Amhara-dominated Dergue. 
Famine will continue to plague Ethiopia, particularly in 
the north, where conditions are optimal for its 
resurgence. It is also likely to spread southwards and 
westwards into the newly settled areas as socialist 
agriculture fails to produce sufficient surpluses. The 
next famine will develop much according to the 
concatenation process outlined in this thesis, unless 
there is an extraordinary change in climatological 
conditions. Agricultural production will continue to be 
disrupted, and peasant responses to crop failures will be 
much the same as always. The only possible changes are 
likely to be a greater expectation among the peasantry for 
food aid from the relief system, perhaps leading to 
earlier migration to established feeding centres; and 
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greater sensitivity towards the threat of famine from IGOs 
and NGOs. Western governments will remain fundamentally 
unwilling to invest in a permanent food security system 
and agricultural development schemes in a State which 
remains a client of the USSR. 
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APPEND17K 
Household Mmbers 
Nwie 
1. 
[- 
FMINE MICRANTIS QJESTICNNAIRE 
Household Nunber Date Location 
Age Sex Relationship 
2. 
3. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
S. 
Deceased (relationsh! D. aze. sex. date died. cause of death. disease historv) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
475 
.I -W- ---. 
I. -1. .I.... 
0 
Place of Origin (name, wereda, awraja) 
Date began to migrate 
Route taken 
(include lengthy periods of stay) 
Date of arrival here 
Who told you this was a good place to care? 
Landholding, original farm (other In brackets): 
Location 
a) Yield/good year 
-b) Yield/last harvest 
0 Yield/previous yr. 
a) barley (gebs) 
b) 
0 
a) maize (bokolo) 
b) 
C) 
a) sorghun (zengada) 
b) 
C) 
a) red sorghum 
b) 
C) 
a) field peas (atter) 
b) 
C) 
Dega Weyna Dega Quolla 
ff 
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I 
Dega Weyna Dega Quolla 
1. How MUch grain do you need to feed your family? (pre-drought) 
a) field beans (bakella) 
b) 
C), 7- -,, - 
a) chick peas (shin-bera) 
b) 
C) 
a) lentils (misseb) 
b) 
C) 
a) niger seed (nug) 
b) 
C) 
a) flax (talba) 
b) 
C) 
a) other (narne) 
b) 
C) 
2. Vhen was your last good year 
Grain Prices: Good year Place 
pre mher post meher kremt belg 
bsbsbs 
Tef f 
SorghLrn 
%eat 
Nhize 
Bar I ey 
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d, 
6 
La"-yea-r--farrned (dat --15T-aE-e 
pre ffeher post meher belg krernt 
b5b5bsbs 
Tef f 
Sorghtin 
Viheat 
hialze 
Bar I ey 
Alternative Kiarkets 
Teff 
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%eat 
Nhize 
Barley 
Previous year 
Teff 
Sorghtxn 
%eat 
Barley 
ý&ize 
Plac 
Place 
3a. Uen did grain prices rise? 
3b. Shen was the peak of grain prices? 
3. Uen did you/others last get vvork? 
Householdmember Employer Location Month Task Wage/day No. days 
1.1 
11111r 
2. 
3. 
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A 
I-- 
Agricultural wages: 
(daily rate) 
Task Ploughing 
Sawing 
Weeding 
Harvesting 
Threshing 
Food for Work 
(megeb le Sera) 
(name task) 
Other vmrk (narne task) 
4. Uen did out-migrants leave/return? Cut Back 
Livestock holdings (last good year): 
Type Size (b, m, s) No. Value pre-drought Died Price when sold Date sold 
Cxen 
Cows 
Horses 
Miles 
CZTIel III 
Sheep 
Goats 
Chickens 
5. Uat else did you sell? 
Asset No. Price realized Date sold Buyer 
479 
Good year This year Last year 
6. Did you borrow money? 
Creditor Anount Interest rate Date borrowed Ariount returned/when 
Did you yet any free help/interest free loans? 
mmun x aource Lill Ie Comments I 
-. -- 
-I 
S. Did you mortgage rights to land? 
Arount realized Buyer Date Terms of transaction 
Has anyone previously living with you stayed behind? 
arne Aze Relationship Lodged with: 
10. Aho is looking after your remaining assets? 
Grain prices on journey: 
Type Price Place Date 
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Livestock prices on journey (b/m/s): 
Tvno- Price Place Date Buyer 
12. How did the wsr affect you? 
13. How has the yovermient helped you? 
Cxnrien ts 
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VV ! 
11. %at wild foods did you eat/when? 
